United Nations S/PV.3486

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3486th Meeting
Friday, 6 January 1995, 12.45 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Cárdenas	(Argentina)
Members:	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Li Zhaoxing
	Czech Republic	Mr. Rovensky
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Henze
	Honduras	Mr. Martinez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Ayewah
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Sidorov
	Rwanda	Mr. Munyampeta
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mr. Gnehm

Agenda

The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

95-85004 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 12.45 p.m.

Expression of welcome to the new members of the Security Council and of thanks to the outgoing members of the Security Council

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): As this is the first meeting of the Security Council to be held this year, I should like to welcome the new members of the Council: Botswana, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia and Italy. We all look forward with confidence to their participation in the work of the Council, which will be of invaluable assistance in the discharge of the Council's enormous responsibilities as it tackles so many challenges.

I should also like to express the Council's gratitude to the outgoing members for their important contributions to the Council's work. The representatives of Brazil, Djibouti, New Zealand, Pakistan and Spain all, in an excellent manner, contributed their talents to the conduct of the business of the Council.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should also like to pay a tribute to my predecessor, Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa of Rwanda, for the service he rendered as President of the Council during the month of December 1994. I express my deep appreciation to Ambassador Bakuramutsa for the skilful manner in which he conducted the Council's business last month.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey (Bosnia and Herzegovina) took a place at the Council table.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have received photocopies of a letter dated 6 January 1995 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, which will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/1995/8.

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following other documents: S/1994/1389, report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 959 (1994); and S/1994/1452, letter dated 27 December 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

> "The Security Council welcomes the agreements between the Bosnian parties on a cease-fire and on a complete cessation of hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded on 23 December 1994 and 31 December 1994 respectively (S/1995/8). It commends the efforts of all who worked to achieve them.
>
> "The Security Council stresses the importance it attaches to immediate and full compliance with the agreements. It attaches the highest priority at this juncture to the timely completion of the various steps envisaged in the agreement on a complete cessation of hostilities. It looks to the parties and others concerned to cooperate fully with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in their implementation. The Security Council calls upon all forces to cease fighting around Bihac. It supports efforts in train to strengthen UNPROFOR, and encourages Member States to make available the personnel and equipment needed for UNPROFOR to supervise and monitor the agreements.

"The Security Council will continue its consideration of all aspects of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Secretary-General's report of 1 December 1994 (S/1994/1389).

"The Security Council deems it imperative to intensify efforts under the auspices of the Contact Group to achieve an overall settlement on the basis of the acceptance of the peace plan of the Contact Group as a starting point. It will give its full support to such efforts".

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/1995/1.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3487

Security Council
Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3487th Meeting
Thursday, 12 January 1995, 3.30 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Cárdenas	(Argentina)
Members:	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Wang Xuexian
	Czech Republic	Mr. Kovanda
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Graf Zu Rantzau
	Honduras	Mr. Martinez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Martino
	Nigeria	Mr. Ayewah
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda	Mr. Munyampeta
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mrs. Albright

Agenda

The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Letter dated 4 January 1995 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/6)

95-85010 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 5.10 p.m.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like at the outset of the meeting to apologize to everyone for the delay in starting the meeting, and to acknowledge the presence at the Council table of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, His Excellency Mr. Antonio Martino. On behalf of the Council, I extend a warm welcome to him.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Letter dated 4 January 1995 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/6)

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Mr. Nobilo (Croatia) took places at the Council table; Mr. Elaraby (Egypt), Mr. Thanarajasingam (Malaysia), Mr. Marker (Pakistan) and Mr. Batu (Turkey) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have received a request dated 12 January 1995 from Ambassador Dragomir Djokic to address the Council. With the consent of the Council, I would propose to invite him to address the Council in the course of the discussion of the item before it.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the letter dated 4 January 1995 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, document S/1995/6.

Members of the Council also have before them document S/1995/21, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Members of the Security Council have received copies of a letter dated 11 January 1995 addressed by the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations, in which he transmits a note by the Contact Group of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The letter and its annex will be issued as Security Council document S/1995/30.

The first speaker is the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on whom I now call.

Mr. Sacirbey (Bosnia and Herzegovina): First, Mr. President, let me welcome you to your new position, and extend to you our warmest wishes for a successful month and our full cooperation in the endeavours of the Security Council under your leadership. Let me also acknowledge the capable and faithful commitment of the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the position of the President of the Security Council for the previous month, and let me finally acknowledge the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, a country that is a neighbour and friend of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and welcome him to this Chamber.

The Security Council has before it a draft resolution, contained in document S/1995/21, to extend for another hundred days the easing of sanctions methodology adopted under resolution 943 (1994), of 23 September 1994, with respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

The lessons of the last one hundred days compel us not to repeat the same mistakes, for none of the stated objectives behind resolution 943 (1994) have been realized.

At the same time, unfortunately, resolution 943 (1994) has set in motion a course that today is most difficult to reverse. Our attempt will be not to acquiesce in this course, or the mistakes, but to maximize what can be salvaged from what is clearly an effort that is quickly taking on water.

Resolution 943 (1994) was adopted, by less than a unanimous vote, to achieve at least the following stated goals:

First, to encourage the so-called Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group peace plan by rewarding the Belgrade regime for perceived steps to cut off and further isolate the so-called Bosnian or Pale Serbs.

Secondly, to limit the resources available to the so-called Bosnian Serbs to continue their military campaigns and aggression in lieu of accepting this peace.

Thirdly, to encourage the Belgrade regime to take further steps to create an environment suitable for a durable and just peace and reverse the consequences of Belgrade's pivotal role as an aggressor against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I am afraid that we can all agree that none of those objectives have been realized. In fact, on the contrary, there is evidence that there are counter-productive consequences. The reasons for this are many.

Certainly, we can argue that the motivations of some who supported resolution 943 (1994), and, most importantly, the methodology established under it, were not consistent with the stated goals and objectives.

The mechanisms established pursuant to resolution 943 (1994) to monitor the border and implement the resolutions's stated objectives were flawed and inadequate from their inception. These established mechanisms ensured compliance by their inadequacy to witness and report non-compliance.

As a consequence, the Belgrade regime could usurp over-extended international observers to continue to echo its claim of no responsibility, while in fact continuing to fuel the fire that it had started in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the way, I do not use the word "fuel" here just as an analogy. It was the very fuel transported under the blind supervision of the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) that allowed the allied so-called Croatian and Bosnian Serbs to carry out their aggression against the Bihac region, occupy its safe area and cause danger, suffering and even death to United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel.

Effectively, a Security Council resolution has been hijacked to subvert its own stated objectives, to undermine other Security Council resolutions and mandates and to endanger the security of United Nations personnel.

None the less, we do not wish to associate only negative and subversive motives to resolution 943 (1994), for we believe that many who supported its adoption did so sincerely.

It is in this spirit that we welcome the elements of the draft resolution that are designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the border monitoring mission and its reporting methodology.

We also welcome the most obvious — but apparently not to all — clarification requiring that any transshipment of goods or personnel through or to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia requires the approval of their respective Governments. This would appear to be a most basic element of respect for international law, but apparently not for those who have placed their persona above the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the two Republics as well as the authority of the Security Council's resolutions, in particular resolution 820 (1993).

With respect to the language in the draft resolution, we would like to clarify that our Republic concurs with all shipments of essential humanitarian supplies consistent with our territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Unfortunately, though, our endorsement of the changes and improvements on resolution 943 (1994) must be tempered by the following factors.

First, can the methodology of border monitoring — or, more accurately, reporting on border monitoring — be corrected, if in fact, there is a most basic design flaw?

Although we can endorse the stated objectives behind the resolution, we must continue to question its application.

Therefore, we recommend that the next time the methodology comes before the Council for review — on or before 21 April 1995 — the Council should establish a new methodology that: first, no longer monitors the Serbians that are supposed to be monitoring the border, but actually monitors the border; secondly, provides the international monitoring force with adequate resources and manpower, certainly more than the couple of hundred people now lightly equipped to actually observe a border of approximately 500 kilometres; and, thirdly, is properly delegated under an appropriate command structure and authority consistent with a mandate designed to truly seal or monitor the border.

The current methodology established to deter violations of the Bosnian border with Serbia is nonsensical. It is analogous to allowing the rats to guard the cheese from the mice while a near-sighted cat is asked to report as to how much cheese is being taken and who is stealing it. The logic of this methodology only becomes clear once we understand that it is the rat who is dictating the terms to provide an alibi and demonstrate his innocence. Although the effectively blind cat can even smell the cheese on the rat's breath, it cannot report that it has actually seen the rat stealing the cheese.

The Security Council really should not be brought to the level of being dictated to by the rat, who has already even admitted previous treachery, and it can certainly afford to ensure that the cat at least has glasses.

Secondly, the Security Council cannot continue 100 days hereafter to further reward the Belgrade regime with another easing of sanctions, unless the Belgrade regime takes the most basic step to start to reverse the perverse ideology of a Greater Serbia, which it has initiated and still nurtures.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should not be allowed in the future to benefit from the self-serving claim that it is promoting peace with its neighbours until it recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbours — the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the other former Yugoslav Republics.

Failure to recognize its neighbours and continue the status quo indefinitely allows the Belgrade regime to plead one case to the international audience, but, in fact, to maintain its ultra-nationalist credentials and still fuel the vision of a Greater Serbia.

Finally, the overall peace process that is in theory to be supported by the draft resolution is moribund as long as the so-called Croatian Serbs continue to conduct cross-border aggression against, and to occupy parts of, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Bihac region. This violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been directly facilitated by the misuse of resolution 943 (1994) and the delusions that led to its adoption.

The so-called Croatian and Bosnian Serbs could not have executed their coordinated assault against the Bihac safe area and region without the fuel and other supplies that were transported to the attackers as part of the misuse of the monitoring mission established pursuant to resolution 943 (1994) or, in fact, in direct avoidance of it.

Certainly, one must also wonder to what extent we are to be led to further delusions in believing that the so-called Croatian Serbs could have become full accomplices in the coordinated assault on Bihac without at least the acquiescence, if not the outright support, of Belgrade.

No matter what delusions may have been behind the course set out by resolution 943 (1994), and no matter what faults may endanger the very seaworthiness of the vessel, it is a ship that has been set sailing by the Security Council and therefore on which we are passengers, unwitting or otherwise. We therefore do not look to drill holes in the hull of this ship. On the contrary, we will look, as any passenger would, to bale out water, plug the leaks and keep the course steady.

However, the Security Council must take the responsibility of ensuring that the objectives of resolution 943 (1994) are being advanced and that the holes are being adequately plugged, or the ship must reverse course, with the realization that this effort by the Council was at least premature.

Just one final warning as we embark on the next 100 days: the rats are already abandoning ship.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Croatia, on whom I now call.

Mr. Nobilo (Croatia): Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month and to assure you that my delegation is fully committed to assisting you on the many important issues that will come before the Council, particularly those that concern Croatia and its neighbours.

I also extend my delegation's compliments to the Permanent Representative of Rwanda for the able way in which he led the work of the Council during December.

My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to welcome the Foreign Minister of Italy, His Excellency Mr. Antonio Martino, who is a high-ranking representative of a friendly neighbouring State.

Croatia welcomes the draft resolution before the Council. It contains elements that will be of great benefit to the peace process in Croatia and the region in general. It also contains elements that should enhance the credibility of the Council, following the reports and decisions regarding the illicit transfer of fuel into the occupied territories of Croatia from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This draft resolution alleviates some of our concern that the international community may not be sufficiently determined in its quest for a durable peace in the region.

Paragraph 3 of the draft resolution extends the Yugoslav-Bosnian border blockade to affect Croatia. From now on Belgrade will not be able to send non-humanitarian assistance to the occupied territories of Croatia via the Bosnia and Herzegovina border, without consequences. Should the Belgrade authorities choose to violate paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993) in this way, the Council will be left with no alternative but to reinstate the sanctions that were suspended by its resolution 943 (1994).

The Council's decision in this regard is made with the same principles in mind as when paragraph 12 was included in resolution 820 (1993) in the first place — to reiterate Croatia's sovereignty over its entire territory; to promote economic reintegration between the Government and the local Serb authorities in the United Nations protected areas in Croatia; and to protect the Croatian citizens in the protected areas from the sanctions regime imposed on the occupier, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Indeed, the reinforcement of this paragraph represents the Council's commitment to the spirit and the letter of that resolution. The Council's decision is especially welcome at a time when my Government is pursuing implementation of the economic reintegration agreement of 2 December with the same local Serb authorities.

This extension of the border blockade, however, is not complete. The border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Croatia's United Nations protected areas Sector East can still be used by Belgrade without consequences. The members of the Council should bear this in mind with regard to the next review of the issue, which will take place in a hundred days' time. This may be quite possible, as substantial human and financial resources will be released from Croatia at about that time, given my Government's decision today on the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The UNPROFOR resources would thus be usable for other alternatives. A complete blockade of the border between Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia in this way would further the peace process in Croatia.

My Government's decision on the UNPROFOR mandate, which was transmitted to the Secretary-General this morning and to your office, Mr. President, this afternoon, was taken with full regard for the international community's concerns and interests in the region. On this occasion I shall simply emphasize the words of my President — that the Security Council can continue to count, in full confidence, on Croatia's acting in a manner consistent with its long-standing constructive policy in the region.

Croatia will continue to support the work of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and to look for a political solution consistent with Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, in a reasonable time-frame. We shall continue to negotiate the Z-4 political plan for Croatia with the Contact Group. We shall continue to work to implement the economic agreement of 2 December, with the assistance of the international community. But we shall not allow the annexation of any part of our sovereign territory.

We hope that the international community will be able, in the coming months, to seize the opportunity to assist Croatia to reintegrate its occupied territories in a timely and peaceful way. The draft resolution gives us great hope. I should like to take this opportunity to praise the sponsors of the draft resolution for their serious and skilful work.

A viable Croatia will as such also be able to play a more significant role in achieving the desired balance of power in the region — a balance that is still needed because of one party's rejection of the Contact Group plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. A political solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina does not appear likely in the near future. By addressing the situation in Croatia first, however, the international community can help Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the short term, by reallocating the necessary additional UNPROFOR resources into Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, in the long term, by creating conditions of balance favourable to continuing with the Contact Group plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. This draft resolution is a small but important step in that direction.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of Croatia for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Turkey. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Batu (Turkey): It gives me great pleasure to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January. We are confident that under your able guidance the Council will successfully carry out its responsibilities.

I should like also to pay tribute to Ambassador Bakuramutsa of Rwanda for his able work as President of the Council last month.

It is also a great pleasure to welcome the Foreign Minister of Italy, a friendly and allied country.

On numerous occasions we have expressed before this Council our views on the ongoing tragedy in Bosnia. I do not intend to repeat them. Today, I should like to confine my statement to our hope that the agreement on the complete cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina will not remain simply an agreement on paper, but will become a first step towards the achievement of a just and viable peace. To that end, this agreement should not be allowed to lead in any way to a freezing of the situation on the ground. Such a freezing could seriously undermine the chances of a just and viable peace. Therefore, we believe it is high time for credible pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to make them accept the peace plan unconditionally. Such pressure should be exerted without further delay.

Unfortunately, there are reports that Serbian aggression is continuing in and around the Bihac region. The so-called Abdic forces and the Croatian Serbs should not be allowed to violate this agreement and the border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatian Serbs' involvement in the aggression is a clear sign of defiance of the relevant Security Council resolutions. Resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) clearly define the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) *vis-à-vis* the safe areas. UNPROFOR is committed to defend the safe areas. The full implementation of this mandate is still a very urgent and vital need. In this context, we welcome the proposal of the Force Commander pertaining to the strengthening of UNPROFOR with a view to enabling it to contribute better to the implementation of the agreement on the complete cessation of hostilities. The reinforcement of UNPROFOR should be completed as soon as possible.

We have serious reservations about the draft resolution. The monitoring mechanism established under resolution 943 (1994) is not effective. There are still only about 200 monitors in the Mission. Because of this shortage of manpower for the monitoring of a long border, the effectiveness and credibility of the monitors are widely questioned.

On the other hand, it is true that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could play an important role in convincing Karadzic forces to accept the peace plan. The adoption of resolution 943 (1994) was based on the optimistic assumption that if Serbia and Montenegro had been encouraged it could have played an instrumental role to this end. However, a hundred days elapsed and the Serbs continued their defiance of the will of international community. The peace plan has still to be accepted by the Bosnian Serbs.

During this period we have also witnessed a new round of aggression against the safe area of Bihac, in which the Croatian Serbs were also involved.

Despite Serbia and Montenegro's claim that it has closed its borders with the Serb-held areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and despite the certification provided by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) Mission monitoring the border, many independent international sources acknowledge that the border continues to be violated through the transport of strategic material and personnel. It is extremely important that the monitoring mechanisms be strengthened and the number

of monitors increased. In addition, serious consideration should be given to independent third-party sources.

Furthermore, having examined the report of the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY Steering Committee, we have once again learned that the border monitoring Mission, under the direction of the Co-Chairmen, has approved fuel shipments to the so-called Croatian Serbs. This is a clear violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, as well as of resolution 820 (1993). It was these fuel shipments that enabled Croatian Serbs to continue their aggression against the safe area of Bihac. Therefore, we hope that the adoption of this draft resolution will at least contribute to the termination of these shipments. We also look forward to the strengthening of mechanisms for deterring and reporting violations.

In conclusion, I once again strongly urge the Serbian side to accept the peace plan unconditionally.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Turkey for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): At the outset, Sir, allow me to express our congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. We are confident that with your wisdom and well-known leadership qualities you will guide the Security Council to fruitful results in its consideration of the important international issues now before it.

I must also express our thanks to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, for his efforts as President of the Security Council last month. I should also like to join others in welcoming the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy to the Security Council today.

The delegation of Egypt did not come here today to put forward new clarifications of, or explanations for, the current, deteriorating situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The picture is clear to all. My delegation will merely remind the Security Council of the many appeals made by Egypt and other States, particularly regarding the need for the Security Council to review its many resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina. There have been approximately 60 such resolutions to date, the majority of which were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, and their provisions have not been implemented. The Security Council should look into taking immediate, firm and effective measures to ensure the implementation of those earlier resolutions before adopting new ones on the subject.

We also wish to remind the Council that it is the fundamental duty of the international community, represented by the Security Council, to deal with the real causes of the current problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that it should not limit itself to addressing just one of its symptoms.

We had reservations when the Security Council decided, under resolution 943 (1993), to gradually ease sanctions, and we still have reservations today. No concrete progress has been made towards a political settlement of the military confrontation. Indeed, further Serbian aggression, by the Krajina Serbs against the Bihac safe area, took place in flagrant defiance of the Security Council and the entire international community. Furthermore, the report before the Security Council in document S/1995/6 includes references to current arrangements for channelling fuel shipments to the Serbs in Croatia at a time when they are not respecting the will of the international community, when their forces have not withdrawn from the Bihac safe area and when they have not acceded to the comprehensive agreement between the Bosnian Serb party and the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on a cessation of hostilities, which was concluded under the aegis of the United Nations.

For years the Security Council has tried different means of exerting pressure on the aggressor responsible for the outbreak and continuation of the military confrontation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sanctions have been among the effective means used by the Council. Serbia and Montenegro was called upon to fulfil various interrelated commitments, one of which was to cut off supplies to Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another was to exert pressure on the Bosnian Serbs so that they would respond to international efforts to accept the peace plan put forward by the international Contact Group, which included a commitment to international sanctions against any intransigent party rejecting the plan. But the Serbian party continues to hold its intransigent position, while the Government of Bosnia has accepted the international offer, with its concomitant international guarantees, and has accepted the cease-fire agreement, as called for by the United Nations. Therefore, the

international community must ensure implementation of the settlement plan and continue to exert international pressure, including sanctions, until the party rejecting the plan abides by the will of the international community.

The position of the international community must be based on the principles of international legitimacy. The international community cannot simply put forward plan after plan, only to meet with the rejection of the Serbian party; that would only show the Serbians that intransigence is rewarded, because the next step will be a new plan with new concessions for them. For that reason, the delegation of Egypt calls on the Security Council to adopt a draft resolution under which international military observer forces will be deployed along the borders between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) so as to ensure effective monitoring and the cutting of the supply line between Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Security Council is called upon today to look anew into further measures to ensure the genuine protection of the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because these are the only lands in that State Member of the United Nations that are under the control of the Government. The Council is also called upon to consider temporary measures until a final, peaceful settlement to the dispute is reached and the consequences of aggression are eliminated. That can be done only through the full implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations. The Security Council must stand up for all States in all parts of the world, without any discrimination.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Egypt for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Pakistan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Marker (Pakistan): Allow me warmly to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January. Having had the privilege and the pleasure of serving with you on the Council, I have no doubt that your wide experience and diplomatic skill will guide the work of the Security Council to a highly successful conclusion. On behalf of my delegation, I also wish to take this opportunity to express deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa of Rwanda, for so capably accomplishing the work of the Council in December 1994.

I also wish to convey my delegation's respect and welcome to the Foreign Minister of Italy, His Excellency Mr. Antonio Martino.

The Pakistan delegation once again expresses its deep concern at the grave situation that continues to prevail in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the strenuous efforts of the international community, the root cause of the prolongation of this unfortunate tragedy remains unaddressed. This is, quite clearly, the aggression by the Bosnian Serbs against the legitimate Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These acts are rendered all the more outrageous by the refusal of the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan presented by the Five-Nation Contact Group, by their continued defiance of United Nations resolutions and by the continuation of their abhorrent practice of "ethnic cleansing".

The Pakistan Government, along with other members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, has always believed that only stern and effective measures by the Security Council could rectify the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We believe it is essential that the resolutions of the Security Council should be effectively enforced, in particular those that authorize the use of force and air strikes. The lack of resolve in fully implementing these resolutions has emboldened the Serbs in their intransigence and enabled them to continue their assault on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

My delegation, which voted against Security Council resolution 943 (1994), did so because we were firmly of the view that it was beyond the capacity of a small number of monitors to certify the uncertifiable. The fact that the Bosnian Serb authorities have been able to continue their military aggression has, regrettably, justified our earlier apprehensions.

My delegation has carefully studied the Secretary-General's letter (S/1995/6), together with its annex, the report provided by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. We find the contents of the latter document to be both unsatisfactory and disturbing. The report of the resource limitations, while commendable in its accuracy, is also, by the same token, somewhat incriminating. If we add to this the nature and the reality of porous borders, then the implications become

obviously ominous, and reports of the Bosnian Serbs' receiving substantial military assistance should therefore come as no surprise.

It was the expectation of the Pakistan Government that the prolonged refusal by the Bosnian Serb party of the five-nation Contact Group peace plan would automatically trigger the action agreed upon by the members of the Contact Group against the defaulting party. Meanwhile, let it not be forgotten that the Bosnian Government has, despite the iniquitous nature of the territorial adjustment, given its agreement to the peace plan.

In conclusion, my delegation would wish to reiterate the decision of the Seventh Islamic Summit Conference, held in Casablanca from 11 to 15 December 1994, which expressed its opposition to the lifting of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, as well as any easing of sanctions, until such time as Serbia and Montenegro fully implements the following conditions: first, recognizes the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its internationally recognized boundaries; secondly, accepts the placement of United Nations forces on the borders for effective monitoring; and thirdly, implements the five-nation Contact Group peace plan, including full withdrawal from all occupied territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Pakistan for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Malaysia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Thanarajasingam (Malaysia): At the outset, let me congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We welcome the arrangements you have made to bring about greater transparency in the work of the Council as well as this opportunity to debate developments pertaining to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our deep appreciation also goes to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda.

Like the preceding speakers, we too wish to welcome the presence and participation of the Foreign Minister of Italy.

My delegation has already made known our position in relation to resolution 943 (1994); we did so in the Council debate on this issue on 23 September 1994, when we strongly argued against the adoption of that resolution. We maintained, and continue to maintain, that its adoption was premature and that it would merely reward the aggressors.

The minimum requirements for any reappraisal of the sanctions regime remain unmet. Those requirements are recognition by Serbia and Montenegro of the international borders, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as of the Republic of Croatia and of all other States of the Republic of former Yugoslavia, and the establishment of an adequate and effective monitoring mechanism for the interdiction of military supplies across the borders of Serbia and Montenegro to the Bosnian Serbs. We are not convinced as yet that the border has been effectively closed, in the absence of an effective mechanism to fully verify such action. There are reports, including some from representatives of the five-nation Contact Group, of continuing violations of the border of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Given this situation, it would indeed be more appropriate for the Security Council to reconsider and to take measures to suspend the implementation of resolution 943 (1994). In our view, any review by the Council on this issue should be undertaken after due consideration with all States concerned, including the Contact Group of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), as well as the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We wish to reiterate our deep sense of regret at the fact that the Security Council, despite the appeal made by the OIC to defer the adoption of resolution 943 (1994) last September, did not find it possible to do so.

We wish to remind the Council that the sanctions were imposed against Serbia and Montenegro in the wake of blatant Serbian aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the massive violations of human rights of its people. This aggression is still continuing, as reflected in developments in the Bihac region. Accordingly, the international community should resist any easing of sanctions as long as all conditions stipulated by the Security Council are not fully met, including the return of territories occupied by force and "ethnic cleansing".

My delegation wishes to reiterate the urgent need to strengthen the monitoring team so that it would be able to discharge its duties more effectively. Clearly, to have only 200 monitors stationed along the borders is grossly

inadequate. There is the additional need further to improve the monitoring process in terms both of resources and of manpower, as well as its methodology. While appreciating the commitment of members of the monitoring team, we are concerned that the actual system of monitoring continues to be confronted by serious constraints. As such, we seriously question the capability of the monitoring team to carry out its duty given the constraints, including lack of necessary resources.

My delegation has studied the report of the Co-Chairmen dated 4 January 1995 (S/1995/6) and we have found it to be vastly inadequate in terms of the certification regarding the closure of the border. Specifically, we do not believe that the Co-Chairmen could only address in the report information that could be confirmed only through a first-hand source. This would certainly hamper the work of the Co-Chairmen. They should also be allowed to work on the basis of information received from third sources. We understand that, under the present arrangement, in order for the monitor team to undertake an investigation from information received from third sources, it would need to seek the permission from the host country before it could make any investigation. The process of obtaining the approval would take at least 24 hours, and by that time the investigation would prove to be too late as incriminating evidence would have been removed. This procedure needs to be rectified if the monitoring team is to carry out its work more effectively. In this regard, we do note that the present draft resolution seeks to address some of these concerns that I have just raised.

My delegation wishes to express its concern over reports that the Border Monitoring Mission has facilitated fuel shipments through the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Serbia and Montenegro to the Croatian Serbs within the Republic of Croatia. This shipment of fuel has violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and is not consistent with the terms of paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 820 (1993). In our view, the violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina alone should have been a sufficient basis to terminate this arrangement. Furthermore, the Croatian Serbs continue to occupy areas within the Bihac region and have all along coordinated their assault against the Bihac "safe-area" with the Bosnian Serbs.

Malaysia welcomes the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities agreement signed on 23 and 31 December 1994, respectively. However, we are deeply concerned over the continuation of hostilities in the Bihac area led by the Croatian Serbs and their cohorts. We strongly condemn the cross-border aggression by the Croatian Serbs against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and demand the withdrawal of the Croatian Serbs from the Republic.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Malaysia for his kind words addressed to me.

In accordance with the decision taken at this meeting, I now invite Ambassador Dragomir Djokic to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Djokic: May I at the outset congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January this year.

I should also like warmly to welcome the Foreign Minister of Italy, His Excellency Mr. Antonio Martino, with whose country Yugoslavia has had a long history of friendly and good neighbourly relations.

The decision that the Security Council is about to take on the extension of the partial suspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a thoroughly inadequate response to the great efforts and contribution that Yugoslavia has been making in the search for a just and lasting solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As is well known, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has fulfilled all the obligations and met all the conditions set by the relevant Security Council resolutions by which the sanctions regime was established. In addition, Yugoslavia has accepted the peace plan of the Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it has accepted all the other peace proposals, and has done everything in its power to influence the Bosnian Serbs to do the same.

In this framework, my Government has consistently fulfilled its commitment to sever all political and economic contacts with the Bosnian Serb leadership. This has been clearly confirmed by the reports of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which have certified that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Srpska.

Therefore, the decision by the Council to extend only the very limited partial suspension of the sanctions for just another 100 days and to put forward new conditionalities and restrictions is certainly very disappointing. It reflects a lack of political will to assess objectively the positive and constructive role of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the search for a peaceful solution to the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It ignores the fact that the decision to close the border with the Bosnian Serbs was a unilateral one, for which the Yugoslav Government asked for the assistance of the Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

References in the draft resolution concerning the export of products from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Krajina Serbs have absolutely nothing to do with the primary objective of the closure of the border, which is to influence the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group's peace plan. It represents an attempt to impose new conditions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is unacceptable. The draft resolution, in fact, is not a mere extension of the partial suspension of the sanctions, but actually calls for the cessation of practically all economic relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Krajina Serbs. Moreover, it seeks to exact an indirect recognition of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is unacceptable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before the overall political solution to the crisis has been found and accepted by all parties concerned. This approach is counter-productive and harmful, particularly in this delicate phase of the peace process, which is demonstrating some signs of progress.

By opting again to maintain the greatest part of sanctions against Yugoslavia, the Security Council is in fact playing into the hands of the extremist elements in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, thus continuing to encourage the war option. This, of course, fuels the ambitions of the hardline Bosnian Muslim leadership, which feels that the continuation of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serb nation as a whole is the shortest way to realize its extremist political goals. At the same time, the perpetuation of the sanctions also strengthens the hand of the Serb extremists, who argue that, no matter what the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is doing, the sanctions will remain in place and therefore the war option should be pursued.

That the sanctions have never managed to accomplish the goals they were imposed for in the first place, except to severely punish the most vulnerable segments of the population, was unambiguously stated in the Secretary-General's "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" (S/1995/1). By making a decision to lift or substantially alleviate the sanctions, the Council would marginalize those extremist positions and would indeed make a significant contribution to the peace process.

Unfortunately, in the past hundred days the very limited suspension of the sanctions established by Security Council resolution 943 (1994) has also not been entirely fulfilled. Despite a clear call by that resolution to the sanctions Committee to adopt appropriate streamlined procedures for expediting its consideration of applications concerning legitimate humanitarian assistance, the Committee has in fact resorted to an ever stricter implementation of the sanctions. Due to the inflexible positions of some delegations, the Committee consistently rejected requests for the export of gas for humanitarian purposes to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, even though all conditions concerning the monitoring and control by the World Health Organization of the consumption of the gas were met. The sanctions Committee has also steadfastly refused to allow the import into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of raw materials for the pharmaceutical industry, which is a necessary precondition for the regular supply of medicaments to the population. The Security Council for its part has ignored the request of the Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the one-shot export of $70 million worth of goods, whose proceeds would have been used for the import of emergency humanitarian products.

Furthermore, even though resolution 943 (1994) clearly allowed all civilian passenger flights to and from Belgrade Airport, it has not yet been possible to purchase or even make reservations for tickets from United States territory to Belgrade, a matter about which the Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia informed the Chairman of the sanctions Committee in its letter of 31 October 1994.

As the Council has now decided to extend the partial suspension of the sanctions, it is to be hoped that these shortcomings and flaws in the interpretation of resolution 943 (1994) will be overcome.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is convinced that the plan of the Contact Group, as a basis for the continuation of the peace process, is the rational and viable way to end the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina

and to establish a just and lasting solution. For its part, it is prepared to continue to make efforts towards that end.

In this framework, any linking of the further suspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to conditions that were not valid at the time when the sanctions were imposed, or have no connection with the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, cannot be acceptable. By pursuing this policy, the Security Council in fact continues the practice of punishing the citizens of a sovereign country for events over which it has no control, which is a definite abuse of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and is highly inhumane.

In spite of the fact that the Security Council has failed so far to properly weigh the constructive role that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been playing with regard to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia will continue to pursue the option of a peaceful, negotiated settlement, which it continues to believe is the only one possible and which it is convinced is in the best interests of all the peoples of the Balkan region.

I would like to offer the following comments in connection with some of the statements made during the debate. My delegation categorically rejects the untrue and malicious allegations made by certain delegations. The situation in the former Yugoslavia is far too serious for the Council to be manipulated in order to satisfy the domestic and political propaganda needs of certain countries. Those delegations that have again chosen to put forward such allegations have thus clearly shown that they are not striving to reach a just and lasting peaceful solution.

I must admit that my delegation is surprised and disappointed that the Security Council did not grant its request to sit at the Council table throughout the discussion of this item, which exclusively refers to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is all the more incomprehensible why the Council decided to make this precedent, when such a request was granted in the past. I should like to believe that the Security Council reached such a decision in particular circumstances, and that it is only an unwanted exception, which will not be repeated.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank Ambassador Djokic for his kind words addressed to me.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. Martino (Italy): Mr. President, let me begin by offering my most sincere compliments on the dynamic and authoritative way in which you are presiding over the work of the Security Council in the month of January.

For me it is a special honour and a source of deep satisfaction to deliver my country's first statement in the Security Council, a body that has taken on a pivotal role in managing the complex and treacherous international balances that emerged with the end of the cold war. On this occasion I reaffirm Italy's active and ongoing commitment to the Council's work of maintaining international peace and security amidst the tumult and strife of this new page of history.

In a century beset by terrible conflagrations, the Bosnian crisis has the unenviable distinction of being one of the worst of them. It has lasted over 30 months, and it has had a tremendous impact on public opinion — all the more so in Italy, where these dramatic events are happening right on our doorstep.

However much has been done in these years to settle this crisis, even more remains to be done. On the positive side, the protagonists of the conflict have been brought to the negotiating table. A massive humanitarian effort has helped to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population. To the greatest extent possible, a spillover of the conflict has been avoided. Finally, the parties have been persuaded to sign a cease-fire agreement, and an agreement for a complete cessation of hostilities effective as of 1 January. We fervently hope that they will fully comply, so as to allow the negotiations to be resumed and brought to a swift and successful conclusion.

We are quite hopeful that the recent agreements will be fully implemented, and provide a solid and permanent foundation on which to relaunch and revitalize the negotiations. We must immediately build on this achievement by strongly encouraging the parties to return to the negotiating table as soon as possible, lest we lose momentum or even undermine seemingly consolidated results.

But let us not lose sight of our long-term goals: a lasting peace, stability in the region and the region's introduction into the fold of the free, democratic, and

prosperous commonwealth of European nations. These goals remain absolute priorities for the international community. Together with other members of the international community, we will work patiently and with perseverance towards these ends.

Sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have proved effective, inducing Belgrade to accept the logic of negotiations. But it was the prospect of suspending and alleviating sanctions that convinced Belgrade to cooperate with the peace process by pressuring the Bosnian Serbs to accept the proposed peace plan, which has already been accepted by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are convinced that any feasible peace strategy must include Belgrade. Therefore, if we want to maintain our leverage with Belgrade at this stage we must be flexible in our approach to sanctions through a balance of incentives and disincentives.

Of course, should the positive trends we are presently witnessing not be confirmed in the future, and the Secretary-General report that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has backtracked on its closing of the Bosnian border, the draft resolution sponsored by the four member countries of the European Union and by the Czech Republic provides for the termination of the sanctions suspension.

On the other hand, should our optimism be rewarded, paragraph 7 of the draft resolution provides for the possibility of the Council's considering additional measures

"in the light of further progress in the situation".

We hope that this possibility materializes as quickly as possible, in such a way as to allow the alleviation of sanctions with humanitarian implications. I am thinking, for instance, of the possibility of financial transactions for the purpose of supplying hospitals. Let us not forget that sanctions hurt people more than they do Governments. By creating the perception of an international conspiracy against the country, sanctions often tend to rally the people around the Government rather than mobilize them against it. If sanctions are to maintain their usefulness as an instrument of international policy, they must be applied cautiously.

We favour the extension of resolution 943 (1994), to eventually be followed by provisions to benefit the people of Serbia and Montenegro rather than their Government. While such an approach would not ensure an immediate solution to the Bosnian crisis, it would certainly help create favourable conditions for relaunching the peace process.

Finally, whatever progress has been made can be attributed at least in part to our cohesiveness. If our house is divided against itself, we will only perpetuate that division among the very people we are seeking to help. By the same token, our unity of purpose and intent can only instil that spirit among the factions, and help remove the last obstacle from the path to a fair, balanced and global political solution to the Bosnian crisis.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr. Al-Khussaiby (Oman): At the outset, Mr. President, and on behalf of my country, allow me to convey to you and to your friendly country, Argentina, my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this first month of the year. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm to you its readiness to fully cooperate with you and your delegation.

We would also like to take this opportunity to thank the Ambassador of Rwanda for his fine captaincy during the closing month of 1994 and to applaud the excellent work done by the retired members of the Security Council — Djibouti, Pakistan, New Zealand, Brazil and Spain, whose contributions will be felt for many years to come.

We also welcome the new members of the Council and assure them of our cooperation at all times. May I also take this opportunity to welcome the Foreign Minister of Italy.

Here we are starting the new year and deliberating for the fourth year on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Undoubtedly, today's deliberations on the question of the suspension of sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are of due relevance to the events in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The measures taken by the Government of Belgrade to close its border with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to any transshipment of goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and necessary clothing to meet essential humanitarian needs were positively met by

resolution 943 (1994), adopted on 23 September 1994, suspending certain measures for a period of a hundred days.

My delegation would like to stress that it was because of the readiness of the authorities in Belgrade to seal the international border with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to help isolate the Bosnian Serbs, who had rejected the territorial settlement plan, that the Security Council took the necessary action. We also want to remind the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) that any continued easing and further easing of the sanctions would be subject to how it meets all its other obligations and to other positive steps that it takes. They should include the following measures.

First, maintenance of the effective closure of the international border between it and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and further efforts by it to enhance the effectiveness of the closure, including the prosecution of persons suspected of violating measures to that end, and the sealing of border crossing points, as requested by the Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) and as called for in the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution.

Secondly, full cooperation with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the ICFY and of the Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) which is entrusted with the task of monitoring the closure of the border.

Thirdly, recognition of and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international border.

Fourthly, condemnation of all hostile acts by the Bosnian Serbs, the so-called Krajina Serbs or any other group that violates the Security Council's resolutions on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and faithful cooperation with international efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the crisis.

Fifthly, cooperation with the International Tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for war crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

My country confirmed its position *vis-à-vis* suspension of the sanctions upon the adoption of resolution 943 (1994), which we supported. Our position stemmed from our commitment to support the Contact Group's efforts to create an environment of isolation for the Bosnian Serbs until they accept the widely supported territorial settlement plan, which was supported by all the other parties to the conflict, including the Government and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Although more than three months have elapsed since the Council's adoption of resolution 943 (1994), the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not changed for the better. On the contrary, it has worsened, especially around the safe area of Bihac. Fighting goes on, and the siege and strangulation of cities is as common as it was in the past. Roads to towns and cities are still blocked, and the movement of civilians and the access of humanitarian convoys are still hindered. Most important, the territorial settlement remains in limbo, due to the defiance of one party.

Once again my delegation supports a draft resolution that we hope will pave the way to peace. My delegation will therefore vote in favour of the draft before the Council.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of Oman for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr. Graf Zu Rantzau (Germany): Allow me at the outset to assure you, Mr. President, of my delegations's full confidence in your wise counsel and guidance of the Council. I should also like to express our appreciation for the excellent work done by your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, Ambassador Bakuramutsa.

In addition, I should like to thank the Permanent Representative of Oman for the kind words of welcome that he addressed to, amongst others, my delegation.

It also gives me great pleasure to welcome the presence at the Council table of His Excellency Mr. Antonio Martino, the Foreign Minister of Italy, a member State of the European Union.

The day must come when the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, with all the atrocities and suffering of innocent people caused by it, is settled. Serbian nationalism — the ruthless readiness to wage war for more territory — was and continues to be a main cause of this conflict. This is clearly visible in the unresolved situation in Bosnia, as well as in the Serb-held territories of Croatia.

Early last fall, after an important policy shift by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Security Council, through resolution 943 (1994), granted a provisional, limited and revocable suspension of certain sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Today, a hundred days later, the Security Council must decide on two important questions.

First, did the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities implement the border closure effectively and did they cooperate with the Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia? Secondly, did Belgrade sustain its course with regard to acceptance of the Contact Group plan and its break with the Pale leadership?

This is no easy or routine matter. After very careful scrutiny of all available information, we have reached the conclusion that both these questions can be answered with a sober 'Yes'. At the same time, there is in our view no reason for any special acknowledgement with regard to the line followed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities. A peace-oriented policy by Belgrade is, after all, in the best interests of the people of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia themselves.

After the adoption of resolution 943 (1994), fuel sent from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has facilitated military activities of the Krajina Serb forces, who continue to be active in border-crossing attacks on the Bihac area. This was and remains completely unacceptable. We demand that all so-called Krajina Serb forces withdraw from Bosnian territory. We have supported the inclusion of new provisions in the draft resolution, with the aim of cutting off shipments of fuel and other non-humanitarian supplies through Bosnia to the United Nations protected areas. We also welcome the fact that in future the mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) will report on whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia side is complying with this specific requirement.

The message of the draft resolution to be adopted today is clear. Belgrade must continue to hold course. What is necessary are deeds, not words. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities must withhold all support for the Bosnian Serb military. They should physically block all crossing points that the ICFY Mission cannot monitor continuously. We urge Member States to provide the ICFY Mission, to whose dedicated personnel we pay tribute, with any information that might be relevant for its reports. On their side, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities must maintain their current cooperation with the ICFY Mission and not give rise to any suspicion that they turn a blind eye to smuggling efforts or other violations of the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We must be certain that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities remain firm in this respect.

But our expectations of Belgrade go beyond that. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to bear major responsibility for everything that has happened in the former Yugoslavia. This is why we expect the Belgrade Government to fully use its influence with the various Serb parties to bring them closer to a negotiated solution. They must bring home to the Bosnian Serbs that there is no alternative to accepting the Contact Group peace plan as the basis for a peaceful settlement. They must also tell the Croatian Serbs in the United Nations Protected Areas, in clear terms, that any political concept more far-reaching than regional autonomy in Croatia is unrealistic.

Belgrade itself must move closer to important further steps, and thus prove, by its deeds, that it has really changed its policy in the former Yugoslavia. Mutual recognition between all States of the former Yugoslavia at the earliest possible date is an urgent political necessity. Such mutual recognition would, in our view, dramatically change the political landscape in this region and greatly enhance the chances of ending the conflict. At the same time, bold steps in this direction by Belgrade would allow a bold reaction by the international community.

The recent agreements between the Bosnian parties on a cease-fire and on a complete cessation of hostilities for roughly the next hundred days provide a new opportunity for intensified peace efforts. Together with our partners in the Contact Group, we are already pressing ahead for negotiations to achieve an overall settlement on the basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group's peace plan as a starting point. With regard to the United Nations Protected Areas, too, we urge the parties to negotiate constructively on the international plan, once it is finalized, and we call on Belgrade to support this process.

When resolution 943 (1994) was adopted last September, I had the honour to speak for the European Union in this forum. Let me reaffirm what I then emphasized: those who persist in a policy of war and obstruction will be isolated and only prolong the suffering

of their own people. Those who move forward on the course of peace will get our support and will be able to lead their people into a better future.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Germany for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Legwaila (Botswana): Let me take this opportunity, first of all, to extend my sincere congratulations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January. My delegation has full confidence and trust in your capacity to discharge the duties of this important office in the very efficient and wise manner for which you are known. May we also convey through you our sincere gratitude and appreciation to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, for the excellent manner in which he conducted the work of the Council in December.

My delegation is also grateful for the very warm welcome extended to us by all the members of the Council. We pledge to cooperate fully with the President and all delegations in the Council's important work.

On behalf of my delegation, let me also welcome the Foreign Minister of Italy to the Council.

The delegation of Botswana thanks the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) for the comprehensive report before the Council on the effectiveness of the closure of the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have scrutinized the report very carefully, and the detailed analysis of the monitoring system is very informative indeed. The conclusions spelt out at the end of the report are, of course, of critical importance.

The report is generally positive. It indicates that, sporadic incidents of smuggling notwithstanding, Belgrade is trying its best to honour its obligation to close the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are told that in cases where violations were brought to its attention, the Government took appropriate measures and responded in a satisfactory manner. It is this constructive role which has persuaded my delegation to support the adoption of the draft resolution before us today.

But I must say this: we labour under no illusion. The border between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been rendered impenetrable by any means, and we would be deluding ourselves were we to be so trusting as to believe that no contraband traverses it.

At the same time, it is my Government's position that the closure of the border with Bosnia should not be an end in itself. President Milosevic of Serbia is, inescapably, a key player in efforts to find a peaceful solution, not only to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to the Yugoslav crisis as a whole. The leverage he has on the Serbs in Bosnia is widely recognized and must be put to good use. It is our hope that the cooperative spirit shown to Belgrade — deservedly or not — by the Security Council in the draft resolution we are just about to adopt will encourage President Milosevic to exert substantial pressure on his brothers across the border in Bosnia to accept the Contact Group plan, which has already been accepted by Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The agreement recently signed by the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina for a complete cessation of hostilities has opened up encouraging prospects for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in that troubled part of the Balkans. We are encouraged by the reports from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which indicate that the situation is generally calm in the country, though there are violations here and there. What is left, therefore, is for the leaders, in a positive spirit, to sit down and negotiate seriously and in good faith the end of that terrible conflict.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Botswana for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Kovanda (Czech Republic): Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency. You certainly lost no time in exercising your firm, effective and businesslike leadership. I also congratulate Ambassador Bakuramutsa of Rwanda on the job he did last month.

Let me also thank the Security Council members that left us at the end of last year. Our delegation certainly learned a tremendous amount from them, and we appreciated their support throughout the year. We also welcome the incoming members, three of which, not losing any time, have already delivered their first statement here. And today I welcome in particular the

presence of Italy's Foreign Minister, His Excellency Mr. Martino, in this Chamber.

We are discussing a draft resolution that can be described as "the son of resolution 943 (1994)". The Czech Republic figures among its sponsors, and there is a certain logic to this, for we co-sponsored the "original" resolution, resolution 943 (1994), as well.

Resolution 943 (1994) recognized a certain shift in the attitude of the leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). We all remember that they had long thwarted various attempts by the international community to seek a solution in the former Yugoslavia. Then, in the fall of 1994, an important shift occurred: they accepted the territorial arrangement for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as proposed by the Contact Group, which the leaders in Pale did not. This difference between the Serb leaders in Belgrade and those in Pale was accentuated further when the Belgrade Government closed down the border with Pale-controlled territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Security Council decided not to ignore this fissure between the two leaderships, but, rather, to accentuate it further and capitalize on it. To this end, we adopted resolution 942 (1994), tightening sanctions on Bosnian Serbs, and on its heels resolution 943 (1994), slightly alleviating sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In so doing, we gave the Belgrade leadership the benefit of the doubt, assuming for the moment that its apparent change of heart was serious and would be long-lasting. We were running a certain risk as well. Belgrade might have played another trick and gone on in its old ways. There were safeguards built into resolution 943 (1994), though; the sanctions in question were only suspended, and a well-defined mechanism could have reintroduced them without much ado.

The Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) dealing with monitoring the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina now has 184 international members from 16 countries, including the Czech Republic. It is about to be increased to 220 members. It controls some 70 checkpoints, most of them around the clock, on 540 kilometres of border. The work its members are doing is awesome, often involving great physical exertion, and my delegation would like to pay tribute to them here.

What the ICFY Mission can do is no doubt limited, and some of the limitations are significant. Nevertheless, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are cooperating with the Mission. They do react to complaints as they receive them. They have taken measures that clearly distance them from any smuggling that does occur. And we have seen no evidence that those authorities would have condoned, let alone participated in, the violations of the border regime that the Mission has detected. The situation on the border is far more favourable today than it was when we adopted resolution 943 (1994).

That is why my delegation sees no reason to change the regime that resolution 943 (1994) introduced. We would have agreed to an extension even longer than another hundred days, but we have no problem with the proposal at hand. The safeguards of resolution 943 (1994) continue in place, unchanged, just in case Belgrade still turns out to be of two minds.

Moreover, this new draft specifically reconfirms paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993), an issue which has been of particular concern to Croatian authorities.

The draft at hand resembles a technical resolution, extending certain measures in place, but its role really is primarily political. In this light, even the ICFY Mission is playing a political role, inasmuch as it underscores the importance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's playing ball with the international community. It is in the best interests of the international community to continue to stimulating Belgrade to exert pressure on Pale.

As for the future of sanctions themselves, this is not the time even to consider their further abatement. The European Union, through the delegation of Germany, suggested in the General Assembly a series of steps that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could fruitfully adopt. Of these, the mutual recognition of States of the former Yugoslavia, within their internationally recognized borders, is a step that we, too, have repeatedly recommended. In this light, we look forward to further progress in the former Yugoslavia.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of the Czech Republic for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Martinez Blanco (Honduras) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Speaking for the first time we are speaking in the Security Council as one of its members,

I wish to congratulate you, Sir, in my capacity as Permanent Representative of Honduras, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of January. My delegation is convinced that under your usual skilful leadership the work of this Council will be fruitful. You and the other members of the Council can rely on our cooperation.

We also congratulate your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, on the very skilful way in which he discharged his duties as President of the Council in December. We also join in welcoming the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

My delegation is grateful to the Secretary-General for presenting the third report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 943 (1994), adopted by the Council on 23 September 1994.

The Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee have certified that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border between that Republic and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces.

The report indicates that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are cooperating constructively with the Mission of the International Conference, that the Mission has freedom of movement within the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that it continues to enjoy the cooperation of the Yugoslav authorities.

In general, the report reflects optimism prompted by the apparently satisfactory way in which the monitoring process on the border is proceeding. These monitoring arrangements may help to improve the political process aimed at achieving peace and ensuring the viability of the agreements on a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities, signed in December by the Bosnian parties in conflict.

The report indicates that the improvement has facilitated the provision of humanitarian relief by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and by the Red Cross, as reflected in the reports that the United Nations Protection Force regularly provides to the members of the Security Council on the situation on the ground.

Despite the apparently irreconcilable positions of the parties in dispute, my delegation takes the view that the suspension for a further hundred days of the restrictions and other measures referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution 943 (1994), as well as in operative paragraphs 1 and 3 of the draft resolution, is a significant step that will contribute to the political process aimed at peace and reconciliation.

My delegation therefore supports all of the draft resolution submitted by the sponsoring countries. But we must also keep in mind that serious incidents continue to take place in that turbulent and conflict-wracked area, and we must therefore urge all the parties in conflict strictly to comply with all the resolutions of this Council and the agreements reached between themselves.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Honduras for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Ayewah (Nigeria): The delegation of Nigeria extends its courtesies to you, Sir, as you assume the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January. We are convinced that you will bring your proficiency to bear on the work of the Council. You may rest assured of the cooperation of my delegation as you discharge your important duties.

I should also like to convey my delegation's gratitude to Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, for the able manner in which he guided the affairs of the Council in the month of December.

We welcome into membership of the Council Botswana, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia and Italy, and wish them well as they take their places in the Council and make their contributions to its work in promoting international peace and security.

We also welcome to the Security Council the Foreign Minister of Italy, His Excellency Mr. Antonio Martino and thank him for his powerful contribution to the debate.

During the consideration on 23 September 1994 of resolution 943 (1994), on the easing of some of the sanctions imposed on the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro), my delegation expressed its reservations primarily because of the timing. The thrust of the resolution and its main provisions, which called for the suspension of

sanctions on civilian air travel and sporting and cultural activities, were generally agreeable to my delegation. We agreed with the need to find ways and means of encouraging the FRY authorities to maintain their acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan and cut off the link between Belgrade and Pale.

However, the context in which we considered the draft was one that we wished had been different. We said then that, had we considered the resolution after the receipt by the Security Council of a report from the Secretary-General that the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) had certified that the authorities of the FRY were effectively implementing their decision to close the border between it and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, my delegation would have voted in favour of the draft resolution. Since that was not the case, my delegation abstained in the voting. In doing so, we however expressed the hope that the FRY authorities would live up to their commitments by effectively implementing their decision to close the international border between the FRY and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Since the adoption of resolution 943 (1994), we have received the monthly reports of the ICFY Mission, which has confirmed that the political decision taken by Belgrade to break off political and economic relations with the Pale Serbs has been maintained. Furthermore, the ICFY in paragraph 28 of its latest report confirmed the new important measures adopted by Belgrade in response to the observations of the Mission to ensure the effective closure of the borders to all goods except food, medicines and other humanitarian supplies.

These developments are positive and encouraging, and we welcome them and call on the FRY authorities to continue in that mode. None the less, we are aware of the existing loopholes along the 450-kilometre border through which violations could occur, and have indeed occurred in the past. These incidents have undermined the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed under resolution 942 (1994) and also disrupted the balance contained in resolution 943 (1994) between effective border closure and easing of sanctions. In this regard, my delegation recalls the proposal of the Caucus of the Non-Aligned Movement during the month of December 1994 to ensure strict implementation of paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993) and resolution 943 (1994). We had presented this proposal to the Council in the form of a draft resolution, which was however vetoed. We found the imposition of this veto difficult to understand, in the face of the fighting that was going on then in the Bihac area, which we felt was being sustained by fuel diverted to the Krajina Serbs across the border into Croatia. What is more, the draft resolution was intended to reinforce the existing measures in place.

We have noted the incorporation of some elements of that proposal in the current draft before us; operative paragraphs 3 and 5, we believe, contain substantial improvements over the provisions of resolution 943 (1994). Furthermore, the inclusion of operative paragraph 2 — a proposal of the Caucus of the Non-Aligned Movement — in the draft is another important element. We are grateful that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution were able to include this reference to the mutual recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and international borders by all the States in the region. Acknowledgement and acceptance of this principle by all States are no doubt germane to the solution of the crisis in the Balkans.

In view of the foregoing and given the recent improvement in the prospects for the peaceful settlement of the conflict in the territory of former Yugoslavia, my delegation believes, in the light of the agreements on a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities, that an affirmative vote on this draft resolution would give an added push to the peace process. As a result, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his kind words addressed to me.

I now call on the representative of China.

Mr. Wang Xuexian (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): I would like warmly to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of this month's presidency of the Security Council at this auspicious time of the year, when everything is taking on a fresh look. I am convinced that, given your wisdom and rich experience, you will guide the Council's work to success. I also wish to thank Ambassador Bakuramutsa, last month's President, for having successfully conducted the work of the Council during that month.

I should like also to take this opportunity to express my regret at the departure of the members who left the Council at the end of last year. I commend them for the work they did in the Council, and I hope they will continue to be concerned in the Council's work.

I wish also warmly to welcome our new partners — the representatives of Botswana, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia and Italy. We pledge our complete cooperation with them in the Council's work.

The Chinese delegation would like, too, to welcome warmly the Foreign Minister of Italy, His Excellency Mr. Antonio Martino. We are glad to have him present during our work today.

Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 943 (1994), the situation along the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina has been stable. The three reports of the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council have stated that the cooperation between the FRY Government and the International Conference's Mission continues to be satisfactory; the FRY Government continues to fulfil its commitment and the border between the FRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina remains effectively closed. We are pleased by this development and we welcome it.

The Chinese delegation has all along supported the political efforts of the international community, including those by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY to resolve peacefully the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are of the view that the efforts made by the FRY in implementing Security Council resolution 943 (1994) are aimed at urging the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan.

In the past month further measures have been taken by the FRY to keep the border more effectively closed, which is a great support for the work of the international Mission. Therefore, the international community should encourage the FRY Government to continue to fulfil its commitment and to make further efforts to bring peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina, so as to enable the parties concerned to take further positive steps to advance the process of a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Chinese delegation holds that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be settled peacefully through negotiations and dialogue. We in principle are not in favour of settling the dispute there through sanctions or mandatory measures, for that has been proved to be of no help to the settlement of problems, but would, rather, aggravate contradictions in the region, bring tremendous sufferings to its peoples and cause serious damage to the economy of third countries that implement the sanctions, particularly those neighbouring the FRY. Similar concerns and views were expressed by the Secretary-General in document S/1995/1.

Based on that position, the Chinese delegation supports the extension of the relevant provisions on easing sanctions in resolution 943 (1994) and will vote in favour of the resolution that we shall adopt. At the same time, the Chinese delegation wishes to point out that there are some elements in the draft resolution, relating to resolutions 757 (1992) and 820 (1993), on which the Chinese delegation has, on the basis of our position of principle, expressed reservations on previous occasions. Our position on them remains unchanged today.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) *(interpretation from Russian)*: At this first formal meeting of the Security Council in January 1995, may I begin by congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency and wishing you all success in carrying out this responsible mission. I would like to assure you that you can count on our support.

I would also like to ask the Rwandan delegation to convey our gratitude to the Permanent Representative of that country, Ambassador Bakuramutsa, for the intensive work he carried out, together with his delegation, in presiding over the Security Council last December.

I would also like to join those colleagues who have expressed gratitude to the representatives of the States that were non-permanent members of the Security Council in 1993 and 1994 for cooperating in our work, and would like to welcome the new members. May I also, through the Italian delegation, convey our gratitude to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Antonio Martino, for his statement.

Today marks the expiration of the first hundred days from the date of the partial suspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). When resolution 943 (1994) was adopted a fundamental factor in the position of many States was the thought that the policy of the Government of the FRY should be judged not on the basis of words but on the basis of concrete deeds, which must be taken into account when decisions are made as to the further suspension of sanctions. As previous speakers have said, no one is left in any doubt that the FRY Government's announced intentions have been matched by concrete deeds. The Council has received four reports from the Co-Chairmen of the

Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), corroborating the effective implementation by Belgrade of its decision to close the border with Bosnia and indicating a high degree of cooperation by the FRY authorities in the solution of problems as they arose. Such assessments are based in particular on information provided by the international members of the ICFY Mission, who are deployed on the very border and are in full control of the situation, extending cooperation in the delivery of humanitarian supplies across the border.

It is also important to bear in mind the political aspects of the question. During the past hundred days all of us have become convinced that the constructive line of the Yugoslav Government is yielding practical results. The economic agreements signed between the Croatian Government and the local Serbian authorities in the United Nations Protected Areas mark the attainment of the long-awaited objective of the establishment of a modus vivendi in the Republic of Croatia. Two weeks ago an agreement on the complete cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into force. Lastly, encouraging changes have occurred in the attitude of the Bosnian Serb leadership towards the peace plan of the Contact Group. All this positive change unquestionably became possible to a large extent thanks to the constructive and consistent line of the Yugoslav Government.

Russia is convinced that for all these reasons there were more than adequate grounds for agreeing on new measures to encourage Belgrade, in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 943 (1994), in which the Security Council clearly stated its decision

> "to keep the situation closely under review and to consider further steps with regard to measures applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the light of further progress in the situation".

We believe that progress was there for all to see, and the Security Council could already as a minimum decide on the indefinite extension of the measures provided for in resolution 943 (1994) and also consider a further easing of sanctions.

In this connection, we proceed from our position of principle, which assumes a need for an adequate and timely reaction to positive changes occurring in the policies of all States to which sanctions are applied. To our great regret, the Council could not agree on a draft resolution which would have provided for further measures of encouragement and thereby give impetus to the peace process. Indeed, the draft resolution before us provides for a number of completely unwarranted innovations, which run counter to the recommendations of the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY, and which we fear are capable of threatening the gains achieved through the efforts of the Contact Group. In the consultations we clearly stated our concerns, but, to our great disappointment, they were not taken into account. For this reason, in unreservedly favouring the extension of the partial extension of sanctions, Russia cannot share responsibility for the possible negative consequences of the adoption of this draft resolution in its current form, and cannot support it.

We hope that the principle already agreed upon in the Security Council — that a deserving party should be encouraged — will be implemented in the future more consistently. This is essential, both for the sake of contributing to the peace process and for reasons of elementary justice. Russia intends to continue cooperating actively with our partners in the Contact Group and with all the members of the Security Council in the settlement efforts for Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia as a whole.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for the kind words he addressed to me.

I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/1995/21.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Argentina, Botswana, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Oman, Rwanda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Russian Federation

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* There were 14 votes in favour, none against and 1 abstention. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 970 (1995).

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Mérimée (France) *(interpretation from French)*: The beginning of your presidency has already demonstrated that the Council is in safe hands, Sir. We are pleased, but not in the least surprised.

I should like to convey my delegation's gratitude for the Rwandan presidency last month, which met all our expectations.

My delegation welcomes the Council's decision to extend the suspension of certain sanctions applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), which were adopted in September in resolution 943 (1994). That resolution took account of a basic change that had occurred in August, when the Belgrade authorities, which had accepted the Contact Group's plan, decided to break off political and economic relations with the Pale leadership.

Since then the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have honoured their commitment to close the border with the territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Serbian control and have cooperated with the observer Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). All the reports of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the Conference attest to this. My delegation considers that the renewal of the suspension of certain sanctions applicable to Belgrade is therefore perfectly justified.

Following the conclusion of an agreement on the general cessation of hostilities, it is important to give fresh impetus to the process of negotiations on the basis of acceptance of the Contact Group's plan as a starting point. My delegation strongly encourages the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue to honour their commitments, to further improve their cooperation with the Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and to continue to support the plan and the action of the Contact Group in the quest for a political solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of France for the kind words he addressed to me.

Sir David Hannay (United Kingdom): May I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of your office and thank the Ambassador of Rwanda for the work he did in December. May I also welcome the new members who joined the Council on 1 January.

The economic sanctions imposed by this Council on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Bosnian Serbs in successive resolutions have undoubtedly been a major factor in the recent progress towards creating the necessary conditions for ending the chaos in the former Yugoslavia. Their impact on the FRY economy was largely responsible for Belgrade's decision last August to break with the Bosnian Serbs and to support unconditionally the Contact Group peace plan for Bosnia. The FRY authorities' decision to reinforce this change in their policy by accepting an international presence on their border with Bosnia was welcome and significant. The Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), the Mission Coordinator, Mr. Pellnas, and all the members of the Mission deserve our praise for their work, often under difficult conditions and involving long hours. We call on Member States to make the resources available so as further to strengthen the Mission's work in the months ahead.

It was in recognition of the significance of the FRY authorities' decision and the importance of the break between Belgrade and Pale that the Council adopted two resolutions last September. Resolution 942 (1994) extended and tightened sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, and resolution 943 (1994) allowed for the limited suspension of sanctions against the FRY, provided that the ICFY Co-Chairmen continued to certify that the FRY was complying with the terms of its original decision to close its border with Bosnia. The Co-Chairmen have now submitted four reports, all of which have certified that the FRY authorities are fulfilling their commitments. There have, of course, been instances of leakage. But our observation has been that the FRY authorities have reacted quickly and taken the necessary steps whenever reported violations have been brought to their attention by the ICFY Mission. We welcome the action that they have taken to maintain the effective closure of that border. It is essential that this cooperation be continued and intensified if the suspension of sanctions is to be sustained.

The resolution which the Council has just adopted, and of which my country was a sponsor, represents a reasonable and balanced response to the cooperation from

Belgrade over the past hundred days. The resolution allows for a further hundred days' suspension of the various measures set out in resolution 943 (1994). It seeks to remove any ambiguity about the application of resolution 820 (1993) concerning transshipments across the FRY-Bosnian border. And it directs the sanctions Committee to give a clear priority to applications for humanitarian assistance to the FRY.

Sanctions are imposed to achieve changes in policy, not to punish. They reinforce the strategy pursued by the Contact Group, of which my country is a member, to increase the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to return to the negotiating table. It is essential that Belgrade continue to support the Contact Group approach, to maintain the embargo on the Bosnian Serbs and to keep up pressure on the Krajina Serbs to cease violations of the Croatian-Bosnian border and to implement the economic agreement in Croatia. As we have said before, further sanctions relief is possible, but only if further substantial progress is made towards the objective of the achievement of a lasting political settlement in the former Yugoslavia.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Wisnumurti (Indonesia): I should like at the outset, Sir, to extend my delegation's congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We remain fully confident that with the wisdom and diplomatic skill you have shown in the past you will provide the Council with effective leadership.

May I also express our appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, for the able guidance he provided the Council during last month.

May I also avail myself of this opportunity to express my delegation's gratitude for the words of welcome by the members of the Council to Indonesia as one of its new members. Let me also join other members of the Council in welcoming the Foreign Minister of Italy in our midst.

The Security Council has been seized of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina for nearly three years. It is a conflict which poses a continuing threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. The death and destruction, the atrocities committed and the suffering it has inflicted is of such magnitude that it has shocked the world. Denied its right to defend itself as a result of an ill-conceived arms embargo, Bosnia and Herzegovina faces the bleak prospect of a forcible dismantling of its multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious society, the brutal decimation of its people and the erosion of its independence and sovereignty.

The wanton aggression by the Bosnian Serbs has been sustained by the stark military imbalance in their favour, which they have exploited to seize what now amounts to 70 per cent of Bosnian territory in their bid to carve a "Greater Serbia" out of Bosnian soil. Condemnation, warnings, sanctions and international isolation have not deterred them from aggression and duplicity.

Meanwhile, the pleas of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina for effective international intervention, or at least the lifting of the arms embargo, have gone unheeded. The consequences of a continued arms embargo on the victims of the conflict are obvious: there will be more killing of defenceless civilians, more atrocities and more destruction.

The Bosnian Serbs' rejection of the peace plan launched by the five-nation Contact Group means only that they intend to keep up the slaughter. While the siege and strangulation of Sarajevo continues, we have witnessed their brazen attacks on "safe areas", as evidenced by their treacherous assault on the town of Bihac. In this instance, the United Nations Protection Force failed to discharge fully its mandate to block or repel the aggression of the Bosnian Serbs. Recent developments in the Bihac region were particularly disturbing, as they involved cross-border aggression by the so-called Croatian Serb forces, launched from the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia. Meanwhile, the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of refugees and a sharp increase in the number of displaced persons have further aggravated the already deteriorating situation.

Realization of the hope engendered by the agreements on a cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities that were reached last month — the hope that the agreements would lead to the termination of war and to a durable and just peace — remains elusive, as the aggressors have continued to violate with impunity the commitments they made under the agreement.

It is against this backdrop that my delegation views the tragedy that has befallen the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indonesia must reiterate that an unjust

peace should not be imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the Bosnian Serbs should not be allowed to dictate terms for a political settlement. Appeasing the Bosnian Serbs could lead to a tragedy on an even greater scale than is evident now in that embattled land. The international community should vigorously pressure the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace proposal of the five-nation Contact Group.

The delegation of Indonesia has noted the reports submitted by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. We fully sympathize with the members of the Mission for the hardships to which they are being subjected in carrying out their tasks under severe financial, physical and operational constraints and in stressful conditions. These simply increase our appreciation of the reports.

Indonesia's principal concern, however, is that, despite the reports' certification that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is continuing to meet its commitment to close its border with the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces, there have been widespread allegations of violations in the form of the transportation of strategic materials and personnel. Reports of the illegal supply of contraband fuel by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the so-called Krajina Serbs in the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia, as well as Serbian deployment of surface-to-air missiles around the Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica safe areas, are illustrative of our concern about the extent to which the border closure has in fact been effected.

The question of the transportation of fuel is included in the latest report of the Mission, but my delegation would have liked to see the question of the alleged supply of air-defence systems across the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Serb forces similarly addressed. It is our view that, unless concerns such as these are addressed, the International Conference Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia runs the risk of being increasingly regarded as irrelevant to the developments on the ground.

The perception of discrepancy between actual developments on the ground and the certifications issued by the Mission on the continued commitment of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to close its border with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is almost inevitable, given the constraints under which the Mission has had to work and, in particular, the terms of reference within which it has had to operate. Without wishing in any way to belittle the dedication of the members of the Mission, we must recognize that under the current terms of reference, and given the limitation of resources under which it has had to operate, its capacity more effectively to ensure compliance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with its commitment seems to have been compromised.

As regards the draft resolution now before us, it should be recalled that my delegation has already expressed its reservations concerning the easing of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as called for in Security Council resolution 943 (1994). In our view, such action was premature. It was taken with undue haste and in utter disregard of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's complicity in the whole crisis. Equally important, resolutions adopted by the Council in this context have explicitly stipulated the steps that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should take if sanctions were to be eased. These clearly went beyond the mere promise to close the border with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Specifically, Indonesia attaches particular importance, *inter alia*, to the following measures that should be taken before the easing of the sanctions regime: recognition by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; effective defence of the "safe areas" and enforcement of exclusion zones; termination of the arms embargo against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; ending of the unconscionable policy of "ethnic cleansing" by Bosnian Serbs; and full cooperation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the international war crimes tribunal, including the surrender of wanted suspects for trial. In short, there should not be any easing of sanctions unless and until all consequences of aggression are reversed and territories occupied through the use of force are surrendered.

My delegation therefore has serious reservations regarding the provision for an extension for a further hundred days of the suspension of sanctions, as contained in the draft resolution before the Council. Despite the dedication shown by the members of the Mission, we doubt whether its monitors can effectively police a 450-kilometre border, when previous estimates called for a far bigger Mission. We therefore call for concerted efforts to strengthen the Mission's capacity and to ensure the fulfilment by the Government of the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia of its solemn commitment to close its border with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In particular, we should like to underscore the fact that during the past hundred days there has been little to indicate that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has initiated steps, beyond the alleged closure of its border with the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to fulfil the requirements laid down in the relevant Security Council resolutions, steps that are necessary if the sanctions against it are to be lifted.

Despite our misgivings, we are fully cognizant of the positive elements contained in the draft resolution before us. We are heartened, for example, by the fact that, through the draft resolution, the Council calls upon all States and others concerned to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and international borders of all States in the region. We particularly welcome the provision in the draft resolution which reaffirms the requirement contained in paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993) that imports to, exports from and transshipment through the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Serb forces — with the exception of essential humanitarian supplies — shall be permitted only with proper authorization from the Government of Croatia or the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This provision goes some way towards addressing the concerns about the illegal supply of fuel to the so-called Krajina Serbs, to which we referred earlier.

Against this background, and despite our misgivings about the extension of the easing of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, my delegation voted in favour of the resolution just adopted. Our position on this matter is based on the understanding that since resolution 943 (1994) has already initiated the process of relaxing sanctions, the Government in Belgrade will scrupulously fulfil the commitments that it has undertaken. Our endorsement is also predicated upon the stipulation that should at any time the Secretary-General report a wilful violation the suspension of sanctions will be terminated forthwith.

It would be reasonable to expect that the conduct of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be above reproach. Otherwise, its Government must be prepared to face even more and tougher sanctions. Finally, it should prevail upon the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace proposals advanced by the five-nation Contact Group and already accepted by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Indonesia for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mrs. Albright (United States of America): Let me congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency. Your energy and fairness have already been of immeasurable help this month, and I am sure they will continue to be. I would also like to warmly thank the Permanent Representative of Rwanda for his hard work during December.

Let me join my colleagues in welcoming our new colleagues to what is going to be a very busy period for the Security Council and in thanking those who have just completed their term. Of course, through the Italian Mission, we would very much like to welcome Foreign Minister Martino; we are glad he was here.

The sanctions regime that the Council has enacted over time is vital to our effort to persuade the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Pale Serbs that a peaceful resolution of the Bosnia conflict is in their interest. The resolution we have just adopted is an indication that our effort to persuade Belgrade to pressure the Pale Serbs to accept a just and viable peace has begun to show results. There should be no doubt that my Government's willingness to support this resolution was a direct result of our conclusion that the Government in Belgrade has moved to implement its decision to close the border by making it less porous over time, a process which it significantly augmented by imposing new measures in recent weeks.

But further efforts must be made to ensure that the border is more effectively closed. In that context, we are especially gratified that the Council is today reaffirming its prohibition of transshipments through Bosnian territory controlled by the Pale Serbs. By doing so, we are not adding any sanctions provisions. Transshipments through Bosnian Serb-controlled territory to the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia without the permission of the relevant Governments were, and continue to be, clear violations of paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993). The United States expects that paragraph to be complied with.

There have been suggestions made, not by members of this Council, that the provisions of paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993) do not apply to shipments from Serbia and Montenegro to Serb-held territory in Croatia. This contention is obviously inconsistent with the Council's previous decisions, including the border closure

we are reviewing today. Tolerating illegal transshipments to the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia without an assurance that these goods would not find their way back into Bosnian Serb-controlled territory undermined the logic of the border closure. There can be no doubt that these illegal transshipments were an obvious contravention of the letter and spirit of our resolutions. The Security Council is reaffirming that these transshipments are prohibited. We expect that others will accept the Council's decision and take their guidance from it.

However, the effectiveness of the border closure will require continued vigilance by the international community, the monitoring Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) and the officials of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We cannot allow any backsliding towards Belgrade's earlier, inadequate level of compliance. Although we believe that the border closure is now effective — in large part because of the actions taken by officials of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the ICFY Mission in the 40 days leading up to our decision today — we expect to see continued improvement over the next 100 days.

In particular, we expect that there will be physical closure of all border crossing points not covered by the ICFY Mission on a 24-hour basis; dismantlement of river ferries and physical closure of ferry sites; continued monitoring of train shipments transiting Bosnia and Herzegovina; an end to exports exiting from Bosnia and Herzegovina; control of smuggling, even by individuals; an end to all logistic and other support for the Bosnian Serb military; the thorough investigation and diligent prosecution and punishment of persons violating the border closure; and the severance of telecommunications links between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Pale Serb-held territory, which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia itself imposed but recently rescinded.

We look forward to the Secretary General's periodic reports on the status of the border closure and, in particular, to the certification on transshipments required under operative paragraph 5. An inability to make such a certification will have consequences. During the next 100 days we expect that Belgrade will continue to implement the measures described in the Co-Chairmen's 4 January report and move ahead on additional measures, including those I have mentioned, that are needed to ensure effective compliance with its commitment to close the border.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of the United States for the kind words she addressed to me.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Argentine Republic.

First of all, on behalf of my delegation, I wish to express my pleasure at the presence this evening in the Security Council of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Antonio Martino. In addition, my delegation thanks the delegation of Rwanda for its work last month under the leadership of Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa.

My delegation voted in favour of resolution 970 (1995) after having carefully studied the reports submitted every 30 days by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, as requested under paragraph 3 of resolution 943 (1994). Those reports, the most recent of which is contained in document S/1995/6, provide the certification of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's implementation of the closure of its border with the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by Bosnian Serb forces.

The Argentine Republic notes with satisfaction the effective fulfilment of the commitments undertaken by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We would also like to emphasize that for a bit more than three months that country has been cooperating with the observers of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

None the less, there are still important steps that need to be taken by the Government of that country in the peace process. For example, we hope it will soon formally recognize the sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The resolution we have just adopted extends the suspension of sanctions for another period of 100 days and, thanks to the experience we have acquired, improves the relevant monitoring procedures. The Argentine Republic reaffirms its belief that in this case the application or suspension of sanctions should be used to encourage measures leading to a peaceful, negotiated settlement in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Argentine delegation wishes to take this opportunity to highlight the agreements for a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities reached by the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina recently — last

December, to be exact. We consider them highly significant, and they give us renewed hope that progress can be made towards a lasting agreement between the parties, based on the Contact Group's peace plan, that will put an end to this conflict that has for too long been bleeding the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

There are no further speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3488

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3488th Meeting

Thursday, 12 January 1995, 7.50 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Cárdenas	(Argentina)
Members:	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Zhang Yan
	Czech Republic	Mr. Kovanda
	France	Mr. Thiebaud
	Germany	Mr. Graf Zu Rantzau
	Honduras	Mr. Martinez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Ayewah
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Fedotov
	Rwanda	Mr. Munyampeta
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mr. Hume

Agenda

The situation in Georgia

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia (UNOMIG) (S/1995/10 and Add.1 and 2)

95-85016 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 7.50 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Georgia

Report of the Secretary-General, concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia (UNOMIG) (S/1995/10 and Add.1 and 2)

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Georgia in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Chkheidze (Georgia) took a place at the Council table.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, contained in documents S/1995/10 and Addenda 1 and 2.

Members of the Council also have before them document S/1995/23, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations.

The first speaker is the representative of Georgia, and I now call on him.

Mr. Chkheidze (Georgia): First of all, Sir, I should like to extend our sincere congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month and to wish you success in your activities. We would also express our gratitude to the previous President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, for his efforts directed at the cost-effective work of the Council.

It is an honour and great pleasure for us to see here present the new members of the Security Council. We believe that their contribution to the work of the Council will be important and valuable.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Georgia and in the personal name of its Head of State, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, allow me to express our deepest appreciation to the United Nations, to its Security Council and especially to the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and his Special Envoy, Ambassador Edouard Brunner, for the attention and goodwill they have accorded to the process under way in my country.

The resolutions on Georgia adopted by the Security Council and the recent visit of the Secretary-General to the region have made clear to the world community the importance that the family of nations attaches to the comprehensive settlement of the protracted conflict in Abkhazia.

I should like to express my sincere gratitude to the members of the group of countries known as 'Friends of Georgia' and to the Russian Federation, as facilitator, for their efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

I should also like to underscore the joint activities being carried out by the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the peace-keeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States to monitor the cease-fire and ensure the safe return of thousands of homeless, which is being organized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

It has been more than a year now since negotiations began in Geneva. My Government remains fully committed to the peace process initiated by the United Nations and has complied with all the documents adopted by the Security Council and the Quadripartite Commission.

Bearing in mind the importance of reaching a negotiated settlement of the dispute, Georgia is fully cooperating with the United Nations and has taken realistic, practical steps to reach a compromise.

In a futile attempt to accelerate the peace process, in September 1994 Georgia's Head of State visited the zone of conflict and negotiated with the leader of the Abkhaz side. Unfortunately, the Abkhaz leadership is constantly violating Security Council resolutions and seeking to evade, ignore and negotiate away its obligations. Its intransigence reached its pinnacle when the separatists unilaterally adopted a new constitution on 26 November 1994 and declared Abkhazia a subject of international law, thus damaging the peace process almost beyond repair. We are gratified that the Security Council immediately condemned this unilateral decision and once again reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Georgia.

As I mentioned earlier, a year has passed since the negotiations opened in Geneva, but no arrangements have yet been made for the return of the more than 250,000 refugees and displaced persons to their homes. The Abkhaz side is doing its utmost to prevent the return of those who have been forcibly expelled, even terrorizing the few still remaining in the Gali and other districts of Abkhazia. The decision of the Security Council that the refugees and displaced persons should be allowed to return to their homes is being effectively disregarded and ignored.

Although the Security Council has condemned any attempt to change the demographic composition of Abkhazia, the region is still being settled with people of so-called Abkhaz origin — in fact mercenaries, who, as a reward, are given the houses of Georgians free of charge.

The current plight of the refugees, who are scattered throughout Georgia, is ruinously affecting its already devastated economy. Despite intensive humanitarian assistance from the international community, Georgia is experiencing, in the face of the cold winter, severe shortages of food, fuel and medicine.

Speaking of the present situation in Georgia, I would presume to remind the Security Council of the prediction that Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze made in his speech before the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly. He warned at that time against the danger of aggressive separatism under the guise of the ideals of self-determination, and he urged the international community to take all necessary measures to keep at bay this new trend, running counter to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and jeopardizing the lives of thousands of innocent people.

My President also expressed the fear that in the Caucasus

> 'as nowhere else is the danger so great that the existing internal conflicts will merge with the ones in neighbouring States and grow into regional or even continental wars fought along national or religious lines'. *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 12th meeting, p. 28-30)*

Unfortunately, in the light of current events this ominous prediction is becoming ever more realistic and imminent.

Under the circumstances, the Government of the Republic of Georgia would welcome a decision by the Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, for we believe that the United Nations presence in the region will greatly contribute to its stability and to the peace process as a whole.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* I thank the representative of Georgia for his kind words addressed to me.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. Kovanda (Czech Republic): Today, we have little reason for optimism. The main problems of the crisis under review — namely, the humanitarian situation and the political process — have barely budged since our last meeting on this issue.

The humanitarian situation resulting from the conflict and the fate of Georgia's one-quarter of a million refugees and displaced persons have always been the primary preoccupation of my country in this issue. In this context, we are horrified by the complete lack of progress on their repatriation. Fewer than 500 of the quarter million have been repatriated voluntarily over the past three months — which is absolutely laughable. At this pace, it would take about 182 years before the repatriation was completed. And it is small wonder that under these circumstances spontaneous repatriation is under way, with all the risks it entails. But even that has

affected only a few tens of thousands of people, according to information provided by the Russian delegation — that is, a small fraction of the total refugee population.

Meanwhile, in Georgia itself these refugees and displaced persons have been forgotten by the world. They suffer outside the field of vision of CNN cameras, and their suffering has resulted among other things in a full-blown health crisis: recently we dealt here approving the export of some vaccine against diphtheria — one of the diseases now plaguing Georgia. And it is pitiful that the operation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the one organization that does help, is facing a financial crisis that might force it to curtail its work in one of the world's spots where it is needed most.

Repatriation has to be speeded up by at least two orders of magnitude, so that its end can be timed in months, not centuries. My delegation is in fact particularly chagrined that this draft resolution makes no reference to a repatriation timetable such as the one the UNHCR has repeatedly proposed — in vain — to the Quadripartite Commission, dealing with refugee issues; nor does our draft propose any other measure that would refocus our attention on the need to bring refugees and displaced persons back to their villages and fields.

No movement on humanitarian issues of course follows from the absence of movement on political issues — the two are interrelated. We are distressed that no progress has been made in the last six weeks or so to resolve the political and constitutional crisis. If anything, the crisis deepened when Abkhaz leaders very unadvisedly adopted certain unilateral constitutional steps.

In the light of these steps it is all the more important that our draft resolution once again clearly and unambiguously reiterate our support for Georgia's territorial integrity. Its territorial integrity formed also the basis of a joint paper which the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Russian Federation submitted to the parties as a basis for further discussions — which, alas, again went nowhere.

The Secretary-General has made many efforts personally, but even these have not been fruitful. We urge him, however, not to be discouraged and to continue trying, again and again, to get high-level talks on Abkhazia off the ground. We do, however, agree with him that a general preoccupation with events taking place elsewhere in the Caucasus region hinders his efforts, and indeed that the crisis in Chechnya may impede the politics of seeking an Abkhaz settlement. This is just another reason why we hope the Chechnya crisis will be resolved soon — albeit not at any price. Heaven knows that the Caucasus region is already plagued by a goodly number of conflicts, and history shows that they influence one other. Would, therefore, that the impact of the crisis in Chechnya were indeed limited to politics, and the politics only of Abkhazia.

If there is anything positive in this altogether gloomy situation, it is the work of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). UNOMIG has reached its full authorized strength. It has correspondingly expanded its activity. It is cooperating well with the peace-keeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Its freedom of movement is being observed. Even its status in Georgia has been successfully settled. All this is very welcome news.

And we are also happy to learn that an arrangement has been reached on the cooperation between the United Nations and the CIS forces, on the basis of the Secretary-General's proposals of 4 November last. This cooperation will, we hope, lead to an improvement of the security situation on the ground. It seems to be especially poor in the Gali region — which the Secretary-General's report touches on in several paragraphs. We certainly hope that the combined activities of the CIS peace-keepers and of UNOMIG will help calm the situation.

If there is one other thing we would like, it is richer reporting on the operations of the CIS peace-keeping force. We are grateful to the Russian delegation for the briefings it occasionally provides to Council members during informal consultations, and indeed I have used today some numbers precisely from these briefings. But we believe it would be very advantageous for their content to find its way into official documents of the Security Council, for the benefit both of greater transparency of the CIS peace-keeping operations and of fuller information for United Nations Members. No new ground would be broken in doing so: The United States delegation, for example, regularly provides comparable briefings on Haiti, which, as we all know, are publicly available as part of the official record.

Extending the UNOMIG mandate until 15 May will in effect synchronize the timetables of the United Nations and the CIS operations, something we have advocated in the past. We therefore fully support this extension and the draft resolution before us.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* I now put to the vote the draft resolution in document S/1995/23.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Argentina, Botswana, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Oman, Russian Federation, Rwanda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 971 (1995).

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Thiébaud (France) *(interpretation from French)*: My delegation welcomes the decision the Council has just taken to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 15 May 1995.

This resolution sends the right message to the parties concerned, since it confirms the international community's commitment to securing a political settlement of the Abkhaz conflict while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia. The maintenance of a United Nations presence in Georgia is legitimate; the Secretary-General recognizes in his latest report that this presence, in close cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peace-keeping force, is playing a stabilizing role.

The situation in Abkhazia is indeed disquieting. There has been no progress on the issue of displaced persons, and this state of affairs is making it impossible to solve the humanitarian problems effectively. The political process is at a standstill and it is to be feared that it will remain there so as long as the return of the refugees is not ensured in secure conditions and in accordance with the agreements undertaken. This is a key factor for the stability of the region and for the return of the peoples concerned to normal living conditions.

Thus our Council, by today reaffirming its readiness to support the efforts to achieve a settlement, expects the parties to demonstrate without delay their resolve to break the present deadlock. The resolution we have just adopted calls on them first of all to comply with their commitments, to refrain from any action which would impede the political process, and to intensify their efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement under United Nations auspices. It is clear that the thorough review our Council will undertake at the beginning of May will take these critical elements into account.

In this respect, my delegation lends its full support to the Secretary-General for the personal assistance that he is ready to give, as well as to the mediation role played by Mr. Brunner, with a view to restarting the negotiating process. Doing our utmost to promote this process should be our primary concern.

Sir David Hannay (United Kingdom): The resolution which this Council has just adopted, and of which my Government was a co-sponsor, renews the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) for a further four months in parallel with the mandate of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peace-keeping force. My Government welcomes the contribution by UNOMIG and by the CIS peace-keeping force towards reinforcing the parties' commitment to their obligations under the Cease-fire and Separation of Forces Agreement signed last May. We also welcome the satisfactory cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force, and the exchange of letters on their respective rules and responsibilities that has now been concluded. My country is a contributor of personnel to UNOMIG, and we are especially grateful to the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Hvidegaard, and to the members of UNOMIG for their work.

But my Government remains deeply concerned by the unacceptably slow rate of return of refugees. The Abkhaz authorities must cooperate fully with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in significantly accelerating the pace of repatriation and in formalizing the position of those who have already returned. This is an essential component in the international humanitarian agencies' efforts to address the human suffering both in Abkhazia and elsewhere within the Republic of Georgia.

The overall aim of this Council's policy is to bring about a viable and lasting settlement to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict while fully respecting the Republic of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Secretary-General's Special Envoy, Mr. Brunner, with the assistance of the Russian Federation and the

participation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has worked hard towards that end, and we welcome his efforts. But we share the Secretary-General's view and his concern that the political process is stalled. United Nations action alone cannot resolve that situation. UNOMIG's presence is a means to an end, not an end in itself. It is contradictory that the Abkhaz authorities on the one hand declare Abkhazia to be a sovereign State while at the same time claiming to be ready to negotiate a political settlement in accordance with the Council's past decisions. That contradiction must be resolved in a manner that respects Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both parties must now fully and unreservedly commit themselves to making a genuine effort to settle their differences and to cooperate with Mr. Brunner to that end.

By adopting the resolution before us, this Council has committed itself to undertake a thorough review of all aspects of the situation in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, in four months' time, before the next expiration of UNOMIG's mandate. It is essential that significant progress, both in the political negotiations and also on the return of refugees, be achieved by then.

Mr. Graf zu Rantzau (Germany): The Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic, in recent consultations, made a very pertinent remark. He said, 'UNOMIG may be a small operation, but it is an operation of great importance.' We fully concur with that evaluation. The mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) is special in that it is built upon close cooperation with the peace-keeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the area. The stakes involved in this joint undertaking are high.

We are deeply concerned about the situation as described in the report of the Secretary-General. We deplore the lack of progress in the political process, as well as the standstill regarding the return of refugees.

The resolution just adopted by the Council is an appropriate response to this situation. It calls upon both parties to reach substantive progress in the political negotiations. The parties must understand that UNOMIG's presence is predicated upon a viable political process.

In this context, I would like to underline that Germany accepts that the Abkhaz side too has understandable and legitimate concerns. We continue to be willing to listen to the Abkhaz case. At the same time, it must be clear that a political solution must be based on the principles contained in the relevant resolutions of this Council, in particular on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia.

With regard to the return of refugees, it is our opinion that the Abkhaz side has to a large extent failed to honour its commitments. The resolution therefore calls upon the Abkhaz side to accelerate this process significantly. We would hope that the authorities in Sukhumi would be able to accept timetables to this effect. We note that in November the Secretary-General's Special Envoy and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation suggested that the Abkhaz side accept the return of 3,000 returnees until the beginning of January — that is, in the space of approximately six weeks.

The resolution renews UNOMIG's mandate for a period of four months. At the same time, it foresees a thorough review of the situation before the mandate expires. We hope that the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, as well as the Representatives of the Russian Federation, will underline in their contacts with the parties, that progress in all areas must be achieved during the coming months.

For the time being, my delegation believes that all possibilities under the existing mandates of UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force should be examined in order to improve the situation on the ground. We attach particular importance to operative paragraph 7 of the resolution.

Finally, we note with satisfaction the willingness expressed by the Russian Federation to brief the Council more frequently on the operation of the CIS peace-keeping force in the area. Greater transparency can only be helpful in achieving our common goals.

Mr. Fedotov (Russian Federation) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Russian Federation was a co-sponsor of the draft resolution just adopted by the Security Council. This resolution we have adopted, along with the further extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), contains weighty political provisions. We consider it important that the Council is confirming its commitment to upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia and the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return home, and that it is calling on the parties to refrain from any actions which might hinder or complicate the peace process.

The Russian Federation is concerned at the clearly inadequate progress in the negotiation process. We consider that the sides must materially intensify the quest for ways to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict.

In this connection, we view as timely the Council's call upon the sides to reach substantive progress in the negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations and with the assistance of the Russian Federation as facilitator and with participation of representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and also the Council's request to the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to contribute to the negotiation process.

We hope that the next stage in the Georgian-Abkhaz negotiations will take place in the next few weeks. The Russian Federation for its part is actively working to that end. In this context, we attach the greatest importance to the coordination of our efforts and close collaboration with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General in Georgia, Ambassador Edouard Brunner.

The Russian Federation is seriously concerned at the extremely slow pace of the return of refugees; the Abkhaz side is to blame for this. We hope that the Security Council's call upon both sides to comply with their commitments with regard to the return of refugees, and upon the Abkhaz side to accelerate the process significantly, will be effective.

The Russian representative on the Quadripartite Commission on refugees, along with the representative of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, is working actively to ensure that the sides fully implement all the provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement of 4 April 1994 on the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons.

We also note the request made by the Council in the resolution to the Secretary-General to examine, in cooperation with the relevant representatives of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peace-keeping forces the possibility of adopting additional steps to contribute to conditions conducive to the safe return of refugees.

The Russian delegation is grateful to the Council for commending the contribution of the CIS peace-keeping forces to the maintenance of the cease-fire and the stabilization of the situation in the conflict zone.

We also note the satisfaction expressed by the Council with the close cooperation between the CIS peace-keeping forces and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), and we confirm our readiness to continue to cooperate closely with UNOMIG. We hope that further development of this cooperation will be facilitated by the exchange of letters on the question that has taken place between the Secretary-General and the Chairman of the Council of the Heads of Government of the CIS.

The Russian delegation attaches importance to the Council's decision to undertake, on the basis of a report from the Secretary-General to be submitted by 4 May 1995, a thorough review of the situation in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia. We expect that in the course of that review substantive consideration will be given to the gradual transformation of the peace-keeping operation now being carried out in the conflict zone into a United Nations operation based, initially, on the already deployed CIS and UNOMIG forces in that area.

In conclusion, I would like to draw attention to the new call in the resolution we have just adopted upon Member States to contribute to the voluntary fund established by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 937 (1994). Probably few occasions can be found when during a period of nearly half a year not one contribution has been made to a voluntary fund. We believe that an inflow of resources into this fund would contribute to a more effective solution of many problems and, first and foremost, to the creation of conditions for the return of the refugees.

Mr. Hume (United States of America): One stark set of facts hangs over the otherwise credible performance of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). We have witnessed the almost total absence of progress towards a political settlement of this conflict or towards the expeditious return of the tens of thousands of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Abkhazia in safety and in dignity.

The Council has asked the Secretary-General to report twice in the short period of four months on the status of the political process and on the return of refugees and displaced persons. When the Council comes to consider the future of UNOMIG in May, we, and I trust other Council members will look closely and

seriously at the entire situation to determine whether continuation of this Mission is justified.

The United States delegation hopes that the Secretary-General's reports will give the Council reason to act favourably in this regard, but we must be realistic. Recent history does not paint an optimistic picture. The Abkhaz party bears a strong burden of responsibility for the absence of progress. By declaring themselves a sovereign nation, Abkhaz leaders have violated their commitment to reaching a mutually acceptable settlement with the Government of Georgia. The Council has rightly expressed its deep concern about this act and indicated that that declaration has no standing.

By establishing UNOMIG, the Security Council showed that it was prepared to help those who are helping themselves. Since then the process has reached a stalemate. The message of this renewal resolution is clear: now is the time for the parties to return to the table and to achieve real progress toward a political settlement and the return of refugees and displaced persons in secure and safe conditions.

Mr. Fulci (Italy): Italy's support for the resolution renewing the mandate of the Observer Mission in Georgia has been based on three main considerations: the usefulness of this resolution to a relaunching of the political negotiations, the need to consolidate the mechanism that has enabled the cease-fire to be complied with, and the reaffirmation of the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity and renunciation of the use of force.

We share the opinion of those who maintained on the eve of the expiration of UNOMIG's mandate that today's decision could not be limited to something merely technical. In our capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) until last December, we noted that during the different stages of the negotiations on Abkhazia, both at the political level and in the discussions between experts on constitutional law, the unwillingness to look for a compromise increased rather than diminished. The contrast between the autonomist — better yet, the separatist — aspirations and the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity assumed a symptomatic importance in the case of Abkhazia, and the unilateral declaration by the Abkhaz authorities on 26 November 1994 constituted the unfortunate epilogue that had been foreshadowed by some of the elements that had already emerged at the negotiating table.

In this regard, Italy wishes to commend the Government of Georgia highly for the restraint and flexibility that it has always maintained, even when faced with the most difficult conditions.

The resumption of political negotiations cannot be a long-term objective. There is an immediate need to relaunch the negotiations, for two main, compelling reasons — the downward spiral of the economy; and the internal security situation that could be triggered by the high number of refugees who are not allowed to re-enter their place of origin. But there are other reasons, especially the risk of the Abkhaz crisis's becoming a deeply rooted and perverse example for other regions of Georgia — Osetia in particular, and other parts of the Caucasus.

The humanitarian crisis is of great concern to my country. Since the spring of 1993 my Government has contributed $1.7 million worth of food aid to the Georgian people and has also helped to provide logistical support through a humanitarian flight to Tbilisi with first-aid needs from the Pisa depot. Italy has also contributed through multilateral channels, sending $1.5 million worth of humanitarian relief. This, of course, is in addition to its previous pledge of $1.5 million at the G-7 summit in London.

The renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia is an occasion to recognize the validity of the formula identified in Security Council resolution 937 (1994) of last July. In his report, the Secretary-General gave a positive assessment of the degree of cooperation and coordination between the United Nations Mission and the peace-keeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States. We noted the specific example of such cooperation mentioned in the report. The seeds of this positive outcome were planted thanks to the commitment of the Secretariat and of the Russian Federation to defining the mandates and responsibilities of the two distinct missions on the ground, which are so closely tied by the common goal of pacification.

The Georgian crisis has provided proof of the cooperation that has developed between the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe — now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Budapest summit last December, in its decision on Georgia, which referred to both Abkhazia and Osetia, recalled the fundamental concept confirmed once again in today's resolution —

strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders; concern about unilateral acts that undermine the efforts to promote a peaceful settlement through negotiation; concern about and condemnation of "ethnic cleansing" and the massive expulsion of people from the areas in which they live.

On the basis of these shared principles, we remain convinced that a regional organization such as the OSCE can continue to make a significant contribution to the efforts of the United Nations towards a final settlement of the crisis — especially in identifying neo-institutional arrangements.

The Security Council can and must make a decisive political input, as United Nations success stories in other crisis areas have demonstrated. In this sense, today's resolution also represents a new beginning for a negotiated settlement.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: There are no further speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 8.35 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3489

Security Council
Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3489th Meeting
Friday, 13 January 1995, 12 noon
New York

President:	Mr. Cárdenas	(Argentina)
Members:	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Wang Xuexian
	Czech Republic	Mr. Rovensky
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Graf Zu Rantzau
	Honduras	Mr. Martínez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Ayewah
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda	Mr. Bakuramutsa
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mr. Inderfurth

Agenda

The situation in Liberia

Eighth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) (S/1995/9)

95-85022 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 12.35 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Liberia

Eighth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) (S/1995/9)

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Liberia in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Bull (Liberia), took a place at the Council table.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the eighth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, document S/1995/9.

Members of the Council also have before them document S/1995/22, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations.

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/1995/7, which contains the text of a letter dated 5 January 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, and the attached agreements.

The first speaker is the representative of Liberia, on whom I now call.

Mr. Bull (Liberia): At the outset, Sir, I would like to congratulate you upon your ascendancy to the presidency of the Security Council for January 1995. The record of your distinguished career shows us that the deliberations of the Council will achieve every measure of success.

I should also like to thank the Ambassador of Rwanda for his stewardship of the Council last month, which yielded positive results.

My delegation expresses its profound gratitude to the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for his unrelenting concern with and involvement in the Liberian crisis. In particular we appreciate his eighth progress report on the activities of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and on the current status of peace initiatives being pursued by the Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), His Excellency President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, and other ECOWAS leaders, in concert with the Liberian National Transitional Government, faction leaders, and others concerned with the conflict in Liberia — initiatives aimed at finding an acceptable and durable resolution of the Liberian civil war.

The useful recommendations which have been advanced by the high-level mission led by Mr. Lansana Kouyate, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and which the Secretary-General endorses in his report, capture quite vividly the various dimensions of the Liberian problem. My delegation shares the optimism that if those proposals are translated into action it will not be long before lasting peace is achieved in Liberia and the subregion as a whole.

While it is a source of considerable regret and disappointment to note that talks in Accra among the faction leaders which should have culminated in the establishment of a new Council of State appear to have ended in a stalemate, we are hopeful that this is only a temporary setback.

We the overwhelming majority of Liberians have publicly declared our desire for peace. It is only in an atmosphere of peace and stability that our national aspirations and ambitions can be achieved. The faction leaders must show courage and flexibility in order to

reach political accommodation and begin the process of national reconciliation.We therefore fervently appeal to their sense of brotherhood and patriotism and ask them to empathize with the unnecessary, long suffering of their compatriots.

While we recognize that it is up to Liberians to end the war and that the international community, particularly States members of the Economic Community of West African States, has expended large resources on peace-keeping and peacemaking in Liberia, their continuing engagement in Liberia is needed.

Even though we welcome the Secretary-General's recommendation for the extension of the mandate of UNOMIL, my delegation would have preferred a longer extension in view of UNOMIL's direct responsibilities in the implementation of the agreed schedule for the cease-fire now in effect and the disarmament and demobilization of the combatants, as well as in the holding of democratic elections on 14 November this year.

The Secretary-General's report emphasized the urgent need for full compliance with the Council's arms embargo on Liberia. The truth of the matter is that as long as arms are provided to the factions this will continue to result in the use of force.

We welcome the Secretary-General's request that an ECOWAS summit be convened to address these and other concerns. However, the Security Council must take appropriate steps to ensure compliance with its own embargo, to which I have just referred. In successive reports to the Council, the Secretary-General has requested the contribution of Member States to the Trust Fund for Liberia. As the Fund is used to help provide assistance to the troop-contributing countries, my delegation joins in the Secretary-General's appeal for increased contributions to it. In this connection, we thank those countries which have responded to the appeal and also the troop-contributing countries.

The grave humanitarian crisis in Liberia, which the Secretary-General highlighted in his report, continues to deserve the international community's sympathy and support. We welcome the Council's appeal for increased humanitarian assistance as set forth in the draft resolution.

When the Liberian crisis is finally resolved, it will herald a significant milestone in what can be attained through regional peace-keeping buttressed by firm action from the international community through the Security Council. We therefore appeal for the Council's steadfast cooperation and support until peace is achieved in Liberia.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Liberia for the kind words he addressed to me.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. If I hear no objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. Wang Xuexian (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Liberian peace process is now at a crucial juncture. We are pleased to note that the parties in Liberia signed the Accra Agreement on 21 December 1994 and thereafter entered into a comprehensive cease-fire. By no means an easy achievement, this has laid a solid foundation for the advancement of the peace process in Liberia.

The reality in Liberia has once again demonstrated that peace cannot be achieved by military means. Persistent, patient and sincere negotiation and dialogue are the only ways to a political solution acceptable to all the parties to a conflict. What is important in this regard is the political will of the parties to commit themselves to a peaceful settlement. A conflict in a country must, in the final analysis, be settled by its own people. The international community, including the United Nations, can play only a supplementary and promotive role in this respect. We hope and believe that the Liberian parties, acting in their national interests, will strictly implement the provisions and the timetable set forth in the Accra Agreement and abide by the cease-fire agreement so as to create the conditions for the restoration of peace in Liberia.

The Chinese delegation would like to thank the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for their unremitting efforts to promote a political settlement in Liberia. We are also highly appreciative of the contributions made to the Liberian peace process by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and particularly by its current Chairman,

His Excellency President Rawlings of Ghana, and by the Military Observer Group. They have set an example for joint efforts by the United Nations and regional organizations in settling conflicts.

The Chinese delegation is deeply concerned at the continued massive flow of arms into Liberia, which could undermine the cease-fire agreement reached by the Liberian parties and hamper the successful implementation of the Accra Agreement. The Chinese delegation hopes that the provisions related to the arms embargo will be strictly observed.

The Chinese delegation has all along supported the peace process in Liberia and the efforts by the international community and the relevant regional organizations to bring lasting peace to that country. It is based on this position that we will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us.

Mr. Ayewah (Nigeria): For over four years now the Liberian people have been at the mercy of factional leaders and parties whose desire for power, as well as the allure of high office, would appear to have blinded them to the need for a negotiated settlement to their political differences. The months immediately preceding December last year marked such a deterioration in the political and security situation in Liberia that the number of military observers of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) had to be drastically reduced, the humanitarian situation worsened, and the area controlled by the Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) effectively became limited to no more than 15 per cent of the country.

Against that background, my Government and other member States of ECOWAS welcome the recent agreement brokered in Accra by the current Chairman of ECOWAS, which builds upon the Yamoussoukro, Cotonou and Akosombo agreements and includes a timetable for the implementation of a programme leading to a cease-fire and to elections.

Taking into account the chain of broken promises and the bad faith so far exhibited by the parties and factions in Liberia in relation to previous commitments, one would be justified in being pessimistic about, if not outright dismissive of, the possibilities and prospects of this latest agreement. As if to justify this pessimism, we have since learned that the latest attempt in Accra to agree on the composition of a transitional Council for Liberia has aborted. We regret this outcome and hope that the great expectations that were only beginning to gain momentum are not permanently lost.

However, because the ultimate solution to the Liberian conflict must rest with the Liberians, one cannot but hope that the parties will seize the opportunity of the moment, however sad it might seem to be, in the realization that it is futile to continue along the destructive path of a fratricidal war whose main victims are innocent civilians, particularly women and children.

The draft resolution before us attests to the continuing interest of the international community in helping the Liberians solve their own problems. My delegation would have favoured an extension of UNOMIL's mandate for a six-month period, to allow sufficient time for the initial and critical stage of the military aspects of the Accra Agreement to commence and be observed before the Secretary-General presented his report to the Council. Because of the three-month duration of the present mandate, such a report by the Secretary-General would, of necessity, be tentative and could give the wrong impression of the prospects for implementing the relevant aspects of the Agreement.

My delegation has always underlined — and this has also been recently highlighted by the Secretary-General in his "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" — that ECOMOG's operation in Liberia presents a classical example of cooperation between a regional organization and the United Nations in peacemaking and peacekeeping. In this connection, the international community has a responsibility to continue to assist the process. Otherwise, the burden on ECOWAS countries, which is already a matter of great concern to most Governments of the subregion, will become even more unbearable for their fragile economies. We look forward with particular interest to the Secretary-General's forthcoming report — referred to in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution before us — on the assistance needed by ECOWAS member States in order to maintain their troops in ECOMOG.

A very important element in the current draft resolution relates to the continuing flow of weapons into Liberia in violation of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 788 (1992). This proliferation of weapons not only complicates the prospects for disarmament but also compounds the problems of security and jeopardizes the safety of ECOMOG and UNOMIL personnel in the country. It is important, as the current draft resolution reminds us, that all Member States abide by and comply

with the embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia.

The Nigerian Government and people continue to expend enormous human and financial resources on the ECOMOG operations aimed at restoring peace to the war-torn country. We are doing so because we are convinced that Liberia and Liberians should not be left to their own devices in their moment of travail. What is more, the crisis in Liberia has implications not only for that country but also for the stability of the entire subregion of West Africa.

We are grateful to the Secretary-General for his continuing interest and involvement in the search for a solution to the crisis in Liberia. We also thank those Member States and organizations that have provided financial, logistic and other forms of support to the peace-keeping operation. We appeal to all Member States for additional support so that Liberians may soon be able to resume normal lives and pursue their economic development and well-being.

Mr. Fulci (Italy): Italy will vote in favour of the draft resolution. We now view the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for three months as being of considerable advantage.

On one hand, three months is long enough to allow verification of whether or not the Liberian factions are complying with the Accra Agreement, signed on 21 December 1994 — in particular, the provisions relating to the cease-fire and the establishment of the Council of State. Unfortunately, as has been mentioned by other members of the Council, the parties were unable last night to reach agreement on the composition of the Council of State, which has therefore not been installed. Thus, the schedule agreed upon in Accra has been delayed.

On the other hand, the extension is short enough to issue a clear warning, a clear signal, to the parties that the time has come for them to demonstrate — and to demonstrate by deeds, not by words only — their willingness to ensure peace in their country. Too many times they have failed to abide by agreements they signed. Too often the factions have resumed fighting, making it impossible for the international relief organizations to deliver much-needed humanitarian assistance, prolonging the suffering of the civilian population and plunging its country into an ever-worsening humanitarian and economic crisis. The parties should therefore, without delay, resume their negotiations.

Today's draft resolution also calls for tightening of the application of the arms embargo. In this sense, let a clear message go out to the countries concerned: no peace will be reached until the arms flow across the Liberian borders is interrupted.

The case of Liberia seems emblematic of the collaboration that there should be between the United Nations and the regional organizations in the area of conflict prevention and the maintenance of peace. Africa's regional organizations recently showed their willingness to play a concrete role in the maintenance of peace and security in their respective geopolitical areas and are equipping themselves with mechanisms for conflict prevention and management and the settlement of disputes.

Italy, but not only Italy, understands and welcomes the growing aspiration of the African countries to play a more effective role, despite the fact that there are still some inadequacies in the structure that is available to them — a structure that we hope will soon be reinforced.

The draft resolution that is before the Council today also acknowledges the crucial role played by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), particularly by the Community's current Chairman, President Rawlings of Ghana, whose diplomatic efforts in the negotiation process that led to the recent developments in Liberia deserve full recognition. We strongly hope that these efforts, including a summit of the ECOWAS States, will continue, thus improving the prospects for a lasting solution to the conflict.

We ask the Ambassador of Liberia, who is sitting at the Security Council table today, to transmit this message of hope and encouragement to his country and his people.

Let me conclude by reiterating my country's willingness to support the African countries' bid for a more direct role in conflict prevention and management on their continent and to strive for more effective coordination between them and the United Nations. Italy hopes very much that the conflict in Liberia will very soon come to an end and that peace and prosperity will be restored in that country.

Mr. Legwaila (Botswana): My delegation is gratified that the Security Council agrees that it is necessary to extend the mandate of the United Nations

Observer Mission in Liberia by three months — although some of us would have preferred a longer extension.

The report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Liberia is informative. My delegation is pleased with it and would like to thank the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for their tireless efforts in the search for peace in Liberia. We should also like to thank and congratulate States members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — particularly its Chairman, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana — in respect of the current breakthrough in the peace process in Liberia, as envisaged in the Accra Agreement.

The Accra Agreement offers perhaps the brightest ray of hope for the people of Liberia. It has brought about a cease-fire, which took effect on 28 December 1994. It also contains a clear programme of action for the peace process. Granted, Liberia has in the past seen the signing of cease-fire agreements that were never respected. It is our fervent hope, however, that this time the leaders of the parties to the Accra Agreement will not renege on their commitment to a peaceful solution to the Liberian crisis.

It would be disheartening and disappointing for my delegation if any of the Liberian parties were to dishonour their commitment to yet another cease-fire. Unfortunately, we are already disheartened and disappointed by the suspension of the talks in Accra. But by their own agreement the Liberian parties are obliged fully to implement and honour the Accra Agreement. It is their bounden duty to uphold the cease-fire, ensure the installation of the Council of State and commit themselves to the demobilization, encampment and disarming of their militias. They should see to it that humanitarian assistance reaches its intended target groups by ensuring the security of organizations involved in distributing relief supplies to displaced persons.

The crucial role that has been and continues to be played by the countries contributing troops to the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) cannot be overemphasized. In his report the Secretary-General has highlighted the need for assistance to be given to these Member States. We appeal to the international community to render all the necessary assistance to ECOMOG so that it can continue its work without interruptions caused by financial, logistical and other problems. They are doing a difficult and very important job on behalf of all of us, and they deserve the support of the international community.

By resolution 788 (1992), the Security Council imposed an embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia. The continued proliferation of weapons into Liberia not only violates the provisions of that resolution, but also has a destabilizing effect on both the peace process in Liberia and stability in the subregion at large. It is important that the enforcement of that embargo should continue to be tightened. In addition, my delegation believes that the idea of a summit meeting for ECOWAS member States is a brilliant one which should be brought to fruition in the near future in order to bring about, among other things, the harmonization and consolidation of a subregional approach to the Liberian question at this important juncture in the peace process.

Let me conclude by repeating that durable peace can come to Liberia only if the Liberians themselves are ready — sincerely and seriously ready — to work for it.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/1995/22.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Botswana, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Oman, Russian Federation, Rwanda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 972 (1995).

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Mérimée (France) (*interpretation from French*): France has followed with interest the latest developments in the situation in Liberia. It is pleased at the conclusion of the Accra Agreement, which at long last provides a glimmer of hope for peace for Liberia. France pays tribute to the Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for his efforts to reconcile the factions. It hopes that the commitments undertaken by all the Liberian parties will this time be respected. It deeply regrets that the Accra talks on the setting up of the Council of State have failed, and it calls upon the parties to set up without delay this organ that is so essential for the transition.

My delegation voted in favour of this resolution, which extends the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for three months, to enable the parties to provide concrete proof of their good will and spirit of responsibility. It is once again being made clear that the international community and the United Nations cannot take the place of the Liberians; they alone are responsible for their country's fate. The French Government urges the Liberian factions to respect the cease-fire concluded on 28 December last and calls for strict implementation of the arms embargo. My Government supports the Secretary-General's recommendation for the holding of a summit of the Heads of State of the region to harmonize their policies towards Liberia and promote the implementation of the Accra Agreement. The continuation of the conflict in Liberia is truly a threat to the stability of the region.

The humanitarian situation, which, as the Secretary-General stresses, has left the population in extreme distress, is of deep concern to my country. France is providing humanitarian assistance, particularly within the framework of the European Union. The United Nations and the non-governmental organizations are doing all they can to come to the aid of the civilian population. It is absolutely shocking that material and other supplies intended to assist people are plundered and that the life and freedom of movement of the personnel of these organizations are threatened. My delegation therefore calls upon the parties to respect their commitments and to ensure that the military commanders in the field allow assistance to reach its destination.

At the end of the three-month period, which will serve as a test of the good will of the Liberian factions, my country will be ready to consider possible recommendations by the Secretary-General for augmenting UNOMIL's resources and functions.

Sir David Hannay (United Kingdom): My delegation welcomes the signing of the Accra Agreement as a positive step towards the solution of the Liberian conflict. It is right that, in the light of this development and, in particular, the implementation of a cease-fire, the United Nations should maintain its involvement in the peace process in Liberia, and it is for this reason that my delegation was pleased to vote for the resolution just adopted.

The successful conclusion of the Accra Agreement is due in very large part to the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and, in particular, its current Chairman, President Rawlings of Ghana, who has shown admirable persistence and commitment in bringing all the factions together to hammer out a solution. We commend his efforts and those of the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), which has been playing a valuable peace-keeping role in the country. The efforts of ECOWAS, ECOMOG, the United Nations and its Member States represent an enormous commitment on the part of the international community to reaching a settlement to the conflict in Liberia. We urge the Liberian factions now to demonstrate similar commitment and to uphold the cease-fire and implement the other provisions of the Accra Agreement in accordance with the agreed timetable, including the prompt installation of the Council of State.

One of the very important issues covered in the resolution we have just adopted is that of reminding all Member States of their obligation strictly to abide by, and comply with, the arms embargo. The damaging effect of the brutal conflict in Liberia, not only on the people of that country but also on Liberia's neighbours, is a matter of great concern to my delegation. The conflict is sustained by arms traffic across and within Liberia's borders, which can only increase the risk of regional destabilization. My Government attaches great importance to the effective implementation of this arms embargo by all.

Finally, let me say that, as the Council adopts this resolution today, my delegation has to admit to the feeling that we have been here before. Throughout the Liberian conflict we have seen a number of agreements signed, each one seeming to offer a way out of the impasse reached. Each time, the Security Council has expressed its support for the peace process and underlined its willingness to work with the factions and with ECOMOG to help bring about a solution to the conflict which is having such a devastating impact on the lives of the people of Liberia. It is our sincere hope that this time the agreement into which the mediators have put such commendable effort will be translated into deeds and that by the time we review the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) again in April we will have seen concrete evidence of the commitment of the Liberian factions to the peace their country desperately needs.

The news we have heard this morning, alas, of the failure of the Accra talks so far to reach a decision on the installation of the Council of State is discouraging indeed, and it hardly augurs well for that review or for the hopes for peace in Liberia.

Mr. Wisnumurti (Indonesia): My delegation, at the outset, would like to register its sincere appreciation for the succinct and useful report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/1995/9 of 6 January 1995, the eighth in the series of progress reports on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).

We also commend and express appreciation to the Secretary-General and his former Special Representative, Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers, for the untiring efforts to bring about peace in Liberia. We welcome the appointment of Mr. Anthony Nyakyi as the Secretary-General's new Special Representative for Liberia; we hope that he will enjoy success in carrying out his new duties.

We pay tribute to the members of the high-level mission dispatched to the Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in order to find ways for reviving the peace process and achieving reconciliation among the Liberian factions. The mission, led by Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Mr. Lansana Kouyaté, carried out extensive consultations throughout West Africa to facilitate a new political accommodation among Liberians, an accommodation which would be possible only if it was supported by a common policy of the neighbouring States directly involved with Liberia.

My delegation is pleased to note that all the Liberian parties succeeded in signing an agreement on 21 December 1994 in Accra. Since this Accra Agreement has been signed by all the factions currently involved in the conflict, we think it appropriate to extend our appreciation to the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, for his success in carrying out the principal negotiations among the parties concerned. His initiatives substantially helped in overcoming the parties' differences; this subsequently led to the signing of the Agreement. In this regard, we also commend the positive role played by the Foreign Ministers of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine on Liberia.

As pointed out by the Secretary-General in his report, the Liberian parties have signed many peace agreements but have failed to implement them. Hence, we hope that all Liberian parties will now begin to adhere to the Accra Agreement and substantially demonstrate their readiness to implement it fully. We believe that the observance of a cease-fire as of 28 December 1994 could lead to the holding of the free and fair elections which are now scheduled for 14 November 1995, and also to the installation of the elected government on 1 January 1996.

We are also in a position to support the Secretary-General's recommendation for the convening of a summit of ECOWAS leaders to coordinate and harmonize their policies on Liberia and promote implementation of the Accra Agreement.

The political future of Liberia depends on the Liberians. Therefore, they must strive to demonstrate further their political will and sustained commitment to peace and stability in their country. This would entail their actively facilitating the safe delivery of international humanitarian assistance throughout the country. In this regard, my delegation calls upon all Liberians to cooperate fully with the activities undertaken by the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).

Since the peace process in Liberia is now entering a crucial moment, by voting for the resolution the Council has just adopted my delegation has indicated its support for UNOMIL's continued presence in Liberia.

The resolution that has just been adopted by the Council extends the mandate of UNOMIL for another three months beginning on 13 January 1995. This reflects the unanimous determination of the international community and the commitment it has undertaken in favour of an early and peaceful solution to the conflict on the basis of the Accra Agreement, including its timetable for implementation of its provisions — and this process has already dragged on for far too long.

We hope that the talks on the composition of the Council of State, as referred to in the Accra Agreement, can be resumed immediately and that agreement can be reached as soon as possible.

The extension of the mandate ought to be seen as an opportunity for the parties to the conflict to respect the cease-fire and implement all the relevant agreements. It is our hope that within this period the Liberian parties will be afforded a significant opportunity to demonstrate their willingness to solve their own problems and to respect the role of international, regional and subregional organizations.

Mr. Inderfurth (United States of America): The United States is pleased to support extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for another three months. This follows the agreement of 21 December among the Liberian parties on a cease-fire and a political process for

ending their five-year civil war. We commend President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for his success in facilitating the peace agreement. We also commend Trevor Gordon-Somers, who was then the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, the Organization of African Unity, the ECOWAS Committee of Nine, and Nigeria, the major contributor to ECOMOG, for their supportive roles in this achievement. It is now up to the Liberian people themselves to demonstrate their commitment to peace by doing all in their power to implement fully the provisions of the peace agreement.

In this regard, we are concerned by the inability of the Liberian parties to agree on the composition of the new Council of State at the recent meetings in Accra, and urge the parties to overcome the obstacles encountered in their deliberations on this matter.

UNOMIL, in conjunction with ECOMOG, has a critical role to play. It is already engaged in monitoring the 28 December cease-fire and, providing the cease-fire holds, will soon begin monitoring the disarmament process, supervising demobilization of combatants and reintegrating them into peaceful society, and assisting ECOMOG in overseeing overall implementation of the peace agreement. If implementation of the peace agreement proceeds and the cease-fire is maintained, UNOMIL should be returned to the level authorized by resolution 866 (1993).

The United States strongly supports humanitarian efforts to alleviate the suffering of the hundreds of thousands of persons displaced by the conflict. We urge all members of the international community to help further the peace process in Liberia and to support international and regional efforts to aid implementation of the Accra Agreement. The United States hopes that other States Members of the United Nations will contribute generously to the United Nations Trust Fund for Liberia, as the United States has already done, because the Fund is a tangible expression of support for the Liberian people's desire for peace. We hope that peace will return to Liberia in 1995.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) *(interpretation from Russian)*: In Russia we are greatly concerned by the complex military, political and humanitarian situation in which Liberia finds itself. We share the assessment and recommendations set out in the Secretary-General's report of 6 January 1995, which in our view adequately reflects the situation in Liberia.

The draft resolution that the Council has adopted today provides for the optimum period for which in present conditions the mandate of the United Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) can be extended. It sends all the Liberian sides a clear signal that they must strictly implement all the provisions of the peace agreement relating to the timetable for their implementation. To judge by the latest information from Accra, the sides have not yet fully realized the importance of consistent actions in that specific direction. We therefore call upon them, as a first step and without delay, to set up the Council of State and to resume negotiations to that end.

In this context, and taking into account the experience of the past few years, we consider appropriate the linkage in the resolution of the establishment of the former level of UNOMIL personnel with the existence, first and foremost, of a stable cease-fire in Liberia.

Russia has always considered that the active participation of African countries in the achievement of a settlement in Liberia is important in principle for that country's return to the path of peaceful, democratic development. We wish to single out the constructive role of the current Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Mr. Rawlings, President of Ghana. We consider that the countries that are participating in ECOWAS and in the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) are playing a key role in preventing Liberia from sliding into complete military and political anarchy and in preventing the breakup of the country — which, without any doubt, would have serious negative consequences for the entire region.

For that reason we view as most important the provisions in the resolution for strengthening the potential of ECOMOG, including through the help of the international community, and the provisions on convening a summit of the leaders of the ECOWAS States with a view to harmonizing their policies on Liberia and promoting the implementation of the Accra Agreement, through, among other things, tightening the embargo on the supply of arms to Liberia. If this agreement is carried out, then the crisis in Liberia can be overcome, and this, in our opinion, can serve as an example of the successful settlement of a conflict situation on the African continent by forces of the Africans themselves and as an example of the effective interaction of the international community, as represented by the United Nations, and regional peacemaking mechanisms.

Mr. Biontino (Germany): Germany views the signing of the Accra Agreement by all the Liberian parties concerned as an encouraging step towards peace in Liberia. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), under the current leadership of President Rawlings of Ghana, has played a most important role in securing this Agreement. We hope that, together with the Akosombo Agreement and the underlying Cotonou Agreement, it will prove to be the basis for a more dynamic peace process in Liberia.

We voted in favour of extending the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for three months. During this extension the Liberian parties will have to prove their commitment to the peace process. In this respect, we are deeply concerned about the failure of the Liberian parties to reach agreement on the composition of the Council of State as stipulated in the Accra Agreement. It is crucial that the cease-fire, the agreed timetable towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and the other relevant aspects of the Accra Agreement be respected meticulously. Otherwise the Council will not be able to examine UNOMIL's mandate more thoroughly.

While it is important to be cautious today, this does not mean that we should hesitate to assist the peace process in Liberia. In this respect, I should like to point out the important role which the Cease-fire Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG), together with UNOMIL, is playing in securing such a process. This shows how regional and subregional organizations can assist the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. We know that the African countries contributing to ECOMOG are shouldering a heavy burden and we think that they should be assisted. I am glad to recall that my Government has offered ECOMOG 35 trucks to help it carry out its mandate.

The Security Council and the international community can assist the peace process. But the various Liberian parties are ultimately responsible for the future of their country. It is up to them to advance the process of national reconciliation and thus to lay the foundations for a lasting peace. We call on them truly to respect the Accra Agreement as well as the Akosombo and Cotonou Agreements, to which they have committed themselves. The international community can assist the Liberians, but only they can achieve true peace.

Mr. Bakarumutsa (Rwanda) (*interpretation from French*): Since this is the first time that I have personally spoken in the Council, permit me to congratulate you, Sir, on your accession to the presidency of the Security Council for this month. Rwanda is confident that with your experience and competence you will lead the work of the Council successfully. We can assure you of our cooperation.

It is an honour for the delegation of Rwanda to welcome the new members of the Security Council and to assure them of our full and fruitful cooperation this year.

My delegation wishes to pay a wholehearted tribute to the Secretary-General for his report dated 6 January 1995 (S/1995/9) on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). We wish also to extend deep thanks to the current Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the President of Ghana; to all the States members of ECOWAS; to the personnel of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG); and to the international community for their invaluable support for the peace process in Liberia.

In regard to the Liberian conflict and its disastrous effects on neighbouring countries, the delegation of Rwanda deplores the deterioration of the situation in Liberia caused by the non-compliance with the letter of the Cotonou and Accra agreements signed in 1993 and 1994.

At this time when the peace process in Liberia is proceeding in fits and starts and therefore dampening the international community's optimism, the delegation of Rwanda believes the Accra Agreement to be an oasis of hope in a desert almost totally devoid of peace.

My delegation nevertheless deplores a widespread attitude in the Security Council *vis-à-vis* the resolution of African conflicts. It became clear in 1994 alone that in some cases the withdrawal of troops led to massacres. In the case of another African country, the decision by the United Nations to disengage its forces was not the best solution for the people of that country who were victims of warlords.

In the case of Liberia, the decision to extend the presence of UNOMIL's peace forces by three months has not been taken for the good of the population but is,

instead, a solution based on a strategy of threatening the parties to the conflicts.

Africa is going through a period of crisis and its effects are not felt by just one country. At the same time, Africa is at a stage of advanced marginalization in many spheres as compared to the rest of the world.

The search for solutions to conflicts like the one in Liberia should not be limited to a three-month period. Only a process, a slow path, can lead to consensus by all parties concerned. This is evidenced by the fact that in other regions of the world the Council has acted differently.

As a gesture of solidarity and cooperation, my delegation voted in favour of the extension of UNOMIL's mandate until 13 April 1995, but we promise the Council that we will return to this matter at an appropriate moment.

Meanwhile, my delegation encourages and supports all efforts undertaken by the countries of the subregion to assist in speeding up the implementation of the provisions of the various peace agreements in Liberia.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Liberia for his kinds words addressed to me.

There are no other names on the list of speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3490

Security Council
Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3490th Meeting
Friday, 13 January 1995, 1.40 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Cárdenas	(Argentina)
Members:	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Zhang Yan
	Czech Republic	Mr. Rovensky
	France	Mr. Thiebaud
	Germany	Mr. Biontino
	Honduras	Mr. Rendon Barnica
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Casardi
	Nigeria	Mr. Ayewah
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda	Mr. Bakuramutsa
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mrs. Aron
	United States of America	Mr. Inderfurth

Agenda

The situation concerning Western Sahara

Progress report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/1995/1420 and Add.1)

95-85028 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 1.40 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation concerning Western Sahara

Progress report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/1994/1420 and Add.1)

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of Council have before them the progress report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, documents S/1994/1420 and Add.1. Members of the Council also have before them document S/1995/24, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it in document S/1995/24. If I hear no objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

A vote was taken by a show of hands.

In favour:

Argentina, Botswana, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Oman, Russian Federation, Rwanda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 973 (1995).

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3491

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3491st Meeting

Tuesday, 17 January 1995, 11.45 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Cárdenas	(Argentina)
Members:	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Wang Xuexian
	Czech Republic	Mr. Kovanda
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Henze
	Honduras	Mr. Martinez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Gambari
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Sidorov
	Rwanda	Mr. Munyampeta
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mrs. Albright

Agenda

The situation prevailing in and adjacent to the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia

Letter dated 12 January 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1995/28)

95-85040 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 12 noon.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation prevailing in and adjacent to the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia

Letter dated 12 January 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1995/28)

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Croatia, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nobilo (Croatia) took a place at the Council table.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/1995/28, which contains the text of a letter dated 12 January 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council, which has begun its consideration of the Secretary-General's report of 14 January 1995 submitted pursuant to resolution 947 (1994) (S/1995/38), has learned with concern of the position adopted by the Republic of Croatia on the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia beyond 31 March 1995, as set out in the letter from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the Secretary-General of 12 January 1995 (S/1995/28). It is particularly concerned about the wider implications of this development for the peace process throughout the former Yugoslavia.

"The Security Council reiterates its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders. It understands the concerns of the Croatian Government about the lack of implementation of major provisions of the United Nations Peace-keeping Plan for Croatia. It will not accept the status quo becoming an indefinite situation. It believes, however, that UNPROFOR's continued presence in the Republic of Croatia is of vital importance for regional peace and security, and that the United Nations in general and UNPROFOR in particular have a positive role to play in achieving the further implementation of the Peace-keeping Plan and bringing about a settlement which ensures full respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Croatia. It recalls the important role UNPROFOR plays in helping to sustain the cease-fire in Croatia, facilitating humanitarian activities and international relief work, and supporting implementation of the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994 (S/1994/1375).

"It is in that perspective that the Security Council hopes that discussions over the weeks ahead will lead to a re-examination of the position now taken in relation to the continuing role of UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia.

"Meanwhile, the Security Council calls upon all parties and others concerned to avoid any action or statement which might lead to an increase in tension. It welcomes the conclusion, under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, of the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994, and urges the parties to continue, and accelerate, its implementation; it notes the need for adequate international financial support, and encourages the international community to respond to this need. It calls for the intensification in the coming weeks of all these efforts to consolidate this achievement and to bring about a political settlement in Croatia, and it also calls upon the parties to cooperate with these efforts and to negotiate in earnest to that end.

"The Security Council affirms its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States there within their internationally recognized borders, and stresses the importance it attaches to the mutual recognition thereof."

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/1995/2.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3492

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3492nd Meeting

Wednesday, 18 January 1995, 10.30 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Cárdenas	(Argentina)
Members:	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Wang Xuexian
	Czech Republic	Mr. Sporýš
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Henze
	Honduras	Mr. Martinez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Gambari
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda	Mr. Ubalijoro
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mrs. Albright

Agenda

An Agenda for Peace

Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations (S/1995/1)

95-85048 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 11 a.m.

Expression of sympathy to the Government and people of Japan in connection with the recent earthquake

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* At the outset of this meeting, I should like, on behalf of the Security Council, to extend deep sympathy to the Government and people of Japan in connection with the great tragedy it has experienced as a result of the major earthquake that has occurred in Western Japan. I am sure that I speak for all members of the Council in expressing profound shock and sorrow at the great loss of human life and extensive material damage suffered by Japan. I would request the representative of Japan to convey to his Government our grief and sincere condolences.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

An Agenda for Peace

Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations (S/1995/1)

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* At this meeting, the Security Council begins consideration of document S/1995/1. It wishes to have the reaction of its members as well as the views of Member States of the United Nations in general. Bearing in mind today's debate, the Security Council will decide how best to continue consideration of this document.

I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Butler (Australia), Mr. Reyn (Belgium), Mr. Valle (Brazil), Mr. Pashovski (Bulgaria), Mr. Fowler (Canada), Mr. Anderfo Garcia (Colombia), Mr. Elaraby (Egypt), Mr. Nathon (Hungary), Mr. Sreenivasan (India), Mr. Hayes (Ireland), Mr. Maruyama (Japan), Mr. Baumanis (Latvia), Mr. Muntasser (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Razali (Malaysia), Mr. Biegman (Netherlands), Mr. Keating (New Zealand), Mr. Bjorn Lian (Norway), Mr. Marker (Pakistan), Mr. Wlosowicz (Poland), Mr. Chirila (Romania), Mr. Bangura (Sierra Leone), Mr. Turk (Slovenia), Mr. Rodrigo (Sri Lanka), Mr. Batu (Turkey) and Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the document entitled "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace; position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations", which has been published under the symbol S/1995/1.

The first speaker is the representative of the United Kingdom, on whom I now call.

Sir David Hannay (United Kingdom): It is a great honour to be the first to speak in a debate which it is clear from the length of the speakers' list is arousing a great deal of interest.

I should like to pay tribute to the Ambassador of France, who typified this last month as the sort of debate which we should have in open session before we get down to a serious discussion of the follow-up. I think it is very encouraging that there has been such a strong response and that the countries that will be speaking in this debate represent such a very broad cross-section of countries that have honourably contributed to United Nations peace-keeping over the years. It will be very important indeed to hear their views.

Just under three years ago, Mr. President, the British Prime Minister, John Major, sat where you now sit, and at the end of the first-ever Summit-level meeting of the Security Council, read out a Presidential statement that commissioned the report that has come to be known

as "An Agenda for Peace". That report offered the United Nations a new vision of its role in international peace and security and a series of concepts, such as post-conflict peace-building, whose common usage today is witness to how far we have progressed in the last three years.

The position paper by the Secretary-General we are considering today updates the original "Agenda for Peace". I should like to say at the outset that my Government warmly welcomes the paper. It is timely and important. It is timely, not only because of the United Nations fiftieth anniversary year, which has just begun, but because it is right, over two years after the publication of "An Agenda for Peace", to reflect on the progress made and the distance that must still be travelled until the United Nations is as effective an organ for collective security as its founders hoped it would be. It is important because in the years since the publication of the first report the United Nations has faced increasing challenges, particularly in intra-State conflicts, and needs to learn both from its successes and its failures. It is important also because in this new paper the Secretary-General has offered a number of practical proposals to improve the United Nations performance in the light of that experience. My Government can wholeheartedly endorse many of those proposals, and does so in a manner complementary to what will be said on our behalf in this respect by the Ambassador of France, who will be speaking in the name of the European Union later in the debate.

The United Kingdom has long championed greater recourse by the United Nations to preventive action. More such action is taken now than was taken a few years ago, and the structure and practice of the Department of Political Affairs have evolved, in our view, in the right direction. But we believe the United Nations could still be more imaginative and more proactive. There should be greater coordination between the different parts of the United Nations system to identify potential crises, and a greater willingness to address such crises early, before they escalate into armed conflict. For our part, the British and French Governments have jointly expressed their willingness to provide for preventive missions' equipment and personnel, ranging from the senior diplomatic figures mentioned by the Secretary-General in his paper to logistics experts and interpreters. We have already made illustrative lists of such people available to the Secretariat. I hope other Member States will follow our example and that the Secretariat will draw upon it and use it.

Preventing conflicts may be cheaper than resolving them after they break out, but, as the Secretary-General notes, it is not cost-free. While we are not convinced of the case for a fixed sum contingency provision for preventive action in the regular budget, we would be willing to consider a small enlargement to the existing provision for unforeseen and extraordinary activities and for making it available for all preventive action and peacemaking. We could also consider greater use of voluntary contributions to finance longer term preventive missions. We are impressed by the value of small United Nations support missions of the sort the Secretary-General has deployed in Burundi, and believe that there will be further instances in which that model may usefully be followed.

Sadly, however, preventive action will not always be effective. There will continue to be a need for a substantial number of United Nations peace-keepers. And we agree with the Secretary-General that a clear line needs to be drawn between peace-keeping and peace enforcement. It is similarly quite clear to my country — currently the fourth-largest contributor of troops to United Nations peace-keeping operations — that peace-keeping is most likely to be successful when it is strictly impartial and based upon the consent of the parties. The United Nations, as well as a number of Member States, including the United Kingdom, has already done a lot of work to develop a military doctrine for modern, multidimensional United Nations peace-keeping based upon these key principles.

My Government would endorse most of the Secretary-General's comments regarding command and control of peace-keeping operations. Unity of command is vital. But that must be complemented, as the Secretary-General recognizes, by the fullest possible information to troop contributors, in theatre as well as here in New York. In the case of Headquarters, I hope that, as soon as resources permit, the weekly situation report may again be made available to Council members and troop contributors. It served as a vital informational tool to them both. In theatre, more needs to be done to inform and consult contingent commanders, or national military representatives assigned to the mission headquarters, about operational planning and decision-making.

Nor is the need for better-quality information restricted to troop contributors. The populations of the territories in which United Nations operations are deployed must be given reliable and impartial information. This Council, as well as the General Assembly, has often called for a more proactive approach

to the public information function in peace-keeping operations. We therefore strongly welcome the comments made by the Secretary-General in his position paper and the instructions he has issued regarding planning for an information capacity, including United Nations radio facilities, in all future operations.

But it is not only the operational aspects of peace-keeping that deserve our attention. We must also continue our efforts, and we hope that the Secretary-General will continue his efforts, to improve its administration and management. We welcome the recent decisions by the General Assembly to streamline the budget cycle and to commission more transparent budgets that better reflect the operational requirements of peace-keeping missions. We believe that the management of field missions needs to be similarly transparent to help to ensure that the large sums of money that we and all other Member States spend on peace-keeping are used wisely and effectively.

The Secretary-General draws attention to the need to ensure more rapid deployment of United Nations peace-keeping operations, and we agree that this is a high priority. But the formation of a distinct rapid-reaction force is only one way of approaching that issue — and, in our view, not necessarily the most cost-effective or the most realistic way of doing it. The United Kingdom has already responded to the Secretary-General's stand-by planning initiative and is ready to send a force planning team to New York to provide greater detail of the assets that we might make available to the United Nations.

More needs to be done, we believe, to build on the embryo system of stand-by arrangements so far established, including on the provision of equipment to less well-equipped troop contributors. The sort of planning data base that the United Nations needs to develop requires a detailed and continuing dialogue and exchange of information with Member States. My Government stands ready to participate in such an exercise.

More thought could be given, too, to ways in which better-equipped contributors with high-readiness forces can be deployed quickly at the outset of a United Nations peace-keeping operation, being then replaced by other troop contributors that may need more time to prepare for deployment.

We wholeheartedly agree that the role of the United Nations does not end with the departure of a successful peace-keeping force. We therefore welcome the Secretary-General's comments regarding post-conflict, as well as preventive, peace-building — particularly the emphasis on an integrated approach, making best use of the wide political and technical expertise of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. And we believe that there are further steps that need to be taken to achieve the proper coordination and coherence of those efforts.

In the section of the report on weapons proliferation the Secretary-General has focused attention primarily on what he describes as micro-disarmament — namely, practical disarmament in the context of conflicts that the United Nations is dealing with. The spread of small arms and anti-personnel land mines is indeed a matter of considerable and continuing concern and one that is of relevance to peace-keeping and, to a lesser extent, preventive action. We support fresh efforts to address these problems.

However, we would not wish to see the serious question of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction neglected because of that. This is an area in which the Council has a fundamental role to play with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. Steady progress is being made in efforts to prevent the spread of these weapons of mass destruction, and these efforts must be sustained. In particular, a successful conclusion to the forthcoming conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, leading to the indefinite and unconditional extension of that Treaty, is of fundamental importance.

In many of the areas I have referred to, United Nations cooperation with regional agencies and arrangements is crucial. The paper makes a number of wise points and suggestions in this area, and I welcome the Secretary-General's offer to assist regional organizations, particularly in the fields of peacemaking and peace-keeping. The need, in our view, is particularly pressing in Africa, where so many of the demands for preventive action and peace-keeping arise.

In his speech during the general debate in the General Assembly's forty-ninth session, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, made a number of specific proposals to enhance the capacity for peace-keeping and preventive action in Africa. They included the designation of peace-keeping training skills centres and logistics basing centres. We have been working up these and other ideas in consultation with a wide range of African countries and the Organization of African Unity, as well as the United Nations and a number of countries outside Africa. Those discussions are

producing practical ideas but also a political will to work together more closely to develop more effective capabilities in Africa to respond rapidly to crises in both the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. We look forward to working with others in the weeks and months ahead to carry this initiative forward.

Preventive action, peacemaking, peace-keeping — these are obviously the preferred tools: persuading, negotiating, cooling heads. But sometimes that is not enough. Aggression needs to be reversed, halted in its tracks or prevented from recurring, and support for terrorism must be halted. In these cases the Security Council has to have resort to the instruments provided by Chapter VII of the Charter. No such measures are taken lightly. Armed force should be used only as a last resort. We recognize the validity of the Secretary-General's argument that recent experience has shown that the United Nations as such is not well equipped to carry out such actions. But, short of that last resort, sanctions, to which the Secretary-General referred, remain, in our view, a valid and sometimes necessary option.

We attach importance to devising sanctions regimes that have the greatest effect on the target Government and its supporters and the least effect on innocent civilians. But we should not be blind to the ruthlessness of regimes that use sanctions to justify their own appalling treatment of the civilian population. Nor should we be seduced by what are called smart sanctions — sanctions that are partially and narrowly targeted. There may be opportunities for this sort of instrument, but in general they are notoriously hard to enforce and are therefore unlikely to have the desired effect of bringing about a change of policy.

The Secretary-General was right to point up some of the problems raised by sanctions. But the posing of paradoxes, such as the conflict between sanctions and development, is hardly a sound basis for making difficult policy decisions. Moreover, a decision to impose sanctions presupposes — because it is taken under Chapter VII — that there is a threat to international peace and security. Such threats are themselves inimical to the development objectives of both the transgressor and the victim. Is it, then, the threats and the unlawful actions that damage development, or is it the sanctions imposed to counter them? The Security Council must be able, if the international situation warrants it, to impose sanctions at short notice and without undue delay.

While we do not, therefore, agree with all the points made on sanctions by the Secretary-General, we do agree that there is a need to strengthen the overburdened section of the Secretariat dealing with sanctions. This would allow the issues of monitoring the application and effects of sanctions and of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to be addressed in a more coherent and effective manner. We look forward to the Secretary-General's taking action to recognize this priority in the allocation of Secretariat resources.

Lastly, the Secretary-General is quite right to stress once again that none of the instruments he refers to can work unless the United Nations has a sound financial basis. We, the Member States of this Organization, cannot ignore the financial crisis of the United Nations or fail to find means to address it. It is crucial that we reach substantive conclusions through the open-ended General Assembly working group on finance during the first half of this year.

This Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace" provides much food for thought for the Council. But it provides food for thought also for the Assembly, including its Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations. My delegation will listen carefully to what is said here today, both by members and non-members of the Council. I hope that we can soon thereafter, on the basis of those views, start work on an early and positive response to the paper on the part of the Council.

Mr. Mérimée (France) (*interpretation from French*): The European Union will shortly be making a statement through its President. My delegation, which naturally endorses the views expressed in that statement, now proposes to emphasize the points to which we attach particular importance.

I should like at the outset to congratulate the Secretary-General on the excellent report he submitted on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, a direct follow-up to "Agenda for Peace", published two and a half years ago. The thinking it contains is fortunately enriched by the experience derived from peace-keeping operations during the interim.

I would like to discuss three subjects to which, in the view of my delegation, special attention should be given if we wish to improve the United Nations capacity to maintain international peace and security. I am referring to preventive diplomacy and peace-making, to the rapid deployment of peace-keeping operations and to the imposition of sanctions.

We attach particular importance to the use of preventive diplomacy for peace-making efforts to forestall the outbreak or aggravation of conflicts and to settle their underlying disputes. It was to this end that we transmitted last year, in coordination with the Government of the United Kingdom, a list of individuals, experts and means to help the Secretariat to carry out preventive diplomacy missions. We are pleased that this example has been, or is in the course of being, followed by other countries. Furthermore, we support in principle the idea that stable funding should be provided for the initiation and conduct of preventive diplomacy missions and peace-making, including long-term missions.

The preventive deployment of peace-keeping troops is one way to prevent the outbreak or worsening of conflicts and to help restore peace. My Government hopes that we can have recourse to preventive deployment to help stabilize tense situations whenever it is useful and possible, including deployment on one side of the border when there is a lack of consent by all the Governments concerned.

Peace-building activities are a necessary corollary to preventive diplomacy and peace-making. They can occur during or as a continuation of a peace-keeping operation in order to ensure the lasting restoration of peace. They can also be initiated independently of an operation, as a consequence of a preventive diplomacy mission or a peace-making mission. Actions to promote the creation of diplomatic institutions and economic and social development help to eliminate the underlying causes of conflicts, particularly internal conflicts. My delegation would like to see such measures implemented, particularly after a peace-keeping operation, when they prove necessary to promote the lasting restoration of peace.

We should follow up the major progress which has been achieved in the last two years in strengthening the ability of the Secretariat to plan, deploy and conduct peace-keeping operations. As experience has shown on many occasions, rapid deployment is essential for the success of operations. In this connection, it should be noted that the speed with which an operation is deployed depends not only on the capacity of the Secretariat, but also to a large extent Member States to respond to the demands made on them.

The concept of stand-by forces, which was developed by the Secretariat, is, if a sufficient number of Member States commit themselves to it, an excellent way of reducing the time required for deployment. My Government, which put forward this concept and which has advocated and supported its implementation, very much hopes that the Secretariat will continue to develop and promote it among Member States. In the current circumstances, the only way to effectively initiate planning for an operation and guarantee its rapid deployment is to develop the data bank containing all the commitments for the contribution of forces and keep it up-to-date. By definition, these stand-by commitments, since they are not automatic, cannot in all cases necessarily ensure rapid deployment of an operation. Nevertheless, we cannot understand why the system developed by the Secretariat should fall into disuse due to lack of attention, on the pretext that its effectiveness is not guaranteed in all cases. We consider not only that arrangements regarding stand-by forces should be maintained, but that the inter-operational nature of the forces, in terms of equipment, deployment timetables and command structure, should be developed.

We took note with great interest of the proposal by the Secretary-General regarding the creation of a United Nations rapid reaction force, made up of national battalions trained under the same procedures and with integrated equipment which would constitute the strategic reserve of the Security Council. This proposal will be considered very closely by my Government. Its practical implications, political consequences and financial aspects raise issues. The main advantage of creating such a force, compared with the existing system of stand-by forces, would be the permanent availability of battalions in all circumstances. We would note, however, that questions concerning agreements between the Governments concerned and the United Nations, the command of the force and its financing have not been spelled out.

Implementing such a concept would obviously take a long time. The careful study which it deserves and the hopes it might arouse do not, in the opinion of my Government, justify any delay in developing the system of stand-by forces.

The measures outlined in Article 41 of the Charter — the imposition of sanctions — are the only enforcement instruments available to the Security Council to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security other from recourse to military force, which, as we know, is very difficult to implement. This is why their use is not subject to any restriction. The Charter only refers to the ability of third States to consult the Council over specific economic difficulties they may encounter.

On this subject, my Government does not entirely agree with the Secretary-General's proposals. Indeed, although experience teaches us that the imposition of sanctions must have a specific aim and that the means and criteria for lifting a sanctions regime and regular consideration of that regime must be stipulated from the outset, we also feel that it is necessary to preserve the Security Council's autonomy in decision-making. It would seem to us that the proposed establishment of a mechanism whose primary function would be to evaluate, before any decision is taken, the potential impact of the planned sanctions on the country in question and on third countries, of the planned sanctions and to measure the effects of those sanctions during their implementation would, unfortunately, lead to all sorts of pressures being exerted on the Council. We would therefore be unable to endorse that suggestion at this juncture.

Some of the questions I have raised, such as those concerning sanctions, are substantive. Others, such as those concerning the proposed rapid reaction force, address more particularly the real possibility of implementing the proposals before us in the near future. We believe that emphasis and efforts should be focused on progress that can be achieved now, allowing the development of existing means to improve the rapid deployment of United Nations operations.

In conclusion, I wish to recall that the basis of our thinking, "An Agenda for Peace", continues to be valid. The current inadequacy of the means available to the United Nations should not lead us to abandon in principle the goals which we may set ourselves for the future, and in particular the United Nations capacity to enforce peace when it is called upon to do so.

Mr. Wisnumurti (Indonesia): It is a distinct honour and privilege for me to deliver this statement on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM).

Let me begin by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Secretary-General for presenting his "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations" (S/1995/1).

The Movement has taken due note of the Secretary-General's Supplement. It offers many proposals and approaches which warrant our careful consideration. The Movement concurs with the objective of strengthening the capacity of the Organization in all fields, including the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of economic and social development within the framework of and in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Considering that the paper before us has still to be examined in depth by both the Security Council and the General Assembly, this statement offers only a few preliminary comments of a general nature.

The Movement has noted that a number of elements contained in the report "An Agenda for Peace" have been neither included nor elaborated in the present Supplement, to which the NAM member countries would give further consideration. In addition, we note that the Supplement is relatively silent on the role of the General Assembly in contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security, as specified in the Charter and reaffirmed in General Assembly resolutions 47/120 A and 47/120 B. It is important that respect for State sovereignty be recognized as one of the basic principles in the conduct of international relations.

The Movement concurs with the Secretary-General's observation that:

> "only sustained efforts to resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation." (*S/1995/1, para. 22*)

The Secretary-General has rightly focused his attention on economic and social issues which have long been sidelined. These have become all the more important today as conflicts are increasingly recognized to have socio-economic origins. The non-aligned countries fully agree that, as the Organization closes the first half-century of its work and stands poised to assume the challenges of the future, its primary mission will be to convey to the world a renewed vision and to fulfil its commitment to development as the best means to uproot the fundamental causes of conflicts which pose threats to international peace and security. Development should be brought to the forefront of the international agenda. We look forward to discussing further the Secretary-General's report on an Agenda for Development.

The Movement attaches particular importance to the issue of peace-keeping operations addressed in the position paper of the Secretary-General. It is to be noted that most of the United Nations peace-keeping operations are in the member countries of NAM and that most of the troop contributors are members of NAM. Considering some recent successes and setbacks in United Nations peace-keeping operations, and taking into account the fact

that such operations have moved beyond the traditional concept, NAM finds that there is an urgent need to review, take stock of and draw conclusions from recent experiences.

The Non-Aligned Movement is pleased to note that the Secretary-General has reiterated the validity and relevance of the traditional principles of peace-keeping operations. We suggest that these principles be strengthened, given prevailing conditions in this changing world. These include the support of the general membership of the Organization; the consent of the States involved; non-intervention in the internal affairs of States; impartiality; the non-use of force; equitable opportunity for all States to participate; and, above all, a clearly-defined mandate, time-frame and secure financing. Furthermore, we think it essential that all measures for the peaceful settlement of disputes be explored before launching peace-keeping operations. Primary emphasis should be on utilizing peaceful means for resolving conflicts; coercive measures and military means must remain the last resort to be used only after other measures have failed. They should be temporary in nature and create an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful and durable settlement, and should not be perceived as a substitute for other efforts to be made in endeavouring to reach a just solution. However, the Movement is of the view that the concept of multifunctional peace-keeping operations, in the light of the basic principles of traditional peace-keeping operations, requires further clarification.

Similarly, the idea of a rapid reaction force, put forward in the section on peace-keeping, requires greater clarity concerning the scope and circumstances under which it would be deployed. This far-reaching proposal needs a very careful scrutiny of its cost implications and even more of the modality of its establishment and use, of the need for consent before such a force may be deployed and of its command and control structure. It is not clear, for instance, what types of emergency are referred to and who will determine the existence of such crises. These ambiguities may lend themselves to interpretations that would challenge the sovereignty and independence of States. In addition, the concept of enforcement action needs to be further reviewed and evaluated, *inter alia*, on the basis of the contents of the Secretary-General's report.

The issue of command and control has now emerged as one of the central issues requiring the most careful consideration and study. We agree that unity of command and control is a *sine qua non* for peace-keeping to proceed effectively and safely. As a matter of principle, peace-keeping operations should be under the operational control of the United Nations. There must be a clear delineation of functions between United Nations Headquarters and the field. While operational matters should basically be the responsibility of the force commander, United Nations Headquarters ought to be given the responsibility for overall control and political direction.

Another equally important aspect of peace-keeping operations is the consultations between the United Nations and troop-contributing countries. Such consultations should focus on political and military objectives, the responsibilities and expectations of their troops and the conduct of the operations in general. We believe that further specific improvements, including the possible expansion of this consultative mechanism to any other interested countries, will depend on how effective the new set-up will prove in its entirety.

The Movement notes with concern that expenditures on peace-keeping operations have far exceeded those committed to developmental activities. It considers that a similar emphasis should be given to development programmes and activities as the best contribution for the preservation of peace and security.

The costs of peace-keeping operations should continue to be calculated in accordance with the existing scale of assessments established by General Assembly resolution 3101 (XXVIII), which takes into account the special responsibilities of some Member States and economic considerations. These arrangements should be institutionalized and must be in keeping with paragraph 2 of Article 17 of the Charter. The Secretariat should also continue to consider ways to facilitate prompt reimbursement to troop-contributing countries as well as other related administrative and financial issues.

As regards the issue of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, the Movement has noted the proposal to establish in the United Nations regular budget a contingency provision and the enlargement of existing provisions for unforeseen peace-keeping activities. The proposal for small field missions, because of its possible implications, requires careful study by the appropriate intergovernmental organs. These ideas should be clearly defined — at least operationally — after thorough examination by the General Assembly.

The Secretary-General, in his report, refers to a norm for Member States to accept the offer of United

Nations good offices. The adherence to such a norm will be practical only if a favourable climate of opinion, or ethos, is created. The Movement feels that this ethos can be created only by the free will and consent of the States concerned.

The Movement takes note of the Secretary-General's view that:

> "Progress (...) in the area of weapons of mass destruction and major weapons systems must be followed by parallel progress in conventional arms". *(S/1995/1, para. 65)*

Although recent changes in international relations have diminished the likelihood of a nuclear war, the issues of the non-use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and the elimination of all nuclear arsenals deservedly continue to be a preoccupation of the international community. It is essential to reaffirm the importance of nuclear disarmament and its priority in disarmament negotiations, as contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It is pertinent to recall the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament over negotiating and reaching the long-sought goal of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We also should recall the lack of progress in either launching multilateral negotiations for a legally binding instrument on the production and the stockpiling of fissile materials or the work carried out by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Likewise, the deadlock in the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty persists. Many other issues, including unhindered access to technology for peaceful purposes and negative security assurances to non-nuclear States, have not been resolved.

The Secretary-General's position paper also touches upon the question of sanctions. Member States are obligated to comply with the Security Council decisions concerning sanctions, in keeping with Article 41 of the Charter. There has been a threefold increase in the number of sanction regimes within the past two years. This expanding use of sanctions has not been accompanied by a thorough consideration of the short- and long-term effects.

Many critical issues need to be clarified before the imposition of sanctions. Their potential impact on the country that is targeted, as well as their time-frame, clearly defined objectives, humanitarian aspects and special provisions to minimize the collateral damage suffered by third parties, ought to be worked out in detail. Such an approach would strengthen international support for the imposition and implementation of sanction regimes.

Sanctions have profound ramifications, not only for the target country, but also for the neighbouring States and trading partners. While Article 50 of the Charter has called for consultations in seeking a solution to these problems, a more extensive use of that provision as a means to limit the impact of sanctions has now become essential. The comprehensiveness of today's sanctions has also raised a different set of complex issues. Increasingly, the costs are being borne by the civilian population, without accomplishing the objectives of the sanctions. It is therefore imperative to rectify this situation, taking special precautions to ease the impact of sanctions on the vulnerable groups of society.

The Charter review Committee at its last session invited the Secretary-General to submit, before its 1995 session, a report on the question of the implementation of the provisions of the Charter. That report should include reference to Article 50, concerning special economic problems confronting States arising from the carrying out of sanctions mandated under Chapter VII. We look forward to receiving the detailed report of the Secretary-General on this issue, which we trust will include an analysis of the proposals and suggestions, as contained in the report of the Committee's 1994 session.

Regarding compensation, the Movement considers that the establishment of a sanctions mechanism, as proposed by the Secretary-General in his report, deserves to be explored further. Moreover, sanctions should be lifted as soon as their objectives are achieved.

Consultations with Bretton Woods institutions for the purpose of giving effect to Article 50 is not necessarily the most effective way of alleviating the damages suffered by third parties. The Security Council, which imposes sanctions, has the responsibility also to provide relief.

Within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, regional organizations can cooperate with the United Nations in the resolution of conflicts in their regions which are seen as threats to international peace and security, within their respective mandates and spheres of competence. In this context, the Movement welcomes close cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations on the basis of the Charter.

The Non-Aligned Movement believes that the largest possible number of delegations should participate in the debate on the Secretary-General's position paper. The Movement would like all Member States to give careful attention to the proposals contained therein so as to create the opportunity to collectively contribute to fostering a new era of true multilateralism. It is our view that the Secretary-General's position paper should be examined by the General Assembly, as it is the sole United Nations body to encompass all States, both in the discussion and in the decision-making processes. We would welcome the establishment of a working group of the General Assembly, at an appropriate time, to study the position paper.

Mr. Legwaila (Botswana): We fully endorse the comments of the Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries, and we do not intend to repeat all that he has ably contributed. We will simply amplify some of the points he has made and place emphasis where we think it is necessary, particularly on those issues that affect my own country and Africa.

The report of the Secretary-General, "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", could not have been more timely. The euphoria that led to the convocation of the first Security Council meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and all that it represented, has long evaporated. There was great optimism in the air at the time about the onset of the "new world order", characterized by the perceived central role the United Nations was to play in post-cold-war international affairs, as had been envisaged by its founding fathers.

The hopes and aspirations of the leaders who met in New York on 31 January 1992 have mostly been dashed — or, rather, the vision they had for the future of mankind after the fall of communism remains an elusive dream. It is in the context of this background of dashed hopes that we find the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" most timely. It affords us an opportunity to reflect on the experiences of the past years, to analyse what could have gone wrong with our vision of the post-cold-war era and to look to the future with new foresight, wisdom and renewed hopes of a world free of war. The report of the Secretary-General is rich in its analysis of the current situation and the prospects for the future, and it should form the basis for an informed debate here today and in the General Assembly later this year.

We have witnessed a democratization process that has extended from the northern hemisphere to the southern hemisphere since the end of the cold war. In some cases, the democratization process has been smooth, while in others it has been accompanied by bloodshed and mayhem, creating serious challenges for the system of collective security under the auspices of the United Nations. The blue helmets, in greater numbers than ever before, have been dispatched to help keep the peace. Yes, there have been successes, and there have been failures. In some cases, serious mistakes have been made, and it is important to learn from them.

The Secretary-General has gone to great lengths to emphasize the importance of greater international cooperation to overcome these great challenges facing humanity. I shall give examples of some serious mistakes that have been made. One issue of deep concern to my Government is the current creeping tendency to reduce or withdraw United Nations forces from seemingly intractable conflicts, particularly in Africa, before peace can be attained. We are certainly not unmindful of the enormous cost involved in the maintenance of peace-keeping operations all over the world, nor are we oblivious to the impatience and frustrations which are often engendered by long, drawn-out peace-keeping operations. Nevertheless, I wish to pose the following questions for consideration by the Council: is it not such impatience and frustration with slow-moving peace trains that send wrong signals to those intransigent parties that wish to see the United Nations fail, and to those who are quick to condemn the United Nations for its shortcomings? Are we not discouraging troop-contributing countries, like my own, from participating in future peace-keeping operations by the premature withdrawal of troops before they accomplish their mandates?

Let me illustrate what I mean by this. We believe the reduction of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), when more personnel would have been needed to deal with the resumption of hostilities that followed the election in Angola, was ill advised. The same applies with equal validity to the reduction of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). In the tragic case of Rwanda, as we all know, when all hell broke loose every contingent except Ghana's withdrew, and this was followed by the worst bloodshed in Africa's recent memory. The United Nations is now winding down its operation in Somalia. I am afraid that not very long after 31 March there may come a time when the conscience of the Security Council is so troubled that the Council might be forced to send troops back to Somalia, but too late to save the situation.

Peace is indivisible, and so should be our efforts for its attainment. Every peace-keeping operation should be given an equal opportunity to succeed. We need persistence and perseverance. More importantly, we need to approach issues in an even-handed manner. There is a long list of positive results in places where the international community has persisted and persevered, such as in the Cambodias of this world, and even in Yugoslavia, where the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has done much to bring under control a war which could have inflamed the whole of the Balkans.

Regionally, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is trying its best, given the paucity of its resources, to respond to the many and varied crises that bedevil the African continent. A permanent Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution has been established, but it will remain a dead letter if the international community does not play its part to ensure its efficacy. There is a need for full implementation of Chapter VIII of the Charter, and this is why we think the Secretary-General's proposals on regional arrangements for conflict resolution deserve close examination in order to give this Chapter full effect.

Moreover, in his report the Secretary-General notes that

> "The United Nations system is also better equipped than regional organizations or individual Member States to develop and apply the comprehensive, long-term approach needed to ensure the lasting resolution of conflicts." *(S/1995/1, para. 24)*

This is particularly true of Africa. In most cases Africa has the combination of political will and political commitment to resolve its own conflicts. However, its ability to deliver is hampered by a lack of the necessary financial and logistical wherewithal to transform such political commitment and will into realizable, durable political solutions. African countries have demonstrated a willingness to provide troops for peace-keeping operations both in Africa and abroad, and we appeal to the international community at large to play a role within the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter to help manage peace in Africa.

Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking are two of the most inexpensive tools in the whole arena of conflict prevention and resolution. We therefore support the Secretary-General's efforts to bolster this aspect of United Nations diplomacy. We are fully aware that sometimes parties are reluctant to seek help from the United Nations by way of the good offices of the Secretary-General, either because they doubt the impartiality of the United Nations or because one or both of the parties are not ready for mediation. Obviously, this can make peacemaking and preventive diplomacy more difficult. Therefore, the United Nations should endeavour to create or cultivate the ethos that would make it possible for it to be readily called upon without misgivings to use its good offices.

One other important issue referred to in the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" is the post-conflict resolution stage. It is right for the Secretary-General to bring up this point. Once a conflict has been resolved, there is a need to cooperate with authorities in the countries concerned to deal with problems of security, while duly respecting their sovereignty. In this respect, one important issue is the process of reintegrating former combatants into civilian life. In a majority of cases these former fighters, some of whom have been in the bush for most of their lives, do not have any technical skills. Hence, besides the unavailability of alternative employment, they are not employable. They have to be trained for conversion to civilian life.

With regard to disarmament, my delegation fully agrees with the Secretary-General's submission on "micro-disarmament". The destructive nature of small arms and their destabilizing effect cannot be ignored. Most of the conflicts afflicting the world today are fuelled by the use of small arms because of the ease with which such weapons proliferate, particularly in countries bordering conflict areas. Even more alarming is the monumental scourge of mines, tens of millions of which are planted all over the world, resulting in senseless death and the exploding population of amputees in those countries where there has been endemic conflict.

We agree with the Secretary-General's report that, in terms of Article 41 of the Charter, sanctions are meant as instruments to change behaviour, not as punishment or retribution. We also agree with the report that sanctions have negative side effects, but we must also point out that sanctions have so far been a peaceful and viable alternative where peace enforcement, or any other means to secure international peace and security, has been untenable. We do not agree with those who say sanctions do not work. History has now registered cases where sanctions applied in conjunction with other means of persuasion have helped resolve seemingly intractable problems. We welcome the Secretary-General's

suggestion for the establishment of a mechanism that would, *inter alia*, assess and monitor the application of sanctions.

We fully concur with the views expressed in the report on the question of command and control of United Nations forces. More often than not, the authority of force commanders is challenged by contingents that receive orders from their national authorities, sometimes at very critical stages of operations on the ground. Indeed, some fatalities have resulted from this lack of coordinated authority within the command structure. Botswana has participated in a few United Nations peace-keeping operations so far, and as a matter of practical experience we have come to appreciate the seriousness of this problem. What Governments have to understand is that by deciding to contribute troops to United Nations missions they cede the powers of command and control to the Secretary-General. This is not to say that contingents should completely sever all links with their capitals. Newly established procedures of consultation between troop contributors, the Security Council and the Office of the Secretary-General have greatly enhanced the process of communication, and it is only proper that Governments present their suggestions in New York, and not in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia or any other place.

I wish to conclude by paying homage to the Secretary-General for his tireless reaffirmation of the crucial interrelationship between peace and development. Continuous support has to be given to social and economic development because there can never be development if there is no peace and there can be no sustainable peace without development. In particular, in those countries where the United Nations has intervened to bring about peace the international community must spare no effort to ensure that desperate post-conflict conditions in these countries do not subject them to more war.

Mr. Wang Xuexian (China)(*interpretation from Chinese*): First of all, I should like, on behalf of the Chinese Government, to express our profound sympathy in connection with the severe casualties and damage caused by the strong earthquakes in the western part of our neighbouring country Japan. I would ask the Japanese Mission to the United Nations to convey our condolences to the Japanese Government and people.

The Chinese delegation has made a preliminary study of the Secretary-General's report entitled 'Supplement to An Agenda for Peace', which is an important follow-up report to his Agenda for Peace concerning United Nations peace-keeping operations and activities in related areas. The report has provided us with some new and thought-provoking views and ideas which deserve our in-depth consideration and extensive discussion.

The world has undergone profound changes since the Security Council summit meeting in early 1992 and the transition toward multipolarity has accelerated. Relaxation of tension has become the main trend today, and yet the world is not tranquil at all. Hegemonism and power politics continue to exist. Regional hot spots flare up intermittently, and various destabilizing elements are increasing. All this poses a serious threat to international peace and stability. Meanwhile, international economic competition has intensified; and the gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen. The maintenance of peace, the strengthening of cooperation and the promotion of development remain the major challenges facing the world and the United Nations today. There would be no development without peace and hardly any lasting peace without development, whereas both peace and development require international cooperation.

The world is now much preoccupied with how to eliminate regional hot spots and settle international disputes properly. In this connection, great expectations have been placed on the United Nations, which since the end of the cold war has made considerable efforts in promoting the settlement of regional hot spots and maintaining international peace and security, both with successes and with setbacks. The report submitted by the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations is therefore of great practical significance.

As an old Chinese saying goes, 'Cognizance of one's divine mandate comes at the age of 50'. The United Nations is now almost 50 years old. We hope that it will reach this stage of sublime cognizance by summarizing the past and looking to the future, thus being better able to fulfil the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security entrusted to it by the Charter in the transit to the next century. This is not only the ardent expectation of the international community on the United Nations, but also a major test for this Organization.

We maintain that in fulfilling their responsibilities for maintaining international peace and stability the United Nations and the Security Council in particular must strictly abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter when engaged in preventive diplomacy,

peacemaking, peace-keeping or other activities in related areas. Particular attention should be given to the following principles:

First, the principle of respect for State sovereignty and non-interference in a country's internal affairs must always be observed. The United Nations is an intergovernmental organization composed of sovereign States rather than a world government. I wish to emphasize that the United Nations is not a world government. Matters concerning a country should, in the final analysis, be settled by its own people, and those concerning a region by the countries in the region through consultations, in which the international community, including the United Nations, can play only a supplementary and promotive role.

Secondly, disputes should be settled by resorting unswervingly to such peaceful means as good offices, mediation and negotiation. As there are profound and complicated historical and social causes for the conflicts and disputes in the world today involving religion, ethnicity, culture or territory, it might be time-consuming and difficult to seek a peaceful solution. But this is the only effective way to peace in the long run. To wish for a rapid solution through military actions or other enforcement measures not only is politically undesirable, but will also sharpen contradictions, cause serious consequences and bring long-term damage to peace. There have already been quite a few lessons of this in recent years.

Thirdly, as the maintenance of international peace and security involves the work of the United Nations in various areas, the major United Nations agencies are required to carry out their respective mandates in accordance with the Charter and play their respective roles in a balanced and harmonious manner while strengthening their mutual coordination and cooperation. We support a more active and effective role for the General Assembly in the maintenance of international peace and security and other related areas. We highly appreciate the unremitting efforts by the Secretary-General in mediating regional conflicts or disputes and support him in playing his role in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter as well as the mandates of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Fourthly, the Security Council is entrusted by the Charter with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, it acts on behalf of all Member States. We have consistently held that all Members, irrespective of their size, strength and wealth, are entitled to participate in the discussion and resolution of major United Nations issues on an equal footing. Therefore, the Security Council should hear their views extensively before making important decisions. Its resolutions and decisions must reflect their common will and conform to their interests. This is also an important expression of the democratization of international relations.

Those principles are easier stated than truly implemented. However, the United Nations has no alternative but to adhere to them in order to maintain international peace and security in an effective manner.

The United Nations has encountered many new problems in fulfilling its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security under the changed circumstances. Contradictions and defects which were inconspicuous have gradually come to the fore. This calls for the formulation, through careful consideration, of a whole set of practical policy measures and mechanisms to ensure the success of United Nations activities. We believe that the following questions deserve our particular attention:

In recent years we have witnessed the conditional involvement of the United Nations in the settlement of internal conflicts in some countries at the request of the Governments or factions of these countries, or that of other countries or parties in a few exceptional cases where there is an absence of a government in a country.

This is a new and highly sensitive issue, which, if handled improperly, will make the United Nations a party to the conflict or even make it become an instrument of a few countries in interfering in other countries' internal affairs, thus throwing United Nations operations into difficulties and failure. We therefore deem it imperative to establish certain principles to govern appropriate involvement by the United Nations in this regard, which should include the following: conflicts or disputes pose a real threat to international or regional peace; United Nations operations must be at the request, and obtain the consent, of the parties concerned; the United Nations role should be confined to assisting in the settlement of conflicts or disputes by peaceful means; and full play should be given to the role of neighbouring countries and the relevant regional organizations.

United Nations peace-keeping operations are faced with new challenges as they are undergoing both significant quantitative and qualitative changes in recent years, according to the report of the Secretary-General.

We are of the view that in the new situation the United Nations should stick to the practices proved effective when engaged in peace-keeping operations — namely, the three principles as emphasized by the Secretary-General in his report: the consent of the parties; impartiality; and the non-use of force, except in self-defence. A clear distinction should also be made between peace-keeping operations and peace enforcement actions. The United Nations is under unprecedented pressure in terms of human, financial and material resources, with the increasing expansion of the number and scale of peace-keeping operations and the scope of their mandates. How to address this problem appropriately also has a direct bearing on the success of the operations. We believe that the United Nations should act within the limits of its means and work to improve the effectiveness of the operations. Member States should fulfil in earnest the financial obligations set forth in the Charter to ensure a stable and sound financial basis for the operations. At the same time, such questions as the command and control of peace-keeping operations and the training of peace-keeping personnel should be properly addressed.

It is believed that United Nations activities in preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace-building, if carried out properly, can play a positive role in eliminating and defusing disputes. However, in playing this role, the United Nations must respect the will of the Governments and peoples of the countries concerned instead of imposing its views on them. It should especially be prudent on questions, such as early warning, that involve a country's sovereignty. It should obtain prior consent of the countries concerned before sending fact-finding or other missions, and major issues in this regard should be decided upon by the Security Council. More play should be given to the role of other United Nations agencies in post-conflict rehabilitation, reconstruction and other follow-up activities in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter. The Security Council should not take over their responsibilities and get involved in what is beyond its terms of reference.

Since the end of the cold war there has been an increase in cases in which the Security Council, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter on flimsy grounds, resorts to, or authorizes a few countries to take, enforcement actions. We have never endorsed such peace enforcement actions. We maintain that enforcement actions as set forth in Chapter VII of the Charter should only be used against acts of aggression that endanger and undermine peace. In case of necessity, they should have a clear-cut mandate as well as the political guidance of the Security Council and the unified command of the United Nations. Indiscriminate use of mandatory means will not help resolve problems. It will, rather, sharpen contradictions, aggravate conflicts and impair the reputation of the United Nations. It should be pointed out that in the history of the United Nations there were a few cases of forced intervention in a country's internal affairs by a few big Powers, using the Security Council's mandate, with adverse consequences. These historical lessons should not be forgotten.

Sanctions are also included in United Nations mandatory means. Recent years have also seen an increase in cases of application of sanctions by the Security Council. We are not in favour of using sanctions to exert pressure, for, instead of helping resolve international disputes, it will only bring suffering to the people of the target countries and cause economic difficulties and losses to third countries, particularly the neighbouring ones that implement the sanctions. We appreciate the Secretary-General's proposal that practical and effective measures be taken to reduce the adverse impact produced by sanctions. In some absolute cases when sanctions have to be used, their objectives, scope and time- limit should be clearly defined. No sanctions should be used as a punitive means. At the same time, appropriate mechanisms should be established by taking humanitarian factors into full consideration to reduce the suffering of the people of the countries concerned and to resolve, in accordance with Article 50 of the Charter, the problems brought to third countries by sanctions. The Security Council should carefully consider these factors in its future work and review the various existing sanctions regimes in the same fashion, with a view to gradually easing these sanctions as appropriate until they are completely lifted.

In recent years United Nations activities in maintaining international peace and security tend to be increasingly mixed up with those in the economic, social, development, humanitarian assistance and other areas. However, the absence of clear guidelines has resulted in confusion of concept and differences in interpretation of these activities. It is therefore necessary to define, on the basis of extensive discussions and under the guidance of the Charter, the concept and scope of these activities and their mutual relationship, so as to provide them with a solid legal base.

The Secretary-General's report covers a wide range of elements which touch upon the work of all the relevant departments of the United Nations and have a direct bearing on the interests of the entire membership. We are

in favour of comprehensive, in-depth and full-range discussion and consideration in various forms of the report by the General Assembly, the Security Council and other United Nations agencies. The Chinese delegation will take an active part in this process and continue to make contributions to United Nations activities in peace-keeping and other areas.

Mr. Henze (Germany): I should like to thank the Secretary-General for his valuable, stimulating and timely report supplementing "An Agenda for Peace". We believe it to be particularly important for the United Nations in its fiftieth year to re-examine its role in the maintenance of international peace and security in the light of the developments of the last years. The supplemental report sums up recent discussions and experiences in a very relevant way.

We fully share the positions set out in the statement to be delivered by the French Presidency on behalf of the European Union. I should like to concentrate my remarks on issues to which we attach particular importance. These are preventive diplomacy; post-conflict peace-building; sanctions; and certain aspects of peace-keeping.

We share the Secretary-General's appreciation of the paramount importance of preventive diplomacy. We also understand that practical mechanisms and measures to implement preventive diplomacy are more difficult to define. In this context, we support the suggestion of the Secretary-General, to establish, whenever necessary, small support missions for special envoys on the ground. The decisions would be taken by the Secretary-General, based on all available information and on the understanding that the Security Council be kept informed.

In all conflict and pre-conflict negotiating processes, sufficient time and a virtually constant presence on the ground are important conditions for success. In the past, formal United Nations missions were set up only when a conflict had reached a certain level of intensity. But even in these cases the preliminary dispatch of a limited number of observers under the authority of the Secretary-General can be required when negotiations have reached a certain stage and quick reactions are necessary, as was recently the case in Tajikistan.

In this context, I should like to mention that Germany has completed a list of personalities ready to perform tasks in the area of preventive diplomacy. This list is being presented to the Secretary-General, during his current visit to Germany, in response to his concern about a lack of experienced personnel. I should also like to point out that we have significantly stepped up our new programme for democratization aid and electoral assistance. In 1994 we granted substantial assistance in these fields to 12 countries. In doing so, we accorded special attention to countries in which United Nations operations had taken place, such as Ethiopia, South Africa and Mozambique.

Another important element of preventive diplomacy is respect for human rights. Experience has taught us that societies in which human rights are upheld and where democratic structures exist are less prone to conflict. Therefore, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights deserves our unequivocal support, and the Centre for Human Rights should be strengthened. We welcome the increased attention that the United Nations is paying to the integration of human rights aspects into its development programmes. The importance of respect for human rights in regard to conflict prevention should also be increasingly considered in the context of peace-keeping and, even more so in post-conflict peace-building.

Economic and social development are basic elements of conflict prevention. We therefore support the Secretary-General in his efforts to complement an Agenda for Peace with an Agenda for Development.

In his report the Secretary-General rightly points to the goal of post-conflict peace-building — the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace. In order for this to be done successfully, the transition from a peace-keeping operation to the establishment of new structures that could consolidate the peace has to be well prepared. We have not yet developed a consolidated conceptual approach to this end. Until now, either United Nations peace-keeping operations have ended more or less abruptly without any significant period of transition, as in the case most recently of Mozambique, or the United Nations has pursued peace-building tasks for years thereafter, as, for example, most successfully in El Salvador. Naturally, each case is different, but we should attempt to elaborate ways and means to ensure a certain degree of follow-up after the formal end of a United Nations peace-keeping operation.

Especially in cases in which programmes for the reconstruction of political and administrative structures are part of a peace-keeping operation, we should avoid terminating them prematurely, before assistance in the field through other channels is assured. I refer in particular to the areas of police and justice. It is essential

to provide a secure environment for the reintegration of refugees and for economic recovery. Frequently, countries re-emerging from conflicts have difficulties in recruiting civil servants, let alone in paying their salaries. Often, democratic elections are not the true end of a conflict, as we have seen in Cambodia and Angola. It is contradictory, and not a good investment, to launch a costly peace-keeping operation and then withdraw without trying to consolidate the results of that operation.

In addition, we might study possibilities for funnelling development aid into post-conflict peace-building projects — in particular, those funds that are generally available but were blocked when a conflict began. To ensure smooth transition from a United Nations peace-keeping operation to an economic cooperation programme, close coordination between the peace-keeping operation and the relevant agencies is required. This need for coordination should be considered in the drafting of the initial mandate of a peace-keeping operation, as appropriate.

Institutional contacts should be established with relevant international financial and development organizations — if possible, at the beginning of a peace-keeping operation — in order to prepare, at an early stage, for the transition to post-conflict peace-building. Contacts should also be established with governmental and non-governmental organizations. Moreover, we should study the possibility of instituting, on a regular basis, very small transitional teams that would continue to be present in the country of conflict, ready to ensure and monitor the transition of the mandate, to observe, to counsel, to provide good offices and to sound the alarm when things go wrong.

Turning to the issue of sanctions, we support more precision in the definition of their regimes and closer monitoring of their impact, especially on third countries, as proposed by the Secretary-General. We remain convinced that the imposition of sanctions is a necessary instrument of coercion at the disposal of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, especially if the use of military force is to be avoided. Nonetheless, we feel that the time has come to consider ways and means to ensure more precise targeting. This will not only be more effective in bringing about the desired result, but will also strengthen the credibility and authority of the Security Council. Thought should also be given to whether sanctions could be targeted at those individuals who bear particular responsibility for the event that gave rise to their imposition.

In his report, the Secretary-General proposed the establishment of a mechanism to carry out, *inter alia*, impact assessment and monitoring functions. Inasmuch as we harbour some doubts as to whether, in the light of the urgency imposed by events giving rise to sanctions, it would be practical to conduct an in-depth impact assessment before sanctions are imposed, we agree that a preliminary assessment should form a part of the basis for decision-making by the Security Council. An extensive impact assessment should, however, be conducted immediately following the adoption of sanctions so that necessary adjustments might be made in a timely fashion. To this end, it would indeed be useful to establish within the Secretariat a capacity to prepare such assessments and monitor the application of sanctions continuously, in close coordination with relevant international financial and development institutions and to report regularly to the Sanctions Committees.

In addition, we agree with the Secretary-General that it is necessary for the Security Council, in its resolutions, to define clearly the objectives of sanctions and the conditions under which they can be terminated. In our view, a high degree of clarity and predictability will also command a high degree of authority and implementation and, accordingly, of success.

Durable peace and international stability will to a large degree depend on the implementation of an effective system of collective security under the roof of the United Nations. To this end, the United Nations must be in a position to react with peace-keeping operations in a credible and efficient way. Germany supports the concept of stand-by arrangements proposed by the Secretary-General. German armed forces are at the moment being fundamentally restructured, a process that will lead, step by step, to more capabilities in the areas of crisis reaction and peace-keeping. Therefore, we are not yet in a position to earmark specific troop contingents, but we shall do so upon request. As Foreign Minister Kinkel declared in the General Assembly on 27 September 1994, we are prepared to contribute.

We also support the Secretary-General's proposal to create a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment for those national contingents that are not adequately equipped. Even before the creation of such a stock, Germany has in the past, through the United Nations, equipped such contingents — for example, the contingents from Pakistan and Bangladesh in the former Yugoslavia.

We once again thank the Secretary-General for his stimulating report. We agree with him that there is no reason for frustration or pessimism. Let us not forget the success the United Nations has had in, for example, Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique. And the Secretary-General's report itself and our discussion today are ample proof that the United Nations is capable and ready to respond to current challenges. In this spirit we look forward to continuing the review of the Secretary-General's report in the Security Council.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Russian delegation would like to express its gratitude to the Secretary-General for the important report he has prepared on peace-keeping. This document is quite rightly considered a great contribution to studying the peace-keeping practices of the United Nations, an endeavour begun in 'An Agenda for Peace', in response to the decision taken by the high-level meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. The assessments contained in the report and the recommendations based on the Organization's various successes and failures also need to be carefully studied and taken into account in the Organization's daily activities.

In this period of evolution in international relations, the time is now ripe for a thorough dialogue on all aspects of peace-keeping and for reconsidering activities in this area. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Kozyrev, referred to this when he spoke in the Security Council on 17 October last year. In our view, the Secretary-General's report quite accurately describes the qualitative changes that have occurred in the nature of the United Nations peace-keeping activities, most of which now involve threats to international peace and security caused by conflicts within States. Resolving such disputes is more complex, more costly and more dangerous for international personnel than conducting traditional peace-keeping operations, though, naturally, they do not follow the same pattern in all situations.

We agree with the Secretary-General's conclusion that there should be greater use of preventive diplomacy; this will require broad support by Member States. In view of the concern expressed by the Secretary-General, Moscow is prepared to consider the possibility of having eminent personalities with considerable political and diplomatic experience perform various peace-keeping missions on behalf of the Secretary-General, as his special representatives.

We also see some rationality in the idea of creating small field missions for the purposes of preventive diplomacy, provided of course that the consent of the host country has been obtained. We also believe it would be useful for the Secretary-General to define the general criteria for establishing and making use of such missions. We consider the determination of the primary conditions for conducting peace-keeping operations to be of fundamental importance.

We are particularly anxious about the fact that, despite decisions taken by the Security Council, it has so far been impossible to adopt standard criteria and conditions for involving the United Nations in extinguishing various hotbeds of tension. Sometimes this means that certain conflicts whose threat to international stability is not obvious swallow up considerable funds, with large contingents of peace-keeping forces being sent immediately, whereas in other instances we believe the Security Council is slow to act, sometimes taking months to study a situation and limiting itself in the final analysis to sending small groups of observers, despite the direct request made by the leaders of the States concerned. This was particularly true in instances connected with conflicts in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. Such a practice gives us every reason to speak about double standards. Of course, we appreciate that the United Nations capacities are limited, but it is precisely for this reason that they must be properly used in settling conflicts in various parts of the world, including the CIS region. There should not be situations in which, to paraphrase Orwell's aphorism, some conflicts are more equal than others.

We share the views expressed in the report regarding the need to observe the principle of unity of command and to determine three levels of authority in carrying out operations. We assume in this connection that the Secretary-General, when taking executive leadership and command, will be ruled by the political instructions of the Security Council, will keep the Security Council fully abreast of developments and will consult it on any steps that are political rather than technical. At the same time, the Governments of contributing countries should be kept informed about all aspects of the operation at all times.

As regards the trend towards the immediate conduct of operations by the Security Council, referred to by the Secretary-General in his report, we would like to emphasize the Council's exclusive authority under the Charter and the need to more carefully weigh the pros

and cons when elaborating the mandates for such operations. Of course, we are not talking about the micro-management of purely practical issues, such as the deployment of contingents, their establishment in the field, their field headquarters and so forth.

We have noted the disappointment expressed by the Secretary-General over the recently adopted concept of stand-by arrangements. We believe, none the less, that it is important to try to perfect the system of such arrangements, particularly as many countries, including the Russian Federation, have shown interest in it. Perhaps it would be a good idea, to this end, to hold a high-level meeting under the presidency of the Secretary-General to encourage action on this very useful idea.

The proposal to create rapid reaction forces involves a number of fundamental issues which will require very thorough consideration, both conceptually and practically. This consideration would obviously require us to take into account the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter. As President Yeltsin stated at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Russia is prepared to conclude an agreement with the Security Council to provide national military contingents for United Nations operations. If this example is followed by a sufficient number of other States, we could move towards realizing the concept of United Nations armed forces. In this case it is particularly important that we should give the Military Staff Committee, which is intended to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements, not only formal, but substantive work. It would also be useful to analyse the Committee's potential to further the work of the Secretariat in developing the Agenda for Peace.

The Russian delegation would like to express its support for the proposals in the report on ways to resolve problems relating to the material and technical supply of peace-keeping operations, the proper training and preparation of personnel, and the creation of effective information capacity when planning future operations. The influence on public opinion and political decisions of information disseminated about conflicts is too great for this problem to be underestimated.

The current definition of security cannot be separated from the idea of sustainable development. From this point of view, it seems to us that the Secretary-General is right to want further to develop the concept of post-conflict peace-building and to create structures that will make it possible to consolidate peace after the achievement of a political settlement. A certain impetus might be given by drawing up parameters and practical arrangements for post-conflict peace-building, whose tasks and significance can be compared in scope to the post-war international Trusteeship system. We also noted the new variation of this major issue proposed by the Secretary-General, described in the report as preventive peace-building. We believe that this is a very far-sighted and justifiable approach. As the report indicates, it would be desirable to carefully study the whole range of possibilities open to the United Nations to carry out both preventive and post-conflict peace-building, based on major improvements in coordination and on the division of labour between all relevant organs and institutions, taking into account the sphere of competency of each.

We should also encourage the Secretary-General's efforts to implement "micro-disarmament". To this end, we could make use of the machinery of the Register of Conventional Arms, among others. We are convinced that in the field of "macro-disarmament", particularly with respect to non-proliferation, the United Nations and the Security Council can make a more active contribution. We hope that it will be possible to study the Secretary-General's ideas on these matters as well.

The report's analysis of the consequences of resort to sanctions reflects the concerns expressed by most members of the United Nations. Other speakers have already referred to this. On this issue, it is important that we be clear about the goals of the sanctions imposed, the need for a timely agreement on precise conditions and machinery for lifting them once they have fulfilled their purpose, the inadmissibility of tightening sanctions if that would hinder the process of a political settlement, and the vital need to consider humanitarian factors.

The report also indicates the urgent need to consider the problem of sanctions and to take concrete measures, particularly in connection with Article 50 of the Charter. We are prepared to consider the creation of a special mechanism within the Secretariat, with well-defined functions and tasks, to address sanctions issues. In such work, it is also important to call upon both the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and, at the intergovernmental level, the Economic and Social Council, taking into account the possibilities afforded by Article 65 of the Charter.

The future international security system will be truly stable only if we can find effective machinery for resolving problems at all their levels: national, regional

and global. Sharing responsibilities among these levels will allow the United Nations to retain its flexible, efficiently operating structure.

In this connection, we support the further strengthening of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, maintaining the statutory role and responsibility of the Security Council. We support the continued practice of the Secretary-General's convening meetings of the leaders of regional organizations with a view to broadening their experience of cooperation with the United Nations and between themselves. We believe that it is particularly important to establish working relations between the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States, which is one such regional organization. Undoubtedly, in all instances of regional peace-keeping carried out on the basis of voluntary regional agreements and arrangements in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter, United Nations involvement should be on the basis of voluntary, equitable cooperation without any monitoring or attempt to interfere in the settlement process, without having responsibility — political and financial — for the outcome of that process.

As to financing, we support the report's ideas on a thorough evaluation of human, material and financial resources available for pursuing current operations or establishing new ones. In considering this sensitive issue in the future we might take an inventory of all United Nations peace-keeping activities. This would eventually help us to direct the available limited resources to issues that pose a real challenge to peace and security and to refrain from using funds where no such threat exists or where the parties themselves have for decades been reluctant to seek a political solution.

The Russian delegation believes that the discussion begun today on the Secretary-General's report will be continued, allowing the Security Council to take substantive and useful decisions on the future role of the United Nations in these matters.

Mr. Martínez Blanco (Honduras): I wish first, on behalf of the Central American countries, to convey our deepest condolences to the people and Government of Japan for the recent tragedy in that brotherly country. We offer that nation our solidarity and cooperation, within our modest resources.

We fully endorse the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia in his capacity as Coordinator of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Central American delegations wish to thank the Secretary-General for submitting his "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations".

It is an honour for my delegation to address this Council on behalf of the countries which make up the Central American Group.

In recent years the international community has witnessed profound changes in the work of this world Organization, such as its adoption of a new approach to, and new concepts on, the maintenance of international peace and security, the promotion of economic and social development as the foundation of lasting peace, and environmental sustainability. These activities currently shape the work of our Organization and will obviously determine the role which it will play in international relations in the years to come.

Of all these activities, the new peace-keeping operations monopolize a great portion of the United Nations agenda and, because of their complexity, a large share of its endeavours and financial resources. Although the Charter contains no provision defining those activities, they are the instruments which enable the Security Council, in coordination with the Secretary-General, to fulfil its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security once all the ways and means for the peaceful settlement of disputes envisaged in Chapter VI of the Charter have been exhausted.

We believe that its peace-keeping operations have made the United Nations an essential factor in international relations, since they enable it to contribute creatively to removing the root causes of conflict while upholding democratic values and ensuring respect for human rights. The tasks of the new peace-keeping operations are not limited to monitoring cease-fires or the cessation of hostilities between the parties in conflict, as was the case with traditional peace operations. They may include, depending on the circumstances, the participation of United Nations forces in the protection of humanitarian operations, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia, or in various matters pertaining to civil order provided for in agreements negotiated between the parties, or at the request of Governments, as with the

operations in El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique, to name but a few.

In any event, whether in traditional or new operations encompassing a broad range of civil activities envisaged in negotiated agreements, the three principles on which peace-keeping operations are based must be observed: the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force, except in self-defence.

Mandates that may require the use of force should have the consent of the parties and should be extensively analysed by the Security Council, given their serious political and economic costs as well as the obvious risk they may entail for the peace-keeping forces, which may not have the necessary capability and training. In this regard, we agree with the Secretary-General's statement in the "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" that international problems cannot be solved quickly or within a limited time and that it is necessary to resist the temptation to use military power to speed them up. Resorting to the use of force should be considered *a posteriori* and as a last resort in peace-keeping.

Since 1992, when the Secretary-General submitted his report "An Agenda for Peace", not only were the foundations laid for a systematic process of concrete reform in this Organization, but a conceptual framework also emerged in which to undertake in-depth reflection on the Charter's purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The report "An Agenda for Peace" continues to constitute the basis that has enabled Member States to propose consistent reforms aimed at formulating strategies and mechanisms leading to the early and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Some of the measures adopted by the Secretary-General, including the strengthening of permanent consultations with the Security Council, the establishment of an early-warning mechanism that could be used in situations that endanger international peace and security, the constitution of fact-finding missions and the establishment of regular meetings with troop-contributing countries are all measures that strengthen the capacity of the Security Council in carrying out its overall political direction of peace-keeping operations.

One of the measures that the Secretary-General has suggested to increase the peace-keeping capacity of the United Nations, given the seriousness of not having adequate troops and equipment available, is the setting up of a rapid reaction force as a strategic reserve of the Security Council, for deployment whenever there was an emergency need to prevent a crisis from escalating. On this point, the Government of Honduras and the Governments of the other Central American countries have taken note of the difficulties and obstacles faced by peace operations in particular instances and therefore share the idea of a rapid reaction force as well as the adoption of measures to improve its capacity in terms of equipment, training and intelligence capability of troops intended for peace operations. At the same time, we believe that there should be further clarification of the circumstances and situations in which that force would be deployed.

We believe that an essential element throughout "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" is the decision-making process in the Security Council, which should be as transparent as possible. The Security Council must improve its consultation mechanisms and offer more opportunities for countries affected by Council decisions to present their positions and to make them known before informal consultations begin.

We support preventive diplomacy and peacemaking as techniques that make it possible to identify potential areas of conflict, the offer of good offices when conflicts are still developing and crisis resolution before they degenerate into armed confrontation. We believe that consolidating the tasks of preventive diplomacy in the Secretariat's Department of Political Affairs was a measure of singular importance for achieving those ends. Equally important is its coordination with the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, whether in terms of establishing a peace-keeping operation or of alleviating the suffering resulting from conflict.

We also believe that it is crucial to make extensive use of the services of Special Representatives or Envoys in fact-finding or good-offices missions, bearing in mind the current increase in intra-State conflicts, especially in Africa and Europe. Given the lower cost of these missions as compared with the enormous cost of war in terms of human suffering and material damage, we believe that financial support should be forthcoming for these activities, and we encourage the Secretary-General to continue to carry them out.

Timely information to all States represented at the United Nations about peace operations will no doubt contribute to substantial support by the international community for the actionsof the Secretary-General and

the Security Council. This information should not only be timely, but in an appropriate form, so that every State can express its point of view on each case, whether writing to the Secretariat or at plenary meetings of the Council, so that Members may have broad and general information at their disposal before they take decisions.

The activities involved in post-conflict peace-building are among the most important instruments available to the Organization in promoting peace and security, because they lay down the foundations for lasting peace. We agree with the Secretary-General that all the activities which constitute this phase should be entrusted to multifunctional operations until normality is restored, when these tasks may be taken over by the programmes, funds, offices and agencies of the United Nations system active in the economic, social, humanitarian and human rights fields.

Central America is today an example of a movement from war to peace and from peace to democracy, and now we are working intensively on regional integration programmes to achieve sustainable development. We hope that the United Nations and the international community will continue to support the efforts of our countries to that end.

With regard to disarmament as an instrument for international peace and security, we, together with the Non-Aligned Movement, adhere to the principle that general and complete disarmament can be attained only in the multilateral forum provided by this Organization. We believe that the elimination of the manufacture, use and threat of use of weapons of mass destruction will help to foster regional and world peace and security, as the Council recognized in resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968 and reiterated in its Summit declaration of 31 January 1992, when it stated that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. In this regard, we consider it essential that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) be indefinitely and unconditionally extended at the Conference of the Parties to be held this year.

In his supplementary report the Secretary-General refers to "micro-disarmament", which we consider relevant both for the prevention of outbreaks of conflicts and for the process of post-conflict peace-building. We agree with his statement that the proliferation, trade and use of light arms and anti-personnel mines not only fuel conflicts, but also sap the limited resources of the countries that acquire them, which are usually developing countries. In this respect, we endorse the Secretary-General's appeal for continued priority to be given to the problem of the proliferation and export of anti-personnel mines and for the States producing them to declare a moratorium on their production and export.

With regard to sanctions as coercive measures for the resolution of conflicts, we believe that when such sanctions are imposed they should be accompanied by measures that curtail their adverse effect on the civilian population and third countries. We therefore agree with the recommendations that when the Council imposes sanctions it should at the same time adopt measures to facilitate the work of the humanitarian agencies that assist sectors of the population affected by sanctions, and that a mechanism should be established to assess the collateral damage to third States, with a view to assisting those States, in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter.

The United Nations has more experience in peace-keeping than any other body. It has the structures for establishing, financing and directing such operations. On the other hand, regional organizations, with the exception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, lack these structures, and for the most part their financial situation is worse than that of the United Nations. This situation remains an obstacle to regional organizations' assuming, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, a leading role in peace-keeping functions.

Consultations, diplomatic support through what have come to be called "Friends of the Secretary-General" or contact groups, technical or operational support, joint deployment of field missions and joint operations have all given proof of valuable and varied cooperation. We believe that in this area the Secretary-General should continue to hold periodic meetings, such as the one held on 1 August 1994, with the heads of regional organizations that have cooperated in peace-making and peace-keeping activities in order to assess that cooperation, with a view to augmenting it in the future.

Financing is one of the most important factors affecting the implementation of peace-keeping operations. As we all know, the demand for peace-keeping operations has grown in recent years, and the more extensive and complex the operations are, the greater the need for financial resources to be invested. The statistics on the costs of peace operations provided to us by the Secretary-General speak for themselves: they show that the sizeable increase in such costs exceeds to an alarming degree the budget for development activities.

On this point, we wish to draw attention to some elements that should be given serious study: first, for developing countries, the financial burden of having to make *pro rata* contributions to peace-keeping operations; secondly, the diversion to these operations of resources intended for economic and social development activities in those countries; and, thirdly, the cutbacks in the programmes of United Nations specialized agencies when developing countries find it impossible to make regular contributions to them.

These are some of the problems underlying the high cost of peace operations. We therefore believe that a balance should be sought between the cost of these activities and the cost of economic and social development activities.

Finally, it is fitting to recall today the statement of the Security Council on the occasion of the first Summit meeting, where the members of the Council agreed that the world now has its best opportunity to achieve peace and security since the very creation of the United Nations. At that meeting members of the Council undertook the commitment to work in close cooperation with the Member States of the Organization in their efforts to solve their problems, in particular those pertaining to economic and social development. They also acknowledged that peace and prosperity are indivisible and that lasting peace and stability call for effective international cooperation to eradicate poverty and promote a better life for all within a broader concept of freedom.

Mrs. Albright (United States of America): Let me join my colleagues in expressing my appreciation for the Secretary-General's timely and thought-provoking paper on ways to improve the peace and security role of the United Nations. The Secretary-General's observations are instructive, and they provide a useful summary of where we now stand in our collective effort to make United Nations peace-keeping a more effective instrument of collective security.

I particularly want to echo the Secretary-General's praise for the courage of United Nations peace-keepers, both military and civilian. They have performed ably, under what are often harsh circumstances and at considerable risk and sacrifice. They have earned the gratitude of us all.

Today I want to expand on the preliminary assessment I gave to the Secretary-General when he first presented his report to us earlier this month. In offering my Government's perspective on past lessons and future challenges, let me begin by saying that the Secretary-General has correctly pointed out that we are still in a time of transition.

Transitions go on for a long time. Certainly we can all hope that the upheavals in global politics triggered by the end of the cold war several years ago will soon pass. But the experience of the last six years suggests that, unfortunately, turbulence, unrest and sometimes violent change will be with us for a protracted period. This means that all of us — the Member States, the Secretary-General and regional organizations, as well as the public — must learn to accept a new reality.

As much as we might wish it and need it, a new order of international affairs is not just around the corner. Our task is to make sense of the current era and learn to adjust our policies so that we may pursue the goal of a more secure world despite the turbulence we see around us.

The 21 United Nations peace-keeping operations established since 1988 — some of which have now been shut down — attest to the leadership of the Council and the willingness of the international community as a whole to address security concerns. But the results of our efforts to date have been mixed: success in Namibia, Iraq, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique; accomplishments diluted by frustration in Bosnia and Somalia; slow progress in Western Sahara; disappointment, now overtaken by the beginning of hope, in Angola; and grim tragedy in Rwanda.

Each of these missions has its own unique history, with unique factors contributing to the outcome. But, taken together, they provide a number of lessons which we would do well to heed.

Perhaps the most important lesson is that peace-keeping operations inside a country make different and greater demands on peace-keepers than do missions that separate two hostile States. Here the rules of peace-keeping may be harder to apply. The contending parties can be difficult to define or identify and are often self-selecting. Their "consent" to the terms of a peace-keeping mandate may be given and withdrawn; factional leaders may be unable to control followers; peace-keepers may be forced to choose between passivity in the face of destructive breaches of a mandate and forceful responses they are ill equipped to carry out.

As the Secretary-General has pointed out, these conditions entail considerable risk to peace-keepers. They complicate prospects for mission success and they may result in missions that fail to meet expectations. The reality is that we will continue to face situations in which we will want to conduct peace-keeping in accordance with the traditional rules but where there will be no guarantee that operations so conducted will be adequate.

The recent successfully concluded mission in Mozambique, however, may help point the way. An extremely able and activist Secretary-General's Special Representative was supported by a well-organized and tightly coordinated donor community willing to apply leverage at key points, by intense diplomatic activity on the scene by a handful of influential countries with long-standing relations with the parties, and by a strong and supportive community of non-governmental organizations.

More generally, United Nations experience from Angola, Liberia and Somalia, and elsewhere, suggests additional adjustments in tactics. One of these should be a willingness to delay the start of a mission until the parties accept and observe for a trial period military and political steps towards a negotiated settlement. Refinements in the composition and resources provided to peace-keeping missions in intra-State conflicts are also needed in order to increase their political capacity while reducing costly and sometimes less critical military elements.

Broadly speaking, this may mean more observers and others with specialized skills, and less infantry. At the same time, we must ensure that missions have adequate support in the areas of transportation, communications and logistics to ensure that timely and appropriate responses to developments occur.

Another important lesson of recent years is the need for rigorous decision-making in deciding whether, and how, to initiate a peace operation. Over the past year, the Security Council has begun, with my Government's strong support, to ask tough questions about the cost, mandate, scope, risk and duration of proposed operations before Council action occurs.

The goal is to ensure that United Nations missions have clear and realistic objectives, that peace-keepers are equipped properly, that money is not wasted and that an endpoint to United Nations action can be identified. The new policy is working, and has resulted in fewer and smaller new operations, and better management of existing ones.

The success of our policy is the result of hard work by the Member States, the Security Council and the Secretary-General. All of us should be pleased. But I also believe we need to work harder to define more clearly the relative roles and responsibilities of the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the area of peace operations.

There should be no doubt about the Security Council's responsibility for peace operations. I cannot accept the statement by the Secretary-General that the Security Council is engaged in micro-management because it seeks information about a peace operation. It is the Council's responsibility to create peace operations, to extend them, to alter them if necessary, and to terminate them if warranted. Those decisions can be made only on the basis of complete, accurate and timely information provided by the Secretariat. There should be no question about providing such information.

As I indicated in my original comments, we must also guard against any inclination to suggest that every time a United Nations operation succeeds it is due to the United Nations as an organization but when a mission runs into trouble it is the fault of the Member States.

A third important area of United Nations experience in recent years relates to the appropriate use of force by United Nations peace-keepers. The Secretary-General's paper maintains, and we fully agree, that peace-keeping and peace enforcement are not adjacent points on a continuum.

The challenge of keeping peace is far different and far simpler than the challenge of creating a secure environment in the midst of ongoing conflict. The precedent of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, where peace-enforcement tasks were given to a lightly armed force equipped only for peace-keeping, should not be repeated. Instead, the Council may continue, at times, to look to regional organizations or to individual Member States or ad-hoc coalitions when peace enforcement is required. The recent French action in Rwanda helped to stabilize the situation there and saved thousands of lives. In Haiti, the multinational force led by the United States has restored democratic rule, eased the humanitarian crisis and created a stable and secure environment.

It is essential, of course, that when the Council does turn to individual Member States or coalitions it retain the capacity to monitor such operations to ensure that

they are conducted in accordance with accepted international principles.

The Secretary-General's paper discusses only briefly one element of enforcement action that merits more consideration: the collaboration of regional military bodies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with United Nations peace-keeping forces, such as UNPROFOR). Given the experience, it is important we work together to develop reliable procedures for making such coordination operate more smoothly and effectively in support of Council objectives.

Another potential tool of conflict resolution is peace-building: the use of economic and social measures directed at the seeds of conflict. While a component of several recent multi-functional missions and of various aid programmes, the strategy has not been fully developed or exploited. The obstacles are familiar ones. Reluctant Governments may resist preventive measures or a continuing United Nations role after a conflict. Independent donor organizations must be persuaded to adjust policies and programmes. When peace-building is an element of peace-keeping, the task of coordinating human rights activities, targeted aid such as jobs programmes, judicial and other institutional reforms, development of social organizations has been difficult for the United Nations. Moreover, when a peace-keeping mission ends and there is no special representative to serve as the focal point, the continuity and coherence of peace-building efforts can be lost.

None of these problems is insurmountable. We should, however, be realistic in our expectations. Some situations may require more assistance than the international community can reasonably provide. But even seeking to accomplish realistic objectives requires reorganizing the way the international community responds to security-related concerns.

We must widen the scope of related issues and increase options for addressing them. A modest, but consequential, step, which I proposed some 18 months ago, would be to explore a mechanism whereby the Economic and Social Council could work in partnership with the Security Council to better identify and address economic and social tensions before the outbreak of conflict or after its conclusion.

The Secretary-General's paper contains also a valuable discussion of the Security Council's use of economic sanctions. My Government shares the concern expressed in the paper about the desirability of avoiding or reducing unintended and harmful collateral effects of sanctions. It should be noted, however, that every sanctions regime approved by the Council permits delivery of humanitarian supplies. And if there is humanitarian suffering as a result of sanctions, let us place blame where it belongs — not on the Security Council but on the Government whose policies caused us to act.

Procedures designed to mitigate the unintended effects of sanctions should not be allowed to obstruct or so mitigate their effect as to render them useless as a means for influencing the behaviour of a Government that is defying the international community and law. Sanctions may be a blunt instrument, but they can be a useful one, and they are less blunt than the alternative, which is, all too often, the use of military force.

My Government hopes that this fiftieth anniversary year of the United Nations will mark continued improvements in the overall capacity of the United Nations to conduct and manage peace operations. Much has been accomplished over the last two years. We now have a reinforced Headquarters staff, Offices of Operations, and of Planning and Support, a 24-hour Situation Centre, a Training Unit, a Policy and Analysis Unit, a Mission Planning Service, peace-keeping stand-by arrangements and a forward logistical base and storage depot.

Despite these advances, further major progress is required. Readiness, as our experience in Rwanda so sadly demonstrated, is another. On this point, my Government questions whether the rapid reaction force proposed in the Secretary-General's paper is the right course of action at this time. Setting aside national forces for this exclusive purpose may result in high continuing costs at relatively little benefit.

We do, however, welcome efforts to eliminate costly delays in deploying United Nations missions once they have been authorized. For example, we support a rapidly deployable Headquarters team, a composite initial logistics support unit and an effort to develop a contracted standing lift capability.

We also look forward to improvements in the quality and readiness of United Nations forces through regional initiatives and bilateral cooperative arrangements, and for improving United Nations public affairs support for peace-keeping in theatre. The Special

Committee on Peace-keeping Operations has highlighted the need for action in many of these areas.

Along with such enhancements in peace-keeping capacity, further steps to assure more efficient use of peace-keeping funds are necessary. In particular, standardization of personnel costs and better systems for peace-keeping mission cost control, accountability and procurement must be adopted.

The question of finance is critical to the United Nations ability to meet its peace and security responsibilities. One important dimension of this relates to the authorization of expenditures for new peace-keeping missions. Since 1992 the Secretary-General and groups of Member States repeatedly have emphasized the need to streamline start-up funding in a way that preserves accountability but avoids costly and dangerous delays in beginning missions.

This remains essential; action should be taken this year. We also hope to see further movement towards annualization of peace-keeping budgets and the introduction of a unified budget for all peace-keeping activities.

On a related matter, as my Government explained in a detailed statement to the General Assembly on 12 December 1994, the United States will work with other Members to devise a more fair and reliable system for financing peace-keeping, including a reduction in the United States share to 25 per cent.

These remarks on the United Nations peace and security role would not be complete without underscoring the importance my Government attaches to the issue of proliferation. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the indispensable cornerstone for assuring a more stable environment.

The NPT entered into force in 1970, and today, with nearly 170 Parties, is the most widely adhered to arms control agreement that is global in scope. As such, it serves as the principle international legal and political barrier to nuclear proliferation. It is my hope that those countries represented here today will join in giving the strongest support to the Treaty at the upcoming NPT Review Conference by voting for its unconditional extension. Few acts would go as far in promoting global peace and stability.

In addition, as the Secretary-General indicates in his report, we need to take steps to control the proliferation of weapons that may kill in smaller numbers but contribute hugely to the violence and destruction we see today in so many corners of the world. In this regard, my Government welcomed warmly the General Assembly resolution calling for a global moratorium on and eventual elimination of all anti-personnel landmines.

Finally, let me make a point that is sometimes overlooked. While it is common to talk about the dramatic rise in peace-keeping, beginning in early 1992, the reality is that the growth has slowed and levelled off. In 1994 total peace-keeping personnel peaked at over 90,000. But during the past year the Security Council voted to end three missions, no major new operations were begun, and by year's end peace-keeping personnel had declined to 63,000. Nearly two-thirds of those now deployed on peace operations are in the former Yugoslavia. More than half of the current missions consist of fewer than 200 observers or peace-keepers.

I emphasize this trend not because we expect peace-keeping forces and costs to fall to historic levels. After all, the imminent mission in Haiti and the potential one in Angola will temporarily reverse this decline. Rather, I want to stress that, as the Security Council has learned some of the lessons of successful peace-keeping, it has grown more determined to apply them to proposals for new missions, or extensions of existing ones.

At the same time, other tools and options, such as preventive action and diplomacy or regional initiatives within a United Nations framework, are emerging, and some have been effective.

This is the direction I see for the future: an international community that has more and better choices for peace and security action but that provides reliable support for actions it asks the United Nations to undertake.

In closing, let me say that I have listened carefully to the comments of other members of the Council and I will listen to those by other members this afternoon. I would hope that our discussion of peace-keeping will continue in both open meetings, such as this one, and in informal consultations. Clearly, this issue will also continue to be of great interest in my own Government. Our national dialogue will continue, and I commit myself to work to bring these discussions to the best conclusion possible.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): There are still several speakers on my list. In view of the lateness of the hour, with the Council's consent, I shall suspend the meeting now. The Council will resume consideration of the item at 3.15 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 1.30 p.m.